


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Ph.D, 1934.

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'Caliphate and Kingship in Medieval Persia'.

Thesis presented for the

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I N T R O D U C T I O N .

The original purposes with which this Thesis was undertaken were: (1) to survey the development in the eastern Islāmic provinces of the theory of the Sultānate and its relations with the Caliphate, from the time when the classical theory of the undivided temporal sovereignty of the Caliphs had broken down, to the establishment of the Safavid dynasty; (2) to correlate these theoretical expositions with the actual course of events, showing to what extent theory and practice were in agreement or opposition and reacted on one another.

While the general outlines of such a survey are already to be found in the standard works of Barthold ("Caliph & Sultān") published in Russian in Mir Islāmā, St. Petersburg 1912) and Arnold ("The Caliphate", Oxford, 1924), neither work deals with these particular aspects of the subject with the fulness which is desirable for a satisfactory conclusion on the problem.

After a survey of the subject in general and of the material already available, I found it necessary to divide the work into three sections: (1) a historical survey of the relations between the Caliphate and the independent dynasties in Persia down to 1258 A.D; (2) a similar survey of the functions of the Sultānate between 1258 and 1500 A.D; (3) the development of the theory of the Sultānate. The wide extent of the ground to be covered compelled me to limit myself for the present to the first section alone, together with a preliminary discussion of the contemporary development of political theory.

The object of the present Thesis therefore is to show the circumstances and the steps by which the provincial Amirs in Persia became independent of the Abbasid Caliphate; how as a necessary consequence of the curtailment of the temporal power of the Caliphate by the Shi'ās, the Sultanate was created by the Sunnis; and how the inevitable conflict between the two institutions brought the downfall of the Abbasid Caliphate in Persia.

In treating the subject, certain minor dynasties, especially of the Shi'ās, and the Ghaznevīds after Masūd, have been left out, since they had no direct bearing on the subject.

The absence of all the official records both at the centre and the provinces, the paucity of information regarding the actual subject, and the length of the period covered, have rendered my task extremely difficult. In fact, without the official records, it is impossible to establish the true relations between the central and provincial governments; but an effort has been made to throw some new light on the subject by collecting from a variety of sources all the materials bearing on it, in much fuller detail than has previously been done.

Abstract of a Thesis for the degree of Ph.D. (1934).

Subject:- "Caliphate and Kingship in Medieval Persia."

The Thesis opens with a short survey of the political conditions at Baghdad in the middle of the third/ninth century, showing how far the theory of the functions of the Caliphate corresponded to the actual practice of the time. The "revolt" of the Saffarids by extorting certain concessions from the Caliphate began the separation of temporal from religious authority, the former being inherited by the Sāmānids who otherwise remained loyal.

The second chapter shows the encroachments of the Buwayhids upon the Caliph's temporal power at Baghdad, and describes the powers that were still retained by the Caliphs. This in turn led to a change of attitude on the part of the Sāmānids who, for political reasons, did not recognize certain Caliphs appointed by the Buwayhids but continued to recognize the deposed ones. The substitution for the Sāmānids of Maḥmūd of Ghaznā marks an important step towards the emergence of a Sunni Sultanate, and an enquiry is made into the character and application of the juridical conditions laid down for such governors.

The third chapter describes the setting up a "Universal" Sunni Sultanate invested by the Caliph with full temporal authority in the persons of the Great Saljūqs, and the dual government at Baghdad, with the difficulties which this involved. A new political theory now makes its appearance in the works of Nidhāl al-Mulk and Ghazzālī. In consequence of the wars of succession the Caliphs are able to assert their political independence in

Baghdad and its neighbourhood, but at the cost of a permanent rift with the Sultanate, and a confused situation of claims and counterclaims appears as the political legacy of the Saljūq Sultanate.

The fourth chapter shows the development of the Sultanate with a completely self-constituted institution under the Khwārazm-shāhs, and their adoption not only of an attitude of independence of the Caliphate but even of a claim to control its activities. The destruction of the power of the Khwārazm-shāhs by the Mongols temporarily ends the dispute, but the apparent victory of the Caliphate is an illusion, which vanishes on its own destruction in 656/1258.

.....

CHAPTER. I.

Caliphate and Minor Dynasties of Persia.

In order to form a correct estimate of the relations between the Caliphate and the minor dynasties of Persia down to the establishment of the Buwayhid power, it is necessary to give a general survey of the political condition at Baghdad, which had reduced the already corrupted institution of the Caliphate into a mere formality.

The period under review is marked by the ascendancy of the Turks who through sheer force of circumstances had become absolute masters of the 'Abbasid empire. It was an evil day for the Caliphate when Mu'tasim (218-227/833-842) introduced the Turkish element into the army. The tyranny, lawlessness and the ever-increasing number of the Turks obliged the Caliph to remove the seat of government from Baghdad to Surra Man Ra'â' (Samarra) in 221/836.² The transfer of the seat of government made the position of the Caliphs more precarious than before. Being cut off from the people of Baghdad and surrounded by these savage and self-seeking men of violence, the Caliphate stood in greater danger of being subordinate to the ever-growing power of the Turkish generals than would have been the

1. It means 'gladdened is he who hath beheld it', though a Baghdadi interpretation of the phrase ran: 'Whosoever saw it with the Turks settled there rejoiced at Baghdad being well rid of them. Muir, Caliphate, P. 513.
2. Ibn Athir, VI. P. 319.

case at Baghdad. There it became easy for them to assume the role of Caliph makers and with each new succession they contrived to arrogate increasing authority to themselves. The mischievous seeds sown by the Caliph, Mu'tasim were soon to bear bitter fruits which were reaped by the Caliph Mutawakkil. The latter by his unscrupulous policy of religious persecution had alienated the sympathies of various sections of his people and by his harsh treatment even drove his own son to enter in a conspiracy with the Turks. This cost him his life in 247/86. Though the parricide did not long survive to reap the fruits of the conspiracy, his mischievous act was fraught with evil consequences for his successors. This was the first occasion that an attack was made on the person of a Caliph by the Turk and this act served as the overture to a series of arbitrary appointments, depositions, blindings and murders. This precedent dealt a fatal blow to the traditional respect that was felt for the person of the Caliphs² who were now treated in a most humiliating way. That the Turks had become the virtual masters of the Caliphs can well be illustrated by a story related by the author of Al-Fakhri, Ibn At-Tiqtaqa who says,

1. Tabari, III. P. 1456-~~60~~.

2. But the institution must not be too closely linked with the misfortunes of its holders.

3. The Turks dragged the Caliph Mu'tazz (251-255/866-869) by the feet, and after stripping off his shirt, exposed him to the burning sun. Oppressed by the severe heat, he lifted his feet alternately and the Turks slapped him with their hands. Finally they put him to death. Tabari, III. P. 1710.

"When Mu'tazz was appointed as Caliph, his courtiers held a meeting and summoning the astrologers, asked them how long he (the Caliph) would live and how long he would retain his Caliphate. A wit, present in the gathering said: "I know this thing better than the astrologers". Being asked to specify the time, he replied, "So long as the Turks please", and every one present laughed."¹

Even the re-transfer of the Caliph's court to Baghdad and the short-lived revival of the power of the Caliphate due to the strong personalities of Muwaffaq and his son, the Caliph Mu'tadid (279-289/892-902) could not for long suppress the power of the Turks. No doubt their influence was much lessened nevertheless their support was sought by various prominent wazirs who attained great distinction during this period. Owing to the insecurity of their position all the wazirs with the single honourable exception of 'Alī Ibn 'Īsā used their position more to serve their own ends than the interests of the state. The first object of the executive was the amassing of wealth. Dismissal on account of charges of corruption and consequent confiscations had become the rule so much so that in an indirect way it constituted a new source of income to the state; and a new department had to be opened to deal with it.² The views of one of the greatest wazirs of the time,

1. Ibn At Tiqtaqa, P. 333.

2. Zaydan, trans. Margoliouth, P. 233; quoted from Hilal al Sabi, Kitab al Wuzara, P. 306.

Ibn al Furāt throw sufficient light on the character of most of the high officials of the state. He used to say, "It is better to move the affairs of the king in a wrong direction than to let them stand still aright."¹ In short the whole administration had become so corrupt that it was almost impossible for an honest person to serve the state. In spite of the fact that the empire so badly needed the services of a statesman like 'Alī Ibn 'Īsā, the latter was made to vacate his position several times through the undue influence that worked on the Caliph Muqtadir.²

The final decline of the Abbasid dynasty set in after the murder of Muqtadir in 320/932. The Turkish party came again in power and the same scene was repeated which had occurred after the murder of the Caliph Mutawakkil in 247/861. Such a state of things encouraged many a ruling Amir to extend his influence over Baghdad itself and by making the Caliph a puppet virtually govern the whole empire. A keen conflict arose between various competitors for the mastery of Baghdad and one after the other several of these aspirants held the post of Amīr al-Umarā - an office especially created for them. Since most of the power of the wazir were taken over by the Amīr al-Umarā, the wazirā

1. Zaydan, trans. Margoliouth, P. 232; quoted from Hilāl al Sabī, Kitāb al Wuzara, P. 119.

2. Miskawayh, I. P. 40-41; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 45.

One of the charges which led to the dismissal of 'Alī Ibn 'Īsā from the wazirate on one of these occasions, was that he had not been able to exact the customary fines from discharged officers. Bowen, 'Alī Ibn 'Īsā, P. 145; quoted from Hilāl al Sabī, Kitāb al Wuzara, P. 79. His reply to such demands was

lost its importance and glamour. The jurisdiction of the wazir was restricted to suits between persons unconnected with the government; cases in which officials or soldiers were involved were no longer tried by the wazir as the representative of the Caliph but by the secretary of the Amir.¹ These ambitious Amirs fixed a daily allowance for the Caliph and appropriated all the revenue themselves.² Besides they also introduced the innovation of having their names conjoined along with that of the Caliph in Friday prayers and coinage.³

Although very little actual power was left with the Caliphs by this time yet since they still commanded the respect and prayers of all pious Muslims, it was not safe for any one openly to defy their orders, as that would have entailed the alienation of the sympathies of the public. For this reason the acquisition of power necessitated a judicious compromise between real authority and seeming obedience. In fact the Caliphs though responsible for the administration were no longer in a position to carry it on in their own way; nevertheless orders were still issued in their names while their hands being continually forced by influential Amirs.

 "I will not behave unjustly with officials whom I have trusted."
 Miskawayh, I. P. 43; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 48.

1. Bowen, Ali Ibn Isa, P. 365; quoted from Hilal al Sabi. P. 31.
2. Miskawayh, I. P. 352; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 396.
3. Ibn Athir, VIII. P. 241. Ibn Raiq's name was ordered to be mentioned from all pulpits.
 Both Bachkam and Tuzun's names appear on the coinage minted at Baghdad. Lane Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, P. 190, & Additions, P. 256 respectively.

That this anomalous position at the metropolis of Islām had turned the institution of the Caliphate into a mere figure-head can be easily understood by a glance at the juridical position that the legists of Islām have assigned to the institution; and an examination of its actual working at this time. It is one of the difficulties in the way of the student that no earlier exposition of the office of the Caliphate was written or if written has survived, than that of 'Alī Ibn Muḥammad Al-Māwardī (381-991/450-1058) whose *Al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniya* or 'The laws concerning rulership' was published in the first third of the fifth century. Nevertheless, an examination of Māwardī's book will show that, although it was written at a time when very little political power was left with the Caliph yet the theoretical exposition of the institution which it contains relates in fact, in its main principles, to an earlier period. Since he bases his arguments and conclusions on historical practice and the opinions of earlier jurists, we are justified, in the absence of any strictly contemporary exposition of the function of the Caliph, in accepting his theory (shorn of those peculiar features which evidently reflect the usage of his own times and which will be dealt with later) as representing the juridical view of the pre-Buwayhid period jurists.¹

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1. The analysis of the exposition given by Māwardī and the investigation of the sources and materials from which it was derived is one of the most urgent tasks which requires to be done in the field of Islamic political thought. It forms no part, however, of the subject of the present thesis which begins with the institution already fully developed

According to Māwardī the institution of the Caliphate is considered necessary to provide leadership in succession to the Prophet for the preservation of religion and the administration of temporal affairs.¹ And it is obligatory² on the people to appoint an Imām by the consensus of the community. Although during this period, the people as a whole actually speaking, had not even the slightest hand in the appointment of a Caliph, yet to preserve the form, a show of public ratification was made. The election of a Caliph by the consensus of the community was reduced only to an oath of allegiance taken by the whole of the people either by their consent or otherwise to an already appointed Caliph. The ceremony may be considered quite formal but it was essential for the completion of the election. More importance was attached to the oath of allegiance by important personalities like Qādīs etc. Such persons, on the other hand were very careful about their oath of allegiance

both in theory and practice. For our purposes it is immaterial whether the main principles of Māwardī's exposition go back to the first, second or the third century - since it must be assumed (i) that a definite juridical view of the Caliphate existed by the third century, & (ii) in the absence of any attempt to controvert Māwardī's exposition that the latter did in fact represent that juridical view. However the very fact that Māwardī introduced 'Amirs by force' shows that his main theory regarding the office of the Caliphate did not belong to his own period but to the pre-Buwayhid period.

1. Māwardī, P. 2. From the above description it is evident that the institution had a double function to perform, religious as well as temporal.
2. Māwardī, P. 3. In Māwardī's opinion, the appointment of an Imām is as obligatory as the practice of Jihād or acquisition of knowledge.

and they were averse to doing anything which was against the strict letter of the law.¹

The author says that on the occasion of a vacancy there are two categories of people in the community, the first comprising all those who possess the right of electing the Imām and the other consisting of those who put forward a claim to sovereignty. The electors are supposed to possess the following three qualifications; Uprightness in all its respects; capacity to judge the qualifications that a leader must possess; discretion and good judgment enabling them to choose the person most deserving of the office.² The real electors were in most cases either the Turkish generals or the wazirs; and most of them being unscrupulous and ambitious men were devoid of uprightness in any form; in consequence of this they could not make proper use of the second and third qualifications which, in most cases, they were possessed of. In selecting the Caliph they were actuated by their own personal motives rather than the qualifications of the candidates.³

As regards the qualifications necessary for the office of the Caliph, Māwardī names the following:- 1. Uprightness in all its respects; (2) Requisite Juridico Theological knowledge to determine the significance of points of Shariā in

-
1. Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 93. Qādī Abū Ahmād b. Rashīd refused to pay homage to the Caliph Mu'tazz on the ground that he had withdrawn himself previously.
 2. Māwardī, P. 4.
 3. Examples will be found below.

in difficult cases; (3) Freedom from defects of hearing, sight and speech; (4) Freedom from physical infirmities; (5) Intelligence and sagacity which provide insight for governing the people and conducting the affairs of the state; (6) Courage and boldness to defend the boundaries of the state and to fight the enemies of Islām; (7) Descent from the family of the Quraysh.¹ Since the hereditary system generally prevailed, the field of choice was very limited and the electors had in practice to select from amongst the sons or the brothers of the deceased or dethroned Caliph. Even within this limited circle, no due consideration was paid to the above qualifications in selecting a candidate. To give a colour of legitimacy and regularity a formal proceeding was carried out and the chief dignitaries of the court, military commanders and religious heads were invited to deliberate on the determination of the above points but the choice used to be made by influential persons long before such an assembly was held.² The qualifications Nos. 3 & 4 were duly observed throughout the whole of this period. They were so de-

1. Mawardi, P. 4-5.

2. Miskawayh, I. P. 3; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 2.

While electing the successor of the Caliph Muktafi the wazir asked the opinion of important persons, amongst others of Ibn al Furāt who said, "Why should you introduce a man who will govern, and knows our resources, who will administer affairs himself, and regard himself as independent? Why not deliver the empire to a man who will leave you to administer it. It was owing to such considerations that the candidature of Abu'l 'Abbās 'Abd Allāh son of Mu'tazz was rejected, and Muqtadir who was of tender age was elected. In the same way when Munis urged the candidature of the son of Muqtadir, Abu'l

rooted in the minds of the people that the blinding of a claimant was considered quite enough to prevent him from succeeding to the throne. The seventh qualification was the most essential and was most rigidly observed. The strict adherence of the Sunni sect to this last qualification was due to several supposed traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. The claims of the Abbasid family were further strengthened by various supposed traditions put forward in their favour.² It was chiefly due to these settled traditions that the Turks though masters of every thing, could not conceive of putting up a candidate outside the family of 'Abbās. This limitation caused the Abbasid family to be regarded in some sort as sacred in the minds of all Sunni people and it was primarily due to this that an appearance of political unity was preserved throughout the Sunni Muslim world (Spain excepted).

Māwardī holds the indivisible character of the Caliphate when he says, "That at one time there cannot be more than one Imām"³. This principle was strictly observed by the Sunnis, and its observance gave further stability to the institution of the

'Abbās, he was successfully opposed by Abu Yāqūb Ishāq b. Ismā'īl Nubakhti in the following words, "After all the trouble which we have taken to get rid of a sovereign with a mother and an aunt and eunuch are we going to have the same thing over again?" Miskawayh, I. P. 242; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 273.

1. Suyūṭī, trans. Jarrett, P. 8. "The Princes shall be of the Quraysh the just among them rulers of the just, and the wicked rulers of the wicked".
2. Suyūṭī, trans. P. 13. It is related from Abū Hurayrā that the Apostle of God said to 'Abbās, "In you shall rest prophecy and sovereignty".
3. Māwardī, P. 7.

of the Caliphate. Again in order to legalise the despotic character of the institution which resulted from the hereditary system, the author upholds the practice by which the reigning Caliph appoints his own successor.¹⑥

According to Māwardī there are ten duties to be performed by a Caliph: (1) To uphold the fundamental principles of the Muslim religion; (2) To decide law-suits and to settle disputes; (3) To defend Muslim territories; (4) To administer the penal law; (5) To guard the frontiers by keeping garrisons and making preparations for war; (6) To fight those who refuse to accept Islām or to submit upon terms laid down for non-Muslims; (7) To levy taxes and imposts according to law; (8) To pay the annuity from the state treasury; (9) To appoint trustworthy men and councillors for the administration of different districts and for fiscal purposes; and (10) To personally inspect and control the administration.² If the Caliphs discharged and fulfilled these duties the people were required to discharge two duties on their part: (1) To render him obedience; and (2) To render him assistance.³ It is obvious that no Caliph, during this period of degeneration did nor could fulfil all the conditions laid down by the jurists, but the provision

1. Māwardī, P. 5.

2. Cremer, *The Orient under the Caliphs*, trans. Khudā Bakhsh, P. 265-266; quoted from Māwardī, P. 15.

3. Māwardī, P. 16.

for deposing a defaulting Caliph could not be made operative owing to the lack of power to enforce it, and to support of the interested persons who were responsible for raising a candidate to the throne of sovereignty. The two chief causes which involved forfeiture were deterioration of morals and physical infirmities.¹ The provision for deposition due to the first cause was an useful instrument in the hands of the interested parties. As long as the Caliph complied with their demands no one questioned his morals but the moment he did not agree with them his morals were called in question; and he was asked to vacate the throne by self-deposition. His consent was taken forcibly and attested by the Qādīs before he was brought before an assembly to declare his own deposition. If the Caliph did not agree to the arrangement settled by the interested parties, he was threatened with death or blinded.²

Under such conditions the absolute obedience claimed on behalf of the Caliphate from the governors could not be expected. The first dynasty which challenged the political supremacy of the Abbasid Caliphate in Persia was that of the Saffarids whose relations with the Caliphate we will now trace.

1. Māwardī, P. 16.

2. Misk. I. P. 290-91; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 330-31.

On the occasion of the deposition of the Caliph Qādir, the Qādī who was sent to attest the document declaring the former's abdication, was very much upset when the Caliph refused to submit. The Qādī said, "What use it was to summon us to a man who had not been forced to submit. On hearing this, Ali Ibn Isā remarked, "His conduct is notorious and therefore he must be deposed". To this the Qādī replied, "It is not for us to establish dynasties. that is accomplished by the men of the swords. We are only suited and required for attestation. The next morning the Caliph was found blinded.

The last ruler of the Tāhirid dynasty¹ was Muḥammad b. Tāhir (248-259/862-872) who ruled Khurāsān and also Sijistān as one of its appendages. He was a prince of tender years and was more devoted to his own pleasure than the administration of the country.² The central government at Baghdad was also paralysed by the tyranny and dissensions of the Turks. The politic

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1. It is a mistake to think that the Tāhirids revolted or ever became independent of the Caliphate. No doubt Tāhir the founder of the dynasty by dropping the name of the Caliph from the Khuṭbā signified his intentions to sever all connections from the Caliphate, but this desperate attempt on the part of Tāhir was the outcome of mutual mistrust and lack of confidence between the Caliph Māmūn and Tāhir. However, the latter's attempt was nipped in the bud by the sudden and premature removal of Tāhir himself from the scene, either from natural causes or from poison believed to have been administered to him by a slave girl who was presented to Tāhir ~~whose~~ by Māmūn with such instructions. (Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, I. P. 653). This attempt was never repeated by any of the successors of Tāhir, whose appointment to the governorship of Khurāsān was not due to any other reasons but their own merits and loyalty to the Baghdad government. That the Tāhirids were not independent of the Caliphate is easily proved by the amount of tribute they sent to Baghdad. In 221/836 Abd Allāh in whose time the dynasty had reached its zenith, bound himself to pay thirty eight million dirhams out of an annual income of forty eight millions, which according to Tabarī, was the amount received in the year of Abd Allāh's death from all sources. (Bib. Geog. Arab. VI. P. 250 and Tabarī, III. P. 1338-39 respectively). The Tāhirids being orthodox Sunnis were staunch supporters of the Abbasid Caliphate; and both in their capacity as governors of Khurāsān and as military governors of Baghdad (an office which became hereditary in their family), their interests were on the whole identical with those of the Caliphate. They helped the institution in all its activities, and by crushing all anti-Caliphate movement, alleviated its troubles to a great extent. They waged wars against non-Muslims provided due facilities to the pilgrim caravans and ruled their territories in accordance with strict laws of Sharīʿa (Tabarī, III. PP. 1046-1062). However the sudden decline of the Caliphate coincided with their own decline and therefore they were not in a position to take advantage of the disruption that followed the murder of the Caliph Mutawakkil in 247/861 even if they had waited for such opportunity.
 2. Gardizi, P. 10.

condition of the Caliphate being thus weakened both at the centre as well as in the Persian provinces, the Khārijites resumed their activities and robbed the people of the peace and security to which they had been accustomed during the rule of the Tāhirids before Muḥammad b. Tāhir. Although the details of the situation in Sijistān are not clear, it would seem that a band of volunteers, called Muṭawwiā was formed to protect the people from the depredations of the Khārijites. At the head of these volunteers stood one Dirham b. Naṣr b. Ṣālih who seized Zarang, drove out the Tāhirid prefect Ibrāhīm b. Ḥusayn from Sijistān and ultimately made himself the master of the province. These volunteers had set up a sort of democracy and the most able and deserving person from amongst themselves was elected as their chief. Thus this organisation gave an opportunity to any person possessed of real talents to come to the forefront. Yāqūb, the son of a copper-smith and the founder of the Ṣaffar dynasty, belonging to the town of Qarnin in Sijistān near Zarang was one of the volunteers of the Muṭawwiā; and through his intrepidity, boldness and organising capacity, found his way to its leadership.² When once Yāqūb became the leader he soon showed

1. Noldeke, P. 177.

2. According to the usual account, Yāqūb by killing in a single combat the most dreaded captain of the Khārijites named Ammān gave the first practical proof of his bravery, which led him to such eminence among his fellows that Dirham thought it expedient to leave the leadership to Yāqūb by settling out to Mecca for the pilgrimage and finally settling down in Baghdad (Noldeke P. 178). According to Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 124, Dirham was captured by the Tāhirid governor and sent to Baghdad where he served the Caliph.

his organising capacity and administrative ability. His energetic suppression of the robber bands and the security he obtained for traffic won for him the admiration of all, and his exercise of the principles of equality amongst his followers enabled him to win the support of the poor Sijistānīs, whose national pride was no doubt gratified by the emergence of a leader who was from amongst themselves.

Though the Abbasid Caliphate stood in theory for the principle of impartiality they did not treat the Muslims on the whole on terms of equality. As the Umayyads had favoured the Arabs, so the Abbāsids favoured the Khurāsānians and neglected the interests both of the Arabs and of the other peoples of Persia.¹ This partiality was hardly to be tolerated; and thus we see this new movement, originally started to suppress the Khārijites, eventually turned against the weak administration of the Tāhirids themselves and ultimately against the Caliphate which supported them in all their doings.

Yāqūb and his brother Amr had no religious compunction in opposing the Abbasid Caliphate when it could not establish justice and equity in Sijistān. Their attitude towards the institution of the Caliphate can be well explained by the reply of Yāqūb when he was asked by Muḥammad b. Tāhir for a deed of investiture from the Caliph at the time of his conquest of Khurāsān.

1. The Abbasids owing to the support given to them by the Khurāsānians were bound to give them all high positions in Persia and the government of other provinces.

Khurāsān. Yāqūb drew his sword from under his prayer carpet and told the messenger of Muḥammad that that was his deed and authority.¹ The same attitude was shown by 'Amr at the time of his receiving the deed of investiture for the province of Māwarā al-Nahr. When the deed was presented to 'Amr, the latter asked the messenger what it meant. On receiving the envoy's explanation that it was the thing he had asked for from the Caliph, 'Amr replied, 'Of what use will it be to me?! The province cannot be taken from the hands of Ismā'īl the Sāmānīd except with the aid of a hundred thousand naked swords."² No doubt Yāqūb and his brother 'Amr caused prayer to be offered for the Caliph as the general Commander of all the Faithful, and inserted the latter's name on the coins current in their dominions; but this signified only a sort of religious recognition of the institution. Even this much was perhaps not due to their belief in the religious significance of the Caliphate, but was the outcome of political motives. At this time, when the Caliph's authority was considered as infallible and he was in fact as well as in theory the head of the Islamic empire, it was very difficult for any governor to hold his own against the Caliphate; and still more for an usurper who had nothing but the sword upon which to base his right. Hence, for the success of their policy, the Saffarids

1. Gardizi, P. 12-13.

2. Ibid. P. 18; Ibn Khallikān, De Slane, trans. IV.P.326.

required to have some sort of nominal relationship with the Caliphate, otherwise there was every danger of alienating the sympathies of their own subjects, which were their main support in their struggle against the Caliphate. The importance of a deed of investiture from the Caliph cannot better be gauged than by the fact that 'Amr who succeeded his brother Yāqūb, was only given recognition as lawful ruler by the 'Ulamā and the volunteers for the faith, when he had secured his patent of sovereignty from the Caliph¹; and to gain public opinion, 'Amr on another occasion, exhibited the standard despatched from Baghdad in the court of his dwelling house for three days at Nishāpūr.² For these reasons, the Saffarids were obliged to come to terms with the Caliphate and ask for the confirmation of their claim over those territories which they had conquered even against the wishes of the Baghdad government; and to continue the name of the Caliph in the Khutbā and coinage even after they had come to a final breach with the central government and were declared heretics and usurpers against the lawful government.³

1. Gardīzī, P. 14-15.

2. Tabarī, III. P. 2133.

3. There is no historical evidence to show that the Saffarids ever discontinued the name of the Caliph in the Khutbā and there is no coin which does not bear the Caliph's name during their regime. Lane Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties.

Upon Yāqūb's conquest of Khurāsān against the wishes of the Caliphate, the former was declared a heretic and a rebel against the legitimate authority before the caravan of pilgrims which was at that time in Baghdad on their return journey in 261/875. (Tabarī, III. P. 1887).

'Amr was also declared a heretic before the pilgrims and orders were issued throughout the Islamic empire that he should be cursed from all the pulpits. (Tabarī, III. P. 2106).

How ambitious were the brothers to curtail even this nominal authority of the Caliph, is evident from the fact that Yāqūb was the first to introduce his name in the Khuṭbā along with that of the Caliph,¹ and 'Amr was the first ruler to have his father's name on the coinage and also the first to have his name inscribed on gold coins.² The latter innovation on the part of a governor in the East almost signified his independence. There is no evidence to show that the Saffarids ever paid any regular tribute to the Baghdad government, although Yāqūb, if Khallikān³ is to be trusted, agreed to pay in two-thirds of the taxes furnished by all the provinces which he governed. Their insatiable nature and want of moderation would not allow them to be content with what they had already gained, but they were bent upon excluding the temporal power of the Caliphate from Persia and if possible from Baghdad

1. Narshakhi, P. 77. It is related that in 261/875, the Caliph ordered the exclusion of the name of Yāqūb from the Khuṭbā and the inclusion of that of Naṣr, the Sāmānid at Bukhārā.
2. Lane Poole, Coins of Muḥammadan Dynasties, Add. IX. P. 177. On a gold coin minted in the year 275 A.H. 'Amr's name appeared along with his father's. It should be noted that the Tāhirids were not allowed to put their names on gold coins in Persia, while their names do appear on such coins in the western provinces. Cf. Lane Poole, Coins of Muḥammadan Dynasties.
3. Ibn Khallikān, De Slane, trans. IV. P. 320.

itself.¹ In fact they were trying to anticipate the Buwayhids by taking over all the political power into their hands and allowing the Caliphate to remain as a nominal religious head.

Whatever their actual intentions, the Saffarids did certain things which made them appear as the champions of the orthodox faith and faithful allies of the Caliphate. Both Yāqūb and 'Amr waged wars against infidels in the East and sent magnificent presents to the Caliph. Yāqūb enlarged his dominions by conquests in the mountainous region to the East and contributed much to the gradual rise of Islām in the country

1. In 261/875 the Caliphate tried to reconcile Yāqūb by granting him the government of Khurāsān, Ṭabaristān, Jurjān, Ray, and Fārs as well as the military governorship of Baghdad. (Tabarī, III. P. 1892) But Yāqūb insisted on coming to Baghdad to settle the terms of the treaty. The Caliph was well aware of his intention of capturing Baghdad itself and consequently made preparations to oppose him and ultimately by giving the colour of Holy War to his movements against the Saffarid, succeeded in repelling the attack. Yāqūb was defeated near Dayār al 'Aqūl in 262/876 and after this never condescended to come to terms with the Baghdad government which made one more effort to come to a good understanding with Yāqūb; but the latter's reply to the Caliph's messenger again shows his attitude towards the Caliphate. He said, "Take back the answer that I am ill, if I die then we will have peace from one another, but should I recover, nothing shall settle matters between us except the sword. If I lose all my territory, I shall return to the coarse bread and onions which was the food of my youth." Cf. Athīr, VII.P.22 Khallikān, De Slane, trans. IV. P. 321.

'Amr was not only confirmed in all his brother's possessions, but was also given the honour of getting his name inscribed on the standards, lances and shields in the government office at Baghdad. Cf. Tabarī, III. P. 2115. But his insatiable nature led him to oblige the Caliph to grant him the deed of investiture for the province of Mawarā al-Nahr which was under the Sāmānids. This led him to a war with Ismā'īl who defeated him and sent him a prisoner to Baghdad in 287/900. Cf. Tabarī, III. P. 2194

now known as Afghānistān.¹ But the object of the Holy War was perhaps to extend their territory~~and~~ and to secure booty; and the despatch of costly presents to the Caliph only to keep him in good humour in order to secure recognition or to plead their cause for a fresh province upon which they had closed their greedy teeth; and also perhaps to figure as the champions of Islām in the public eye.

The Saffarids also fought against both the Kharijites and the Alids and with the same political objects in view. Yaqub though he himself is supposed to have been a Khārijite in the beginning of his career², yet came into prominence by fighting against them as has been shown above. After the defeat of Muḥammad the Tāhirid, when he was making his case for the government of Khurāsān, he, in token of his profound attachment to the Caliphate, sent the head of a Khārijite captain who, in the neighbourhood of Hirāt, for thirty years had dared to call himself, 'Commander of the Faithful.'³ When Hasan, the ruler of Tabaristān, gave refuge to Yāqūb's opponent 'Abd Allāh he declared war against him and defeated him. He sent a most

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1. Noldeke, P. 182. In 259/872 Yāqūb sent an embassy to the Caliph Mu'tamid with the idols which he had captured in Kābul or the neighbouring lands. 'Amr also carried his arms into the eastern heathen lands as is shown by the large presents he sent to Baghdad in 283/896. Besides 400,000 dirhams, he sent a number of camels, and especially a bronze image richly decked with precious stones of a goddess having four arms. There were a number of other idols upon the car on which it was borne. Cf. Noldeke, P. 200.
 2. Barthold, Turkestan, P. 216.
 3. Tabarī, III. P. 1882; Noldeke, P. 184.

deferential account of his victory over the Alid dynasty of Tabaristan to the Caliphate and announced to the Commander of the Faithful that he had in his custody ^{se}nty members of the family of Ali in 260/873.¹ 'Amr also took the field against Rafī' when he revolted against the authority of the Caliphate and by joining the 'Alid prince of Tabaristān had embraced the Shī'ā sect and caused the public prayer to be offered for the 'Alid. He hunted Rafī' from place to place and finally sent his head to the Caliph in 284/897.² In both cases the object was to secure the possession of Khurāsān.

The revolt of the Saffarids against the 'Abbasid Caliphate should by no means be considered as a Persian revolt against Arab domination. That there was not even the vestige of Persian nationalism in those times is evident from the absence of any concerted action of various Persian rulers against the Caliphate. As has already been shown, the Saffarids were always busy in fighting the other Persian rulers, and on several occasions they allied themselves with the Caliphate against them. That Yāqūb was a Muslim first of all cannot be illustrated better than by his refusal of an alliance with the leader of the Zanj against their common enemy i.e. the Caliphate. Yāqūb's despatch of a Qurānic verse in reply to the peace overtures, "Say to the infidels, I do not worship the One whom You worship", is characteristic of his orthodoxy.³

1. Tabari, III. P. 1884.

2. Ibid. P. 2160.

3. Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 201.

Nor were the Saffarids inspired by any ideal of a pre-Islamic king in Persia. In the absence of any settled government they could not establish a regular system of administration; but whatever principles they applied in governing their dominions were more in keeping with the teachings of Islām than with the pre-Islamic idea of kingship.¹ They considered them equal even to their soldiers; and formed all their plans themselves and directed their executive personally as far as possible. Even a ruler of extensive dominions, Yāqūb continued to live as a simple soldier. In his tent he slept upon his shield without any attendants. Both the brothers supervised the administration of their country and delivered justice personally. As regards any fixed rules for revenue collection, they had none; they applied their own laws in accordance with their needs.²

In short the relations of the Saffarids with the Abbasid Caliphate were not so anomalous as they appear. The Saffarids were willing to show the traditional regard for the religious institution of the Caliphate, but the exigencies of right and justice and the weak rule both at the centre and the provinces prompted them to set up a new rule. Their want of moderation

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1. The Sāsānid king remained hidden, inaccessible and invisible even to the highest dignitaries of his court. Cf. Christense P. 97; Huart, P. 145. The king showed himself in public only on rare occasions amidst great pomp and show which was intended to impress the onlookers, for nobody durst raise his voice in the presence of the king. Cf. Christensen, P. 98; Huart, P. 147. In great battles which were directed by the king himself, a throne of considerable grandeur was set up in the centre of the army. Cf. Christensen, P. 63; Huart, P. 15.
 2. Noldeke, P. 193-194; Mir Khwānd, P. 710.

came in the way of their achieving any permanent results for the dynasty.¹ But they were the first in Persia to contest the political supremacy of the Abbasids and were bent upon reducing their temporal power to the minimum. Fortunately for the Caliphate, the emergence of these dissenters coincided with the period of Muwaffaq and his son Mu'tadid who were strong enough to curb their ambition. They themselves also contributed to this result by antagonising both the Khārijites and Shī'ās at the same time. Although both the brothers were defeated and died without fulfilling their ambition, yet they succeeded in asserting the right of the subordinate princes to share with the Caliphate the two outward insignia of sovereignty i.e. the inclusion of their names in the Khutbā and on the coinage in their dominions and, moreover, established a precedent in governing their territories without any regular payment to Baghdad. Thus the Saffarids set the example for the curtailment of the temporal power of the Caliphate in Persia. These concessions once extorted from the Caliphate, had to be volens nolens bestowed by the Caliphs themselves upon their successors i.e. the Sāmānids whose relations with the Caliphate we shall trace in the following pages.

1. But the strength of the ties uniting the Saffarids with the population of Sijistān is shown by the reappearance and maintenance of the dynasty (except for a short interval under Ghaznevids and Saljuqids) down to the fifteenth century. Cf. Zambar, P. 200.

The relations of the Sāmānids¹ with the Caliphate naturally fall into two periods, the first from 261/874, when they first came into direct relationship with the Baghdad government, till 333/944; the second from 334/945, when the Caliphate came under the tutelage of the Buwayhids, till their downfall at the hands of Maḥmūd of Ghaznā in 389/999. Since their relations during the second period form part of the next chapter they will be dealt with later.

Ruling as subordinates to the Khurāsānian government, the Sāmānids came into direct relationship with the Abbasid Caliphate only after the conquest of Khurāsān by Yāqūb, when in 261/874 the Caliph Mu'tamid granted to Naṣr, the founder of the dynasty, the patent of sovereignty to govern the province of Māwarā al-Nahr which he had already been governing under the Tāhirids.² The Caliph gave an order for the exclusion of the name of Yāqūb from the Khutbā in those regions and the inclusion of Naṣr's name instead.³ Thus the concession of mentioning the governor's name in the Khutbā after that of the Caliph, which had been extorted by Yāqūb, was voluntarily given by the Caliph himself to the Sāmānid Amīr. On the death of Naṣr in 279/892, his brother Ismā'īl was installed in his place and in addition to Māwarā al-Nahr, Ismā'īl after his victory over 'Amr in 287/900 was given the government of Khurā-

1. See article on the Sāmānids in the Encyclopaedia of Islām.

2. Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 193.

3. Narshakhī, P. 77,

sān which by right of conquest already belonged to him.¹

There is no evidence as to any regular tribute paid by the Sāmānids to the central government from the time of the grant of the province of Khurāsān to them after the defeat of 'Amr. In fact ever since the defeat of Muḥammad b. Tāhir in 259/871 neither of the governors who were given the government of Khurāsān paid any regular tribute nor were they willing to do so. The defiant attitude of various governors had involved the Baghdad government in costly wars. Under such circumstances, the Caliphate was perhaps glad to have the opportunity of entrusting the government of this province to one of its loyal governors on the same conditions as it was ruled by the defiant ones. Since the inclusion of the name of a governor on a gold coin in the East signified his independence, we can date the political independence of the Sāmānids so far as any regular tribute is concerned, at the latest, from the year 295/907 in which year there appears a gold coin on which the name of the Sāmānid Amīr Aḥmad b. Ismā'īl appears along with that of the Caliph.² By the year 306/918, however, it becomes quite clear that the Sāmānids did not pay any regular tribute for the province of Khurāsān and Māwarā al-Nahr, as the Budget drawn up for 'Alī Ibn 'Isā, the Wazir of the Caliph Muqtadir, in that year does

1. Tabarī, III. P. 2195; Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 346-47.

2. Lane Poole, Coins of Muḥammadan Dynasties, Additions, P.179.

not contain any revenues from the above provinces.¹ Thus the Sāmānids were now in full enjoyment of the three concessions extorted by the Saffarids from the Caliphate, ie. the sharing of the two insignia of sovereignty, and the appropriation of the whole of their revenues.

The Sāmānids, being staunch Sunnis, needed the sanction of the Caliphate to govern their territories so that their possessions might be placed on a legal basis, and their civil administration carried on in accordance with the Shariā. It was this religious necessity that compelled them to ask for a deed of investiture for the possessions whose de facto rulers they had become by right of conquest. The acceptance of a deed from the Caliphate was in form a declaration of their political subordination to the former, to which a sort of sanction was attached by the necessity of its renewal on the demise of the grantor and the grantee. The possession of this right by the Caliphate made it the custodian of the sovereignty de jure, and the Sāmānids were left with the possession of the sovereignty de facto alone. On the other hand, the Caliph had no hand in the appointment of an Amīr, which was the concern of the Sāmānid government alone. On occasions of succession to the throne, the new ruler applied to the Caliph for the deed of investiture, which was then duly issued by the Caliph. With their political

1. Kremer, Ueber das Einnahmehudget des Abbasidenreichs.
(Monograph on 'Alī Ibn 'Tsā and his Statesmanship).

influence waning, the Caliphs began to attach a touch of sacredness to the ceremony by sometimes tying the banner with their own hands.¹ It is very regrettable that there is no copy of such a deed in existence within our knowledge, but from the contents of a copy of an oath of allegiance taken by Masūd to the Caliph, we gather that this document was not a blank cheque given to the governors to rule their kingdoms as they liked; there were certain religious as well as political obligations to be fulfilled by the rulers, who used to bind themselves with formidable oaths to perform them.² Although there was no sanctioning authority to enforce these obligations on the rulers, yet it seems still to have been understood that they were morally bound to abide by them, and there seems to be no hint in any of our sources that orthodox public opinion in Khurāsān was prepared as yet to admit any severing of the link with the Caliphate.

So far as their internal administration was concerned the Sāmānids were quite independent of the central government, but the report of every revolt, every new conquest, and all the movements that were going on in their dominions, was sent to the Baghdad government; and the Sāmānid Amīrs were expected to act in accordance with the instructions received from Baghdad. In all religious revolts, waging Jihād, arranging for the pilgrimage etc.

1. Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 4.

2. Bayhaqī, PP. 384-389.

When Tāhir b. Muhammad b. Amr (Saffarid) entered Fārs and expelled the prefect of the Caliph in 288/901, Ismā'īl wrote to him that the Caliph had given him the province of Sijistān with all its appendages, and therefore he should abstain from capturing it. In consequence of this, Tāhir returned, and the Caliph appointed his own client Badr to Fārs.¹ In 298/910 Ahmad b. Ismā'īl sent a despatch to Baghdad announcing the conquest of Sijistān and the capture of Muhammad b. 'Alī b. Layth who was a rebel against the Caliphate.² This was followed by a despatch announcing that he had captured Subkarā who had captured Fars against the wishes of the Baghdad government.³ In accordance with the orders received from the Caliphate, the two prisoners were despatched to Baghdad and the messengers of the Sāmānids were sent back with robes, scented jewels for the governor of Khurasān.⁴ In 309/921 an envoy of the ruler of Khurasān brought to Baghdad the head of Layla b. Nūmān, the Daylamite, who had rebelled against the authority of the Caliphate in Tabaristān;⁵ and in 330/941 Makān b. Kāki's head was sent with some presents to the Caliphate.⁶

The Sāmānids were so loyal to the authority of the Caliphate that they did not oppose it even if their own rights

1. Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 352.

2. & 3. Misk. I. P. 19; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 21:

Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 46.

4. Misk. I. P. 20; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 22.

5. Ibid. 76. Ibid. P. 84.

6. Misk. II. P. 23; Ibid. V. P. 24.

were infringed. They took all such things in good part and were quite content with what they could get out of the Caliph by peaceful means. When Baris Kabīr who was the governor of Rayy, Ṭabaristān and Jurjān on behalf of the Sāmānids, made his way to Baghdad on the death of Ismāʿīl in 295/907 with all the revenues he had collected, the Sāmānid government condoned the action of the Caliph Muqtadir who welcomed the traitor and gave him the government of Dyār-Bakr.¹ Again in 303/915 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Sulūk, a cousin of the governor of Khurāsān who came to Baghdad demanding protection, was welcomed by the Caliph and presented with a robe of honour.²

When the people of Sijistān revolted against the authority of the newly appointed Sāmānid ruler, Naṣr II, and paid homage to Muqtadir, the Caliph assigned the province to his own men who imprisoned the officials of the Sāmānid ruler and sent them as prisoners to Baghdad in 301/913.³ Even then the Sāmānids did not lift a finger against their legitimate suzerain i.e. the Caliph, whom they considered justified in granting a piece of territory which they themselves had governed on payment of tribute, to whomsoever he chose.

Whenever an opportunity arose, the Sāmānids waged Holy War against the infidels. In 291/903 when the Turks entered Māwarā-

1. Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 5-6; Mīr Khwānd, P. 717.

2. Miskawayh, I. P. 39; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 43.

3. Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 59-60.

al-Nahr, Ismā'īl persuaded the Muslims to wage war against them, and with the help of the warriors for the faith, he practically destroyed them. He sent a despatch relating these proceedings to Baghdad.¹

The Sāmānids being staunch Sunnis were naturally opposed to any anti-Sunni movement during their jurisdiction, as it was also detrimental to their political interests. When Muḥammad b. Zayd, governor of Tabaristān attacked Jurjān in 289/901, Muḥammad b. Hārūn, the general sent by Ismā'īl, not only expelled the 'Alids from Jurjān, but brought his own country Tabaristān under the jurisdiction of the Sāmānids, and caused the Khuṭbā to be read in the name of the Abbasid Caliph.² In 290/902 when Muḥammad b. Hārūn, who had been appointed by Ismā'īl as governor of Tabaristān, rebelled against him, and threw off the allegiance of the Abbasids by defying the authority of the Caliphate and occupying Rayy against its will, Ismā'īl, under instructions from the central government proceeded to restore order in Rayy and expel the rebel.³ He occupied Rayy whose government was assigned to him by the Caliphate on the stipulation of a regular payment of tribute.⁴

1. Tabarī, III. P. 2249; Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 368.

2. Ibid. 2208; Ibid. P. 357.

3. Ibn Athīr, VII. P. 365.

4. Kremer, Ueber das Einnahmebudget des Abbasidenreichs. P. 28. The reneue of Rayy appears in the budget of Baghdad government for 306/918-919. In 314/926 when Ibn Abu'l Saj was given the government of Jibāl and was ordered to fight the Qarmatians the government of Rayy was given to the Sāmānids and a person was sent to settle the Kharāj. See. Miskawayh, I. P. 149; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 166. This clearly shows that Ismā'īl had not annexed Rayy as it is mentioned in the art. on Ismā'īl in the Encycl. of Islam by Barthold.

The Qarmatian propaganda won several adherents amongst the Sāmānid officials and finally the Amīr, Naṣr himself became a convert to their teachings.¹ The 'Ulamā naturally resented the conversion of the Amīr to heresy and they invoked the help of the Turkish guards who formed a plot to depose the Amīr and offer the throne to the great Sip-hasālar. The plot being discovered, the Amīr's son Nūh ordered the leader of the conspirators to be executed, and Naṣr announced his abdication in favour of his son, Nūh, against whom there was no accusation of heresy. Nūh gave orders to imprison his father and put him in chains. Afterwards he ruthlessly persecuted the heretics, and their property including the treasure of the deposed heretic Amīr was transferred to the orthodox. Henceforward the Shīas were completely suppressed and continued only as a secret sect.²

The Sāmānids were not as ambitious as their predecessors, the Saffarids; and were content with what they could get out of the Caliphate by peaceful means. As the strongest Sunni power in Persia their opinion was invited even in the matter of an election of a Caliph.³ They had inspired so much confidence

1. & 2. Nidhām al Mulk, Siyāsat-nāmā, PP. 188-93; Al Nadīm, Fihrist, P. 188; Barthold, Turkestan, P. 243-244.

3. Miskawayh, I. P. 4; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 4.
At the time of the election of Muqtadir in 295/907, the Wazīr Abbās was waiting for the arrival of the chamberlain of Ismā'il b. Ahmad, ruler of Khurāsān.

through their loyalty that the Caliphs regarded their dominions as the last place of refuge in case of danger. When the Caliph Muqtadir was hard pressed by the Qarmatians,^R 'Alī Ibn 'Īsā addressed the Caliph thus: "If another thing come about, then do thou depart to the remotest part of Khurāsān."¹

The Samanids were in return duly rewarded for their loyalty by the Caliphate. Without the least remonstrance the central government granted them the very concessions which were grudged to others. So much was the Caliphate sure of their loyalty that the government of all those parts which were supposed to be on the verge of revolt were invariably assigned to them; while they, on their part, suppressed all such revolts, pacified the country and held it if the Caliphate so desired, or else made it over to it. In short, it can be concluded that perfect mutual harmony existed between the Abbasid Caliphate and the Sāmānid Amīrs in their relations during this period.

1. Miskawayh, I. P. 181; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 204.

Caliphate under the Buwayhids' regime and its relations with Persian rulers.

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With the capture of Baghdad by the Buwayhids¹ a new chapter opened in the history of the Caliphate. Almost all the temporal power of the Caliph was already taken over by various Amirs who had risen to power at Baghdad before the Buwayhids. The most important symbol of sovereignty, i.e. the coinage, had already been shared by them and many of the functions of the Wazir were taken over by the Secretary of the Amir al-Umarā. Even the revenue realized from several parts of the empire was not received directly by the Caliph who was given an allowance just sufficient to meet his necessary expenses.* In spite of all this the Caliph was still considered the temporal as well as religious head of the Islāmic community and orders were issued in his name. He still retained the right to appoint his own Wazir, whose existence could not be ignored especially when there were so many competitors for the rank of Amir al-Umarā.

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1. See Art. on Buwayhids in the Encycl. of Islām. After strengthening his position, Abu'l Hasan 'Alī applied in 322 A.H. to the Caliph Rādī, to invest him with the provinces which were already in his possession. The Caliph consented on condition of payment by him of eight million dirhams. 'Alī forcibly took the robe of honour and the standard from the Caliph's messenger and did not pay even a single penny. Cf. Misk. I. P. 299-300. This shows the necessity of securing a deed of investiture from the Caliph; and also the attitude of the Buwayhids to recognize the Abbasid Caliphate.
 2. Miskawayh, I. P. 352; Eclipse, trans. IV. P. 396.

But with the advent of Buwayhids to power at Baghdad, still worse was to come. Being Shi'as, they did not acknowledge the Caliphate of the Abbasids whom they considered as usurpers.¹ It was only for political motives that Mu'izz al-Dawlā recognised the institution. His position in the beginning was not safe at all. After his peaceful occupation of Baghdad, he had to meet his rivals, the Hamdānids, who had already held the post of the Amīr al-Umarā. They nearly turned the scales of victory in their favour and it was only a stroke of fortune that by a mere strategem, Mu'izz could retain possession of Baghdad in 334/945.² Besides he had to deal with the Bāridīs and the Qarmatians.³ Mu'izz al-Dawlā was aware of this opposition and therefore did not think it politic to alienate the sympathies of the majority of the population at Baghdad who were Sunnis.³ Perhaps he had a mind to replace the Abbasid Caliphate by an 'Alid one after completely establishing himself. He expressed his desire to transfer the Caliphate to the family of 'Alī immediately after deposing the Caliph Mustakfī on a mere suspicion of intriguing against his authority. But he was checked in his design by the advice of one of his courtiers who pronounced it to be unsound

1. Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 339.

2. Ibid. P. 341.

3. Miskawayh, II. P. 328; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 325.

policy, remarking, 'If trouble were to arise between yourself and the Abbasid Caliph, your followers who do not believe him to be the rightful claimant, will not hesitate even if you order them to kill him, but in case of an 'Alid Caliph, they will not hesitate to carry out his commands even if it be to kill you! These words appealed to Mu'izz who being actuated by personal considerations, dropped the proposal. Political consideration outweighed his religious sentiments and thus the choice fell on an Abbasid Caliph, Mu'ti'. Thus the Abbasid Caliphate obtained recognition at the hands of those who did not believe in their rights.

When the Buwayhids took charge of the administration of the Caliphate, a permanent Amirate with hereditary rights was established, and by these Amirs the Caliph was practically stripped of his remaining sovereign functions and privileges. Formerly the Caliph had a Wazir and the Amir al-Umara a Secretary, but now it was the other way about. The Caliph had no hand in the actual appointment of the Wazir and even the right of appointing the Wazir and the governors in theory was shared by the Amirs. The Caliph Mustakfi ~~was~~ granted a daily allowance of five thousand dirhams,³ but it was further reduced to two thousand

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1. Ibn Athir, VIII. P. 339-340. This conversation is probably to be regarded not as a historically founded fact, but rather as a summing up of Ibn al-Athir's own reading of the situation. Nevertheless, in the present state of our knowledge, it appears to be a justifiable view.
 2. Eclipse, trans. V.P. 399; quoted from Sābi's collections, p. 222-223.
 3. Ibn al Athir, VIII. P. 338. Not dinars as mentioned in the History of the Saracens by Amir 'Ali, P. 303.

on the appointment of his successor, the Caliph Muṭī¹; and that too was at the mercy of these Amīrs. His personal estate, which yielded a yearly income of 200,000 dinars, was put in charge of a secretary²; but this revenue like the personal allowance, depended on the good will of the Buwayhid Amīrs who might confiscate it if they so desired.³ Sometimes when the Amīrs were hard pressed for money, it was not unusual that a demand was made of the Caliphs to advance some money from their personal income towards the common exchequer; and the Caliphs being not in a position to resist such abnormal demands for fear of deposition, had to accede to them.⁴

The provincial governors or rulers who recognized the Abbasid Caliphate as a religious institution mentioned the name of the Caliph in the Khutbā on Fridays and other ceremonial occasions, and this signified (as has been shown in the previous chapter) the religious recognition of the Caliphate by the rulers who were otherwise independent. But the Khutbā at Baghdad was also, before the advent of the Buwayhids, a symbol of their

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 87; Eclipse, trans. V.P. 91.

2. Ibid. 108; Ibid. 111.

3. Ibid. 344; Ibid. 373.

During the period of Mu'izz al-Dawlā much of the personal property of the Caliph was confiscated and given to the soldiers.

4. Miskawayh, II. P. 308; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 330.

In 361/971 Bakhtiyār under the pretext of waging Jihād realized 400,000 dirhams from the Caliph Muṭī¹, who, it was given out, had to sell some of his jewels and furniture, to meet this abnormal demand.

In 381/991 Bahā al-Dawlā actuated by his greed for the wealth of the Caliph Tāi, deposed him; and robbed him of all his belongings. Cf. Misk. III. P. 201; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 213.

political supremacy. During the regime of the latter, this prerogative of the Caliph also was encroached upon and the custom was started of having the name of the Amīr conjoined with that of the Caliph in the Khutbā at Baghdad. 'Adud al-Dawlā was the first to introduce the innovation¹, and henceforward it became the usual practice for the subsequent Buwayhid Amīrs. Although this prerogative was more under the control of the public than of either the Caliph or the Buwayhid Amīr, yet 'Adud al-Dawlā could show his high-handedness when he caused the omission of the name of the Caliph Tāi for two whole months from all the pulpits under his control.² Generally, however, a request was made by the Amīr to the Caliph for the inclusion of his name in the Khutbā at Baghdad, and this was usually granted. Since it was the most decisive sign of recognition of an Amīr by the Caliph, great importance was attached even to the order in which the names followed after the name of the Caliph. One of the conditions of peace between Sharaf al-Dawlā and his brother Šamsām al-Dawlā was that the former's name should be mentioned in the Khutbā at Baghdad after the Caliph's and before

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 396; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 435. Ibn al Athīr, VIII. P. 507. Ibn Raīq's name was ordered to be mentioned in the Khutbā 'in all pulpits', Cf. Athīr, VIII. P. 241; but it is quite clear that these did not include the pulpits of Baghdad. It is noteworthy that this came about gradually; as distinct from that in the provincial cities.

2. Arnold, Caliphate, P. 62.

Samsām al-Dawlā's name.¹ The exclusion of the name of a certain Amīr from the Khutbā at Baghdad meant ipso facto the termination of his sovereignty at Baghdad. A striking illustration of this is furnished by the repeated inclusion and exclusion of the name of Jalāl al-Dawlā from the Khutbā at Baghdad.²

In all those provinces which were under political control of the Buwayhids the Khutbā contained not only the name of the Amīr al-Umarā at Baghdad alongside that of the Caliph, but sometimes those of other members of the Buwayhid family as well.³ In those provinces, of course, where the rulers were politically independent of the Buwayhids the latter were not included in the Khutbā, and only the name of the Abbasid Caliph was mentioned to signify the religious recognition of the institution.

In regard to the coinage, the Buwayhids not only shared but monopolised this symbol of sovereignty to such an extent that even the epithet 'Amīr al-Mūminīn' after the name of the Caliph was omitted.⁴ Only the name of the Caliph, generally on the reverse side, was kept on, whereas not only the name of the Amīr al-Umarā with his titles and Kunyā but also the name and

1. Miskawayh, III. P. 124; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 127.

2. Ibn Athīr, IX. PP. 288, & 308-309.

3. Miskawayh, II. P. 115; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 118.
In 337/948 in a treaty with Naṣīr al-Dawlā, the Hamdānid, Mu'izz al-Dawlā agreed at that his name as well as those of Imād al-Dawlā and Bakhṭiyār should be mentioned in the Khutbā recited in his territories.

4. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muḥammadan Dynasties, II. PP. 194-220. There is no coin minted during the Buwayhid regime, which bears the epithet, 'Amīr al-Mūminīn' after the name of the Caliph.

title of the head of the Buwayhid family and sometimes that of the ~~Amir~~ apparent were inscribed on the coinage minted at Baghdād.¹ Since the coinage was directly under the control of the Buwayhids, they could put on it even those titles which were not granted to them by the Caliph.² It is very interesting to note that even the title 'Shāhinshāh' appears on coins minted at Baghdād, although there is no historical evidence to show that such a title was ever granted to any of the Buwayhid rulers³ before Jalāl al Dawlā. The controversy that arose on the request of the latter for the grant of the title 'Malik al Mulūk' and which led to the setting up of a tribunal of Qadīs to consider the legality of such a grant⁴, is an ample proof of the above statement. A study of the coinage shows how the pendulum of sovereignty swung from the Amīr to the Caliph and vice versa. During the regime of powerful Amīrs, the name of the Caliph appears generally on the reverse side, whereas during the reign of weak Buwayhids, it appears on the obverse side; and with the decline of the Buwayhid power, the Caliph Qādir

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1. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, II. PP. 200-206.
 2. *British Museum Catalogue*. A coin minted at Baghdād in the year 370 A.H. bears the title 'Shāhinshāh' after the name of Adud al Dawlā. The above epithet is very frequent after the name of Bahā al Dawlā. Even the title 'Malik al Mulūk' appears on a silver coin minted at Hamadān in the year 406 A. H.
 3. It is wrongly stated that Bahā al Dawlā obtained the title of 'Shāhinshāh' from the Caliph; and that the controversy with regard to Jalāl al Dawlā was concerned with the recital of the above title in the Khutbā. Cf. Minorsky, *La Domination des Dailamites*, P. 18.
 4. Ibn Athir, IX. P. 312-313.

succeeded in having even his son's name struck at the coinage minted at Baghdad.¹

Another prerogative hitherto exclusively reserved to the Caliph, that of having the drums sounded at his gate at the prayer times, was encroached up-on by 'Aḍud al-Dawlā who compelled the Caliph to give orders that the drums should be sounded at his gate three times a day, morning, sunset and nightfall.² Henceforward it became the usual practice for the Buwayhid Amīrs to have the drums sounded at their gates. Both Sultān al-Dawlā and Jalāl al-Dawlā in spite of the remonstrance of the Caliph succeeded in having the drums sounded at their gates five times a day.³

The Buwayhids, ambitious as they were to rule, still found it expedient to allow the Caliphate to retain its sovereignty de jure. Consequently the function of issuing the deed of investiture both on the change of a Caliph and an Amīr remained intact and in force. Though it was a purely formal proceeding and the Caliph had no alternative but to issue such a deed to the winning party, yet its importance cannot be minimised, as in order to satisfy the public mind, the proceeding had to be gone through and there is not a single instance in which a deed was not asked for by a Buwayhid Amīr. A formal

1. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, P. 219.

2. Miskawayh, II. P. 396; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 435.
Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 507.

3. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 215. + 255

assembly used to be held to which the high officials, various dignitaries of the court, commanders of the army and religious heads, i.e. Qādis and Faqīhs were invited. The recipient of the deed of investiture presented himself most humbly and solemnly before the Caliph whose hands he would kiss and then place the robes of honour on his head as a mark of reverence. Then the contents of the deed of investiture would be read aloud, and both the recipient Amīr and the Caliph would bind themselves with mutual oaths, that of allegiance on the part of the former and of fidelity on the part of the latter.¹ The public attached so much importance to this deed of investiture that^{at}/this period, it seems, it was still difficult for any ruler to establish his rights permanently without securing it. In cases of contending parties and usurpers it was considered a chief factor in establishing their claims.² But during the Buwayhid regime every thing depended upon the reigning Amīr without whose consent the Caliph could not issue any such patent

1. Miskawayh, III. P. 84; 141 & 240; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 85, 146 & 254 respectively.

The words *بالحسن والوفاء* have been mis-interpreted as loyalty and fidelity; while the words *بالحسن والوفاء* have been mis-translated as fidelity. Cf. Miskawayh, III. P. 240; Eclipse trans. VI. P. 254.

2. Misk. II. P. 239; Eclipse trans. V. P. 254.

After the imprisonment of his father by Abū Taghlib, the Hamdānid, in 357/968, his right was contested by his brothers and in order to strengthen his cause, Abū Taghlib offered 1,200,000 dirhams a year to Bakhtiyār for the renewal of the deed. Cf. the story told in Miskawayh, III. P. 89; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 91, that Mudhaffar b. 'Alī, the chamberlain of Abu'l Malī, governor of Marshes, bade his clerk write a letter in the name of the Caliph entrusting him with the administration.

of sovereignty. In fact most of the governors and usurpers applied to the Buwayhid Amīrs for such grant rather than to the Caliph, who sometimes used to issue such deeds even if they were against his own wish.¹ Not only the Amīr al-Umarā but any powerful Buwayhid ruler could render the whole proceeding a mere mockery. When Bakhtiyār wanted to conciliate Fakhr al-Dawlā in order to win his support against ‘Aḍud al-Dawlā, he had the Caliph Tāī issue a deed of investiture to him and his commander, Sahlān b. Musāfir, for the territories in their control as governors appointed by the Caliph and not as deputies of ‘Aḍud al-Dawlā as previously arranged. Sahlān was also granted the title of ‘Ismat al-Dawlā and was called by his Kunyā. But both these persons owing to their fear of ‘Aḍud al-Dawlā could not even venture to don the robes of honour neither did Sahlān dare to assume his title.²

Another prerogative of the Caliphate/^{was} to bestow Honours and this was the only thing left to them by which they could flatter or please a certain Amīr. Since there was a regular craze amongst the Amīrs to obtain flattering titles from the Caliphs,³

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 156-157; Eclipse, V. P. 167.

Ibn Muḥtaḥ secured the deed of investiture through Rukn al-Dawlā for the province of Khurāsān which was in the possession of the Sunni rulers, i.e. the Sāmānids.

2. Ibid. II. P. 364-65; Ibid. V. P. 398-399.

3. Ibid. II. P. 321. Ibid. V. P. 346.

When peace was made between Bakhtiyār and Abū Taghlib, it was also agreed that the latter should receive a title.

Bakhtiyār secured the title of ~~Uḍat~~ al-Dawlā from the Caliph

the latter were very careful about the grant of them and great ingenuity was exercised in devising a suitable title in each case. Even the use of the Kunyā by the Caliph was considered to be an honour and sometimes persons of high rank insisted on receiving this honour.¹ In this respect too the Caliphs were prevailed upon by their Buwayhid masters to grant them high sounding titles beyond all proportion to their merits; whilst, much as they would have liked to do so, they could not grant any title worth mentioning to the Sāmānids, who were more loyal to the Caliphate than any contemporary Persian ruler. Usually a request for the grant of a title was made not to the Caliph direct but to the Buwayhid Amīr at Baghdad who generally secured the title demanded for his favourites. In this respect too, a new practice was adopted by the Buwayhids; not being content with the titles conferred on them by the Caliphs, some of them assumed titles of their own accord.²

For political reasons, the Buwayhid Amirs had various important orders issued in the Caliph's name and bearing his seal of which he was the sole custodian.³ His signature was also required on all important correspondence that was carried on

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 346; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 376.

When 'Adud al-Dawla wanted to conciliate Bakhityār's wazīr the latter demanded the confirmation of his title and the use of Kunyā by the Caliph.

2. As already stated the Buwayhids assumed the title of Shāhinshāh and Malīk al Mulūk which were definitely not granted to them. Cf. P. 39.

3. Miskawayh, II. P. 344; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 373.

with the provincial governors.¹, and even on contracts made with the officials effecting the assessment.² But this appears to have been a purely formal proceeding; the Amīr made whatever arrangements suited him and sent the documents to the Caliph for signature.

Being Shīās, the Buwayhids had no respect for the Abbasid Caliphs and this explains the humiliating treatment accorded to the Caliphs by them. It was during their regime that the Caliphs, on formal occasions, visited the Amīrs in person.³ Even the formal ceremony of election was done away with and the Buwayhids nominated whomsoever they would from amongst the family and could depose the Caliphs at will.⁴

The whole position of the 'Abbasid Caliphate under the Buwayhid regime can be best described in the words of the Caliph Muṭī' (334-363/946-974) who being asked by Bakhtiyār to contribute to the expenses of the Sacred War out of his personal income

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 113; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 117.

2. Ibid. 129; Ibid. 132.

3. Ibid. 395; Ibid. 435.

In 368/978 the Caliph Ṭāī went out to meet 'Adud al-Dawlā with the whole of the resident army. The Caliph Ṭāī also went to offer condolence to Bahā al-Dawlā. Cf. Misk. III. P. 152-153; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 158-159.

4. Misk. II. P. 86; Eclipse, V. P. 90; Athīr VIII. P. 338-39.

In 334/946 Mu'izz al-Dawlā deposed the Caliph Mustakfi on a mere suspicion that he was maintaining a secret correspondence with the Hamdānids against him (Mu'izz). When the Caliph was holding an assembly to receive an envoy from Khurāsān, two Daylāmites, at Mu'izz's instigation entered the assembly, dragged the Caliph from his throne and took him on foot to Mu'izz's palace where he was confined. Muṭī' who had sought protection with Mu'izz owing to his enmity with the late Caliph, Mustakfi and is said to have excited Mu'izz against him, was raised to the office of the Caliphate.

In 381/991 Bahā al-Dawlā actuated by his greed for the supposed wealth of the Caliph Ṭāī, deposed the latter and installed his cousin Qādir in his place. Misk. III. P. 201; trans. VI. 213.

replied; "The Sacred War would be incumbent on me if the World were in my hands, and if I had the management of the money and the troops. As things are, when all I have is a pittance insufficient for my wants, and the world is in your hands and those of the provincial rulers, neither the Sacred War, nor the Pilgrimage, nor any other matter requiring the attention of the sovereign is a concern of mine. All you can claim from me is the name which is uttered in the Khutbā from your pulpits as a means of pacifying your subjects; and if you want me to renounce that privilege too, I am prepared to do so and leave everything to you".¹ No doubt these words were written in a state of utter despondency and in order to avoid the unjustifiable payment of money, yet they show the utter subservience of the Caliph to his merciless masters. The position of the Caliphs, however, was not so utterly hopeless as is represented by the above words. The same Caliph who was unwilling to part with some of his wealth to be spent on the Sacred War and the Pilgrimage, could find money to spend on the erection of three palaces which were of such considerable size that in the following century together with the remains of the old palace of the Tāj in whose grounds they were erected, they are said to have occupied about a third of the total area of East Baghdad.²

In spite of the insignificance to which the Caliphate at

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 307-308; Eclipse, V. P. 330;
Ibn Athir, VIII. P. 456.

2. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, P. 162-63.

Baghdad had fallen, and the utter disregard in which the Caliphs were held by their Shi'a masters, their prestige as the religious head of the Sunni Muslims was such that even the Buwayhids felt proud to offer their daughters and sisters in marriage to them; and could never get one in return.¹ In this capacity, they received deputations from various independent Muslim (Sunni) rulers, to whom they issued deeds of investiture and from whom they received costly presents on various occasions;² and they addressed the pilgrims on their way to or back from Mecca.³ Even the Buwayhid Amirs in order to impress on men's minds the majesty and dignity of the Caliph's exalted office, considered it politic to display great pomp and show on ceremonial occasions.⁴ Besides the Buwayhid Amirs considered it one of their duties to maintain the prestige and integrity of the Caliphate in the eyes of the Muslim princes by asking them to pay homage to it by mentioning the name of the Caliph in the Khutbā and coinage in their

1. Eclipse, trans. V. P. 454. In the year 369 A.H. it is mentioned that 'Aḍud al-Dawlā arranged an alliance between himself and the Caliph Tāi by marrying the Caliph's eldest daughter. It is obviously a mistake in the translation as it is 'Aḍud al-Dawlā's daughter. The context makes it quite clear on P. 14, VI. (Eclipse) where it is mentioned that in the year 371 A.H. on his return to Baghdad, 'Aḍud al-Dawlā was told that Tāi disliked his daughter.
2. Bayhaqī, P. 361. It was customary with the Sunni independent rulers to send costly presents to the Caliph.
3. Misk. III. P. 250; Eclipse, VI. P. 265-266.
4. A vivid description of a grand assembly that was held to receive the Egyptian Ambassador is given by Professor Arnold in the 'Caliphate', P. 66-67.

territories.¹ Even the Buwayhid rulers in Persia, Shīa though they were, continued to recognize the Abbasid Caliphate by fulfilling the above obligations;² and in order to impress on the public mind the legality of their claims, received deeds of investiture from the Caliph³ and put on the robes of honour sent by the latter with great pomp and show.⁴

At Baghdad there were certain religious obligations which could only be fulfilled by the Caliphs themselves; and in spite of the efforts of the Buwayhids to usurp those functions, the Caliphs succeeded in retaining them. For instance, the appointment of the Qādīs remained a prerogative of the Caliph even during this period of degradation. It was impossible for any Qādī to hold his office unless he was directly appointed by the Caliph. When Mu'izz al-Dawlā in 350/961 not only appointed the Chief

1. When in 401/1010 the 'Uqaylid Amīr Qarwāsh b. Muqallad mentioned the name of Hākīm, the 'Alid Caliph of Egypt in the Khutbā in all his provinces, Maṣīl, Anbār, Kūfā and Madā'in etc, the Caliph Qādir protested against it and sent the Qādī Abū Bakr to Bahā al-Dawlā asking him to take action. The latter sanctioned one hundred thousand dinars towards the expenses of the army and ordered one of his commanders to bring Qarwāsh to his senses. The latter was compelled to drop the name of the Egyptian Caliph from the Khutbā and re-insert that of the Abbasid. Cf. Athir, IX. P. 153. Being a Shīa, Bahā al-Dawlā was placed in an awkward situation and to justify his action in having the name of the Egyptian Caliph dropped from the Khutbā, he caused a document (Maḥḍar) to be drawn up in 402/1011 by the Qādīs and the Shīa 'Ulamā in which the claims of the Egyptian Caliphs were denounced. Cf. Athir IX. P. 166.
 2. The name of the Abbasid Caliph appears on all the coins minted in the territories administered by the Buwayhids in Persia. Cf. Lane Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties.
 3. Misk. II. P. 364-365; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 398-399.
 4. Ibid. 119 ; Ibid. 123.
- Rukn al-Dawlā when he received the robes of honour for the province of Khurāsān donned them in public and read his deed in the public mosque.

Qādī without the sanction of the Caliph but actually farmed the post for 200,000 dirhams a year,¹ things did not pass off quite smoothly for him. The Caliph declined to receive his nominee and would not permit him to be presented to him even on reception days; and two years later when he was removed, his successor set aside all his judgments on the ground that he had bought his office.² When Bahā al-Dawlā wanted to place the judicial system under the Shīʿī Chief Judge, he could not succeed owing to the refusal of the Caliph to nominate him. Consequently the otherwise all powerful Buwayhid Amīr had to content himself with a separate office-holder, called Naqīb, to administer justice amongst the Shīʿās according to their code of law.³

A transcript of the letter of appointment of the Chief Qādī in the name of the Caliph in 366/976 in the Rasā'il as-Sābi is of interest as indicating the substantial independence still enjoyed by the officers of justice. Since most of the Qādīs received a very meagre allowance, just enough to maintain them-

1. Misk. II. P. 189; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 205; Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 399.

2. Misk. II. P. 196; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 212; Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 407.

3. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 129.

4. Mez. Renaissance of Islām, trans. Khudā Bakhsh in Islāmīc Culture, Jan. 1931, P. 136-137; quoted from Rasā'il as-Sābi, Pp. 118-127. The Qādī is enjoined to study the Qurān constantly and offer prayers punctually. He is to show impartiality in matters of justice between Muslim and non-Muslim. He is authorized to select 'Attestors' discreetly and to employ an experienced legally trained Kātib, an incorruptible court usher (Hājib) and a trustworthy deputy for work if he cannot personally attend to it.

selves and their family, or sometimes even no salary at all¹, they were little inclined to yield to political pressure and feared neither Caliph nor Amīr.²

Besides delivering justice, one of the chief duties of the Qādīs was to prepare a list of 'Attestors' (public notaries) who should be of irreproachable character. The Qādīs were punctilious in filling up this list; every six months fresh nominations were made and undesirable names were removed.³ From among these Attestors were chosen a fixed number of persons to constitute a body of Assessors to assist the Qādīs.⁴ These assessors were appointed personally by the Qādīs and had to vacate their posts automatically by the removal or dismissal of the Qādī who had appointed them.⁵ That in the selection of the Attestors the Qādīs were not influenced by the temporal authorities, can be illustrated by the fact that when 'Adud al-Dawlā's general asked him to direct the Qādī to include a name in the list of Attestors he gave the following reply, 'You should speak about the promotion of soldiers. The inclusion of names in the list of Attestors is the Qādī's business

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 196; Eclipse, trans. V.P. 212.

2 & 3. Mez, Renaissance of Islām, trans. by Khudā Bakhsh in Islāmic Culture, Jan. 1931, P. 125.

4. The Baghdad Qādī al-Isfarā'īnī (d. 406/1015) could say to the Caliph Qādir that he dare not dismiss him. On the contrary he - the Qādī - need only write to Khurāsān to shake the Caliph's throne. Cf. also the well known instance of Māwardī's decision against Jalāl al-Dawlā's receiving the title of Malik al-Mulūk (Athir, IX.P.312-13).

4. & 5. Mez. Renaissance of Islām, trans. Khudā Bakhsh, in Islāmic culture, Jan. 1931. P. 134-135.

ness. Neither you nor I have any voice in the matter.¹ The Caliph as the religious head could intervene if in his opinion any person of doubtful character was included in the list of Attestors. Yet sometimes the position of a Qādī was rendered very precarious if pressure was brought to bear upon him by the reigning Amīr; and in such cases usually a compromise was effected.²

The Imāms of the mosques were directly responsible to the Caliph and generally had to carry out his orders. Of course the Buwayhid Amīrs would, if they so desired prevent the Caliph's orders from being carried out; nevertheless, they generally did not interfere with them owing to public sentiment. The Imāms were also responsible for seeing that no innovations were introduced in the Khutbā. In 420/1029, when the Shīās introduced an innovation in the Khutbā at Karkh, the Caliph appointed a Khatīb and although he was stoned and prayers were stopped, yet subsequently the Shīā leaders apologized to the Caliph and asked his

1. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 15.

2. Misk. III. P. 270-280; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 295-298.

Two traders while in Mecca on pilgrimage had employed a person who was not officially recognized as Attestor. When the purchaser, on his return, sought the ratification of his contract by the Qādīs, the latter, in accordance with the Caliph's instructions in such cases, refused to ratify it. Upon this the purchaser invoked the help of the Buwayhid Amīr (Bahā al-Dawlā) who issued orders to his representative at Baghdad to see to the ratification. The Qādīs were placed in a very awkward situation. One of them who did not carry out the instructions of the Buwayhid Amīr was rebuked by the representative of the Amīr and had to leave his place; while the other three were summoned by the Caliph who severely rebuked and detained them in his palace. The Caliph also issued orders that the names of these Qādīs and the Attestors be struck off the list and their discharge be proclaimed from the pulpit. The whole matter was compromised only by bringing to the Caliph's notice that his orders could very well be stopped from being carried out; and that one of the Attestors in question was the only respectable living marginal witness to the deposition of the late Caliph.

permission to read the Khutbā in his name in the usual manner, which was done.¹

That the religious functions were still under the control of the Caliph is borne out by the fact that when the Caliph Qā'im in 426/1034 felt annoyed with Jalāl al-Dawlā, he, in order to bring the latter to his senses, issued orders to the Qādīs, Faqīhs, Imāms and persons in charge of marriage to suspend their functions.²

It was during this period of degradation that systematic exposition of the theoretical position of the office of the Caliphate was given by one of the most important jurists of Islām, 'Alī Ibn Muḥammad, Al-Māwardī (381/991-450/1058). The motive of the latter in propounding a theory which stands in such glaring contrast to the actual facts and practice, may perhaps be found in the fact that at this time not only the Buwayhids (who being Shī'as had no real respect for the Abbasids) but also the Muslim Sunni independent rulers, out of political necessity, had begun to ignore the existence of certain Caliphs at Baghdad.³ In such circumstances there was grave danger of the utter destruction of the institution with the consequent result of the disappearance of that semblance of Islāmic unity that existed between the various Sunni states owing to their common

1. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 278.

2. Ibid. P. 300.

3. The Sāmānids as will be shown later, did not recognize the Caliph Muṭī' for about ten years and the Caliph Tā'ī at all.

bond of allegiance, however nominal to their religious head. It is quite possible that Māwardī may have written this treatise on the institution of the Muslim state at the instigation of the Caliph with the object of showing the importance of the Caliphate and bringing the necessity of its existence before the notice of the Buwayhids, the Sunni public and the Sunni Muslim independent rulers, notwithstanding the apparent weakness of its actual situation.¹ But is it not more likely that it was the very fact of the excessive weakness of the Caliphate that instigated him to write his work as a reminder to the Sunni Muslim World and its rulers that the Caliphate was not a casual political institution which had outlived its day, but a divinely ordained institution which formed an integral part of the religious structure of Islām?. It is absurd to suppose that a man of the intelligence of Māwardī should have composed such a treatise as a mere essay in theoretical idealism. Hence he sets out to show what the Caliphate ought to be, and ignores its actual weak and degraded position, in bondage, to the Buwayhids, at the same time, like all Sunni jurists, he is concerned to rebut the argument that the Sunni community has been living in sin, and hence finds it necessary to give legal sanction to a variety of practices which to a

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1. The high regard in which Māwardī was held by the Caliph is shown by the fact that he was the first to bear the title 'Aqdā'e-Qudāt (Yāqūt, Irsād, V. 407). Māwardī was several times employed on diplomatic service by the Caliph; and his chief mission was to induce the Muslim rulers to pay homage to the Abbasid Caliphate. Cf. *Maw*, ix. 285.

certain extent are in conflict with the religious ideal. Thus, in consideration of the practice of his time, he devises a category of temporal governors whom he calls 'Amīrs by force' within which the Buwayhids and other independent princes of his time such as the Ghaznevids can be placed, but endeavours to mitigate this concession and brings it within the principles of the Islāmic law by laying down certain conditions to be fulfilled by them for the validity of their claims.

An Amīr by force, according to Māwardī, is a person who, without the knowledge or consent of the Caliph, takes possession of certain territories by force of arms; and the Caliph, being powerless, to prevent his seizure of temporal power, entrusts him with the entire administration of those possessions.¹ In this case, says Māwardī, 'The Amīr would be a permanent ruler but the Imām or Caliph by the nature of his position as religious head would be considered the source of all orders relating to religion so that an illegal and unconstitutional Amirate may be validated as legal and constitutional'. For the installation of such an usurper, seven conditions are then laid down which he must needs fulfil.

1. He should preserve and respect the dignity of the Caliph as the supreme religious head of the entire Muslim community.
2. He should make open religious submission to the Caliph so that there may not be any doubt of opposition to him.
3. He should remain on good terms with the Caliph, and render him assistance in all common matters of Islām in order to maintain the prestige of Islām in the eyes of strangers.

1. Māwardī, *Akḥām al-Sultāniyā*, P. 32.

4. He should maintain religious rights and should see that orders and decisions relating thereto are not set aside.¹
5. He should collect revenue in accordance with the laws prescribed by the Shariā, and should exercise justice and equity therein.
6. He should watch that criminal justice is administered with fairness.
7. He should protect the faith and encourage it, and should abstain from all forbidden things. If he finds people obedient to the religious laws, then he should give them their religious rights, if on the other hand, he finds them indifferent, he should extend to them the invitation of Islām.²

It has already been shown that the Buwayhids being Shiās, had no belief in and consequently no regard for the religious claims of the Abbasid Caliphate; as such therefore they could not sincerely comply with those obligations which were of a purely religious character. They did show outward respect to the office of the Caliphate and tried to maintain its prestige in the public eye; but that was mainly to serve their own political ends. On the contrary, they did certain things which further degraded the position of the Caliph; and gave much offence to the Sunnis at Baghdad.

As soon as Mu'izz al-Dawlā thoroughly established himself at Baghdad, he tried to bring the Shiā element, which consti-

1. This clause is rendered in 'Orient Under the Caliph, trans. by Khudā Bakhsh, P. 277, as 'To respect the Caliph's nomination to religious offices e.g. Qādīs and Imāms'. This is a gross mis-interpretation of the fourth condition given on page 33 of Ahkām al-Sultāniyā.

2. Māwardī, Ahkām al-Sultāniyā, P. 32-33.

tuted only a small portion of the population¹, into prominence at the expense of the major sect. i.e. the Sunnis. The State encouragement given to the Shī'ās emboldened them to the extent of writing the following words in bold letters on the mosques and houses of the Sunnis in 351/962, "May God curse Mu'āwiyā Ibn Abī Sufyān who usurped the Caliphate, those who confiscated Fadak from Fāṭimā, those who prevented Ḥasan from being buried by the side of his maternal grand-father, those who banished Abū Dharr/~~al~~-Ghifārī and those who turned out Ibn 'Abbās from the Council". When it was found effaced during the night, Mu'izz al-Dawlā was advised to replace them with 'May God curse the doers of wrong against the family of the Prophet of Allāh', not mentioning the name of anybody except Mu'āwiyā².

In the following year (352/963) Mu'izz al-Dawlā introduced the ceremony of the tenth of Muḥarram. All the shops and markets were ordered to be closed on that day and people were made to put on clothes made of hair cloth to lament the event of the martyrdom of Ḥusayn. The women were made to come out with dishevelled hair and blackened faces, and go round the city and its suburbs beating their faces in mourning.³ The other chief festival of the Shī'ās, namely 'Īd al-Ghadr, was also celebrated with great rejoicings. The official quarters were illuminated

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 328; Eclipse, trans. V.P. 355.

2. Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 403.

3. Ibid. P. 407.

and shops were kept open all night.¹ With Mu'izzal-Dawla at the helm of state affairs, the Caliph was unable to stop these innovations which were hurting the sentiments of the Sunnis, and in spite of the resentment of the latter they were carried on by the Shi'as.

Even the two most important religious functions of the Caliph i.e. Waging of Jihād and supervision of the pilgrimage were neglected during the Buwayhid regime. The Caliph shirked the responsibility for fulfilling the above obligations by saying that these duties belonged to those who had undertaken the administration of the Empire,² whilst the Buwayhids, being Shi'as, did not care to discharge them as they involved expenditure without any definite personal advantage to them.³

During this period of irresponsibility especially when the Hamdānids' attention was divided between fighting with the Byzantines on the one hand and the Buwayhids on the other, the former were able to raid the Muslim territories and cause incalculable damage to Muslims' lives and property. The horrors committed by them⁴ touched the heart of every Muslim save those

1. Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 407.

2. See above, P. 45.

3. The sacred cities at this time being in the hands of the Fātimids.

4. In 351/962, the Byzantines entered 'Ain Zarbā and massacred about 66,000 Muslims; the Domesticus remained on Islāmic territory for twenty one days, took fifty four forts and massacred 400,000 citizens of the town of Tarsūs. Cf. Misk. II. P. 190-91. In 354/965 about 200,000, men, women and Muslim children were dragged to the Byzantine country, and the public mosque of Tarsūs was turned into a stable and many Muslims were forcibly converted to Christianity. Cf. Misk. II. P. 211, trans. V. P. 225.

of the Caliph and the Buwayhid Amīr¹. In the year 361/972, when the Byzantines raided Nasibīn, took possession of the place and burnt it down, killing men and taking children captive, a number of people from Diyār Rabiā and Diyār Bakr came to Baghdad summoning the Muslims to arms in the public mosques and in the streets. It was only then that a number of people of Baghdad joined them and they all went to the palace of the Caliph Mutī and succeeded in gaining admission to him by breaking through the windows. They employed insolent language to him, telling him that he was incompetent to discharge the duties which God had enjoined upon the Imāms. The leading men of Baghdad came to remonstrate with Bakhtiyār who though ostensibly visiting the martyrrium was really on a hunting expedition. They addressed him in the following words, "You are neglecting the interests of the Muslims and instead of devoting your energies to an attack on the Byzantines, you are wasting them on a fight with 'Imrān who is one of the people of the Qiblā", Bakhtiyār promised to return, make peace with 'Imrān and come back to the frontiers. On his return to Wāsiṭ, he sent

Miskawayh, II. P. 202; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 216-217.

In 355/966 about 20,000 Khurāsānians including various jurists and Shaykhs proclaiming themselves bent on the Sacred War, asked the permission of Rukn al-Dawlā to cross the frontier. Such permission being given to them, they demanded a huge sum of money saying: "We require the entire land tax of the province which are in your hands, for you may only collect it for the Treasury of the Muslims, to be used in case of emergency; and there can be no greater emergency than the ambition of the Byzantines and Armenians to conquer us and gain possession of our frontiers, and the inability of the Muslims to resist them". They also demanded that an army should be sent out to join them but when their demands were not met, they proceeded to quarrel with the Daylemites whom they cursed as unbelievers. Their quarrel with the Daylemites led to a conflict with Rukn al-Dawlā who, through a strategem, defeated them. Thus they all were

orders to Abū Taghlib, governor of Maṣīl, asking him to prepare sufficient provisions and fodder for himself and his army since he intended to make a ^{raid} ~~raid~~ on the Byzantines. He also sent an order to Sabuktāgin, the Chamberlain who was in Baghdad, to join in the Sacred War with him. Although the latter found an unexpected response from the public to his hypocritical call, yet being not desirous of leading them, he kept them as a sort of reserve for himself, in consequence of which they became a serious source of trouble. Being inactive they began to quarrel with each other killing each other plundering each other's goods and violating each other's woman folk. The matter assumed grave proportions and instead of using their energies in the Sacred War for which they were assembled, they devoted them to the devastation of Baghdad itself.¹ It was not without irony that Bakhtiyār under the pretext of waging Sacred War extorted 400,00 dirhams from the Caliph Muṭī' on this occasion.²

It is no wonder that during this period, the route of the

dispersed and went back to Rayy whence they had come. Cf. Misk. II. P. 222-227; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 234-241; Ibn Athir, VIII. P. 421-422.

1. Misk. II. P. 303-305; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 326-327.

2. Ibid. 308; Ibid. P. 330.

pilgrim caravans was not safe.) Such was the neglect of both the Caliph and the Buwayhid Amirs in this wise that Badr b. Ḥaṣanwayh, a Kurdish chief, transmitted five thousand dinars with the caravan from Khurāsān to be spent in guarding the road. Later on he increased the sum to nine thousand finally raised his contribution to the sum of 20,000 dinars annually. When he died in 405/1014, this stoppage seriously affected the beneficiaries; where upon the pilgrimage came to a stand-still.²

The utter subservience of the Caliphs to the Buwayhids who had taken over all the powers without any corresponding duties or responsibilities, was also to affect the relations of the Caliphate with those Sunni independent rulers who were the political rivals of the Buwayhids. In this category fall the Sāmānids whose relations shall now be traced.

1. In 353/964 the Kurds made an united attack on the pilgrim caravan that was returning to Khurāsān, and seized and plundered it near Hulwān whither the pilgrims returned. Cf. Misk. II. P. 203; trans. V. P. 217. Again in 355/966 a vast caravan consisting of pilgrims, merchants and refugees from Syria to Irāq who were migrating for fear of the Byzantines, was robbed by the Banū Sulaym. Some of the people returned to Egypt but most of them perished. Cf. Misk. II. P. 215; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 228.
2. Misk. III. P. 287; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 306. In addition to this he transmitted a sufficient amount of money to be expended in repairing the road or to be given to the descendants of the Refugees and Helpers in the two sanctuaries or to the nobles, ascetics, Qurān readers and members of distinguished families in Baghdad; thus raising his contribution to the sum of 20,000 dinars annually.

With the establishment of the Buwayhid power at Baghdad, the relations between the Caliphate and the Sāmānids could not have been the same as they were before. The Sāmānids were well aware of the fact that as the political rivals of the Buwayhids in Persia they would be required continuously to wage war against them over the possession of Rayy, Jibāl, Tabaristān and even Khurāsān; and that the Caliph being a puppet in the hands of the Buwayhids, was a mere instrument to serve their ends. Therefore any orders of the Caliph affecting the political position of the Sāmānids in Persia could not very well be obeyed. To send any tribute or even presents to the Caliphate¹ under such circumstances was to fill up the coffers of the Buwayhids, and it would be used against the Sāmānids themselves.² Even realizing all these factors, the Sāmānids did not hesitate to recognize the Caliph Mutī' who was set up by the Buwayhids after their most insulting deposition of the Caliph Mustakfi on the occasion of a grand assembly which was held in honour of the reception given to the Khurāsānian ambassador.³ This humiliatin

1. Misk. II. P. 307-308; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 330; Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 456.

2. Miskawayh, II. P. 143-144; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 151. In 341/952 on the occasion of the invasion of Rayy by the Khurāsānians, Rukn al-Dawla received a million dirhams on demand from Mu'izz al-Dawla in addition to other help given in shape of forces.

3. Miskawayh, II. P. 86; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 90; Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 338-339.

treatment meted out to the Caliph coupled with the insult done to their own ambassador should have been a sufficient cause for the Sāmānids to break off all relations with the Caliphate by not recognizing the Caliph, Mutī, who by means of an intrigue against the late Caliph, Mustakfi and currying favour with the Buwayhids, was raised to the office of the Caliphate.¹ But the Sāmānids waited till their own political interests were in jeopardy. For about two years they continued to recognize the Caliph Mutī² but afterwards they ceased to pay homage to him. There is no definite historical evidence to show the real cause that led the Sāmānids to take this abrupt step. Most probably it was the outcome of the rebellion of Abū 'Alī Ibn Muhtāj, the commander of the Khurāsānian forces, instigated by the Buwayhid³ in alliance with Ibrāhīm, the uncle of Nūh, who was employed in the army of Naṣīr al-Dawlā, the Hamdānid at Mausil. In 334/945, Abū 'Alī invited Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad to Khurāsān informing him that he (Abū 'Alī) had appointed him sovereign and obtained allegiance for him from his followers. Ibrāhīm was also supported

1. Cf. P. 44. above.

2. Misk. II. P. 156-157; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 167;

Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 381: Both the above historians state that the Caliph Mutī was not recognized by the Sāmānids from the time of his accession to the Caliphate, and Ibn Muhtāj was the first to introduce his name in the Khutbā in 343/954 in Khurāsān. But in view of the fact that there exists a coin No. 359 minted at Bukhārā in the year 335 A.H. bearing the name of the Caliph Mutī, it becomes difficult to accept their statement. Cf. Lane Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, P. 98.

3. Misk. II. P. 100-101; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 106.

One of the conditions of peace between Rukn al-Dawlā and Nūh was that 'Imād al-Dawlā would help the former against Abū 'Alī. 'Imād al-Dawlā at the same time instigated Abū 'Alī by sending him a missive that he ('Imād al-Dawlā) remained constant in his attachment and alliance with him and warned him against the treachery of Nūh.

by Nasir al-Dawlā who sent him robes of honour and tied a banner for him in the name of the Caliph Mutī'.¹ Rayy was evacuated by Abū 'Alī Ibn Muhtāj for Rukn al-Dawlā who also occupied Jibāl in the year 335/946. The same year Nūh was routed by the combined forces of the opposition, and Abū 'Alī and Ibrāhīm entered Bukhārā where they captured the stores and treasures that were there, and had homage paid to Ibrāhīm. On this occasion, Abū 'Alī communicating the joyful intelligence to 'Imād al-Dawlā, asked the latter to secure a deed of investiture with the government of Khurāsān for Ibrāhīm.² It was perhaps to nullify the importance of such deeds that Nuh decided on this action, and continued not to recognize the Caliph Mutī' for full nine years.³

The position in which the Sāmānids, who were staunch Sunnis now found themselves was most embarrassing. As a religious institution of the Sunni community the Abbasid Caliphate had to be recognized by mentioning the name of the Caliph in the Khutbā on Fridays and other ceremonial occasions, and by having the name of the Caliph inscribed on the coinage current in their dominion and they had in return to secure the renewal of the deed of investiture on the demise of every Amīr in order to legalise their administration. Since Nūh B. Naṣr held the deed from the

1. Misk. II. P. 101; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 107.

Ibn Athīr, VIII . P. 344.

2. Misk. II. P. 101-102; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 107-108.

3. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muḥammadan Dynasties, PP. 99-102.

All the coins minted from 336 to 344 A.H. in the territories of the Sāmānids bear the name of the Caliph Mustakfi who was deposed and blinded by the Buwayhids in 334/945.

late Caliph Mustakfi, he could very well afford not to recognize the Caliph Muti' set up by the Buwayhids. In order to fulfil the other obligations i.e. the offering of the prayers in the name of the Abbasid Caliph and inscribing his name on the coinage, the Amir hit on the ingenious device of continuing to mention the name of the late Caliph in the Khutbā and inscribing it on the coinage as well. But the position became ridiculous when the deposed and blinded Caliph died in 338/949¹, and the Sāmānids continued to put his name on the coinage till 344/955. This was the first occasion when political necessity compelled the rulers to devise such an expedient by which they could ignore the orders of the Caliphs but at the same time could satisfy the public sentiment by putting the name of the dead Caliph in the Khutbā and coinage; thus recognizing the necessity of the institution and yet disregarding the sacrilegious moves of wire-pullers. It was this example first set by the Sāmānids, that was followed later on, though in modified form, by the Mongols who when converted to Islām needed such an expedient.²

1. Ibn Athir, VIII. P. 338.

2. Ibid. 341. As a temporary expedient Naṣir al-Dawla also adopted the same line of action. While at war with Mu'izz al-Dawla in 334/945, he prohibited any transaction with the coins bearing the name of the Caliph Muti', and had the new coins struck with the die bearing the name of the Caliph Muttaki'.
 3. For political reasons, the Mongols when converted to Islām did not want to recognize the Egyptian Caliphate but at the same time they wanted to satisfy their own consciences as well as those of the public by mentioning the name of some Caliph in the Khutbā and coinage. Consequently they hit on another novel device by giving this honour to the first four Caliphs or if Shiās, to twelve Imāms, whom they considered the only lawful Caliphs. Cf. Lane Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, P. 47-48. (Coins of the Mongols, Vol. VI.). Vassāf, P. 506.

The period between 336/947 and 344/955 when the Sāmānids did not recognize the Caliph Muṭī' was full of political rivalry between them and Rukn al-Dawlā who, actuated by the disturbed political condition, was bent upon carving out as big an independent state as possible. Ever since the death of Mardawij in 323/934, and later on of Mākān in 329/940, there had been a scramble for power between various claimants amongst whom the Sāmānids and Rukn al-Dawlā played an important part by encouraging and welcoming each other's rivals to gain their own political ends. It was therefore natural for the Sāmānids to discontinue their recognition of Muṭī' who was made to issue various orders against the Sāmānids during this period. Rukn al-Dawlā went so far as to ask his brother Mu'izz al-Dawlā to obtain a deed of investiture for him for the government of Khurāsān in 337/948 which was actually done by the latter.¹ Rukn al-Dawlā donned his robes of honour and appeared in public to convince them of his rightful claims; and recited his deed of investiture with the government of Khurāsān in the presence of the judges, military commanders and notables.² Again in 343/954 Abū 'Alī Ibn Muḥtāj when dismissed by the Sāmānid ruler Nūh b. Naṣr, raised the standard of revolt against the Khurāsānian government, sought the help of Rukn al-Dawlā and asked him to secure a deed from the Caliph. Mu'izz al-Dawlā received the envoy of Abū 'Alī with

1. Misk. II. P. 118; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 122.

2. Ibid. 119; Ibid. P. 123.

great honour and introduced him to the Caliph, Mutī', who issued a deed of investiture to Abū 'Alī in place of Nūh b. Naṣr. Mu'izz al-Dawlā also despatched Abū Mansūr Lashkarwāz to reinforce Abū 'Alī. The latter omitted the name of the ruler of Khurāsān from the Khutbā at Nishāpūr in the year 343/954 and inserted that of the Caliph Mutī'.¹ But such actions had no effect on the minds of the public who knew very well the abject position of the Caliph, and that he was a mere tool in the hands of the Buwayhids; and were persuaded also of the validity of the claims of the Sāmānids who had ceased to recognize that Caliph. Nor did the Sāmānids, under the circumstances, have any scruples in disobeying these orders. The new Amīr 'Abd al-Malik who succeeded Nūh in 343/954 marched against Nishāpūr and after expelling Abū 'Alī, took possession of it. Abū 'Alī fled to Rukn al-Dawlā but soon after died with his son. In the following year, the Khurāsānian army marched towards Rayy and took possession of Iṣfahān. The Sāmānid general grew so bold after this victory that he pursued the son of Rukn al-Dawlā and plundered his belongings; only the skill and courage of Ibnu'l 'Amīd, Rukn al-Dawlā's wazīr, saved him from complete annihilation.*

But the new ruler of Khurāsān, 'Abd al-Malik, although recognized as de facto Amīr, did not hold any legal title to his territories from any of the Abbasid Caliphs. He was, in conse-

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 156-157; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 167.

See above P.61, note 2.

2. Ibn Athīr, VIII. P. 383-384.

quence, anxious to come to terms with Rukn al-Dawlā in order to obtain a deed of investiture from the Caliph, without which the appointment of Qādīs and other religious officials was not considered valid. Besides being a religious obligation, it was also a political necessity. How much importance the rulers attached to the securing of a deed from the Caliph even during this period can well be seen from the reply of Nasir al-Dawlā, the Hamdānid to his employee, Ibrāhīm b. Ahmad, the uncle of Nūh. When the latter on an invitation of Abū 'Alī in 334/945 to dethrone Nūh, the Sāmānid, asked the permission of his master, Nasir al-Dawlā, the latter replied in the following words, "We are just about to start for Baghdad so wait till we enter it, when the Caliph will invest, give you a robe of honour from his place, and tie a banner for you; this will add to your glory and strengthen your cause."

After making peace in 344/955 with Rukn al-Dawlā on condition that the latter should have Rayy and Jibāl on payment of a certain sum of money to the ruler of Khurāsān.² 'Abd al-Malik sent his sister's son along with a representative of Rukn al-Dawlā to the Caliph, Muṭī', requesting the latter to grant him ('Abd al-Malik) the deed of investiture for the government of Khurāsān.³ The Caliph delivered the robes of honour to the envoy for 'Abd al-Malik and tied the banner for him. He added to the robes of a governor those of a messmate; and presented him with

1. Miskawayh, II. P. 101; Eclipse, V. P. 107, as noted above, P.62. Naṣir al-Dawlā actually sent him the robes of honour & tied a banner for him in the name of the Caliph Muṭī'.

2. Misk. II. P. 161; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 172.

3. Ibid. Ibid. P. 173.

a horse.¹

Another and final breach was brought about in their relations with the Buwayhids which led the Sāmānids not to recognize at all the Caliph Qādir set up by them. This was over the deposition of the Caliph Tāi in 381/991 by Bahā al-Dawlā who actuated by his greed for the supposed wealth of the Caliph, deposed him without any fault of his.² As in the previous case, the Sāmānids continued to offer prayers for the deposed Caliph Tāi and, as their coinage shows, to inscribe his name on the coins³, refusing to recognize the new Caliph Qādir in spite of the efforts which he made through the pilgrims whom he addressed on this subject in 383/993. The Khurāsānians undertook to bear a message and letters to the Sāmānid ruler, but nothing came of it.⁴

These two incidents show very well the attitude of the Sāmānids towards the recognition of the Abbasid Caliphate. In fact, their ties with the institution were loosening day by day. The last two Sāmānid rulers Mansūr (387/997-389/999) and 'Abd al-Malik who ruled for a few months, carried on the government without obtaining any legal title, but the putting of the names of the deposed Caliphs of the Abbasid house in the Khutbā and coinage gives proof of their loyalty to the cause of the Abbasid

1. Misk. II. P. 161; Eclipse, trans. V. P. 173.

2. Ibid. III. P. 201; Ibid. VI. P. 213; Athīr, IX. P. 55.

3. Lane Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, P. 114.

4. Misk. III. P. 250; Eclipse trans. VI. P. 265-266.

Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 103. As late as the year 388 A.H. the name of the Caliph Tāi appears on a coin minted at Herāt. Cf. Art. 297 of 1929, Indian Numismatic Supplement, published from the proceedings of the Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Caliphate. That the Sāmānids were genuinely devoted to the institution can be known also by the fact that they not only recognized it throughout their regime, but also considered it as one of their duties to get it recognized by the Buwayhids. In 373/983 after the death of Mu'ayyad al Dawla and the establishment of Fakhr al Dawla in his place, Ibn Sādān, his wazir, tried to bring about a reconciliation between him and Samsām al Dawlā. Amongst other things, he wrote to the former about the arrival of an envoy from Khurāsān conveying the terms of peace, of which the first condition was to be submission to the 'Abbasid Caliphate (a religious obligation and a qualification for worldly success.)¹

The Sāmānids had a great regard for the institution of the Caliphate and it was chiefly due to this that in spite of the fact that their rivals, the Buwayhids, were arrogating to themselves high-sounding and flattering titles irrespective of whether they were bestowed upon them or not, they on their part never assumed any such titles, and were content with 'Walī of the Commander of the Faithful' - a title which was granted to them by the Caliphate itself.² No doubt they granted high sounding titles to their subordinates, but such titles were not considered so respectable as those granted by the Caliphate. How much importance was attached to the latter can be seen from the fact that one of the conditions of peace of Abū 'Alī Simjūrī with the

1. Miskawayh, III. P. 98; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 101.

2. Narshakhy, P. 160. The epithet 'Malik' often appears on the coinage of the Samanids. Cf. Lane Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties.

Sāmānid Amīr was that the former should be granted the same title which they (the Sāmānids) themselves had from the Caliphate;¹ although he had already received from Nūh, the Sāmānid, a much more high-sounding title, i.e. 'Divinely aided Amīr of Amīrs'.²

In compliance with the conditions laid down in the deed of investiture, the Sāmānids like other Sunnī governors, were expected to rule their territories in accordance with the laws of the Shari'ā; and this explains the organisation of their government on the same model as that of the Caliphate itself. The Caliphs had no hand from the very beginning of their rule in the appointment of the Sāmānid Amīrs beyond sanctioning by issuing deed after their accession to the throne. Hereditary succession was the general rule. Like most of the Caliphs, the Sāmānids used to nominate their successors and some of them designated two or three successors in succession.³ In the absence of such nomination, the notables and religious heads chose the successor from amongst the members of the family.⁴ As in the case of the Caliphs so in the case of the Sāmānids, an oath of allegiance was taken by the electors and 'bayat' was done by all the people afterwards. Practically the same system was in vogue as in the case of the election of a Caliph with one exception that in the case of Amīrs, even minors might succeed

1. Narshakhi, P. 160.

2. Barthold, Turkestan, P. 253.

3. Gardizi, P. 39.

4. Ibid. P. 25.

without any difficulty.¹

Though the Sāmānids were aristocrats by origin, they never figured as autocrats in their rule. They bound themselves by the laws of the Shariā, and thus did not hold themselves above the law. Most of them were pious Muslims, easy of access to the public and noted for their justice, equity and moderation. For the administration of justice there was a Qādī of Qādīs with various subordinates under him.² Like most of the Caliphs, some of the Amīrs or a member of a royal family held the Court of Madhālīm to investigate legal disputes especially complaints of oppression on the part of officials.³ The learned and the theologians enjoyed great honour in the Sāmānid dominions. Once in order to show respect to a learned and pious man, Ismāīl moved seven steps backwards.⁴ The most learned and worthy man was selected from amongst the Faqīhs of the Hanafite School at Bukhārā and important matters were decided according to his instructions.⁵

There was also in existence an office corresponding to the office of a Muftī or Shaykh al-Islām of later period; the holder of which bore the title of Ustād.⁶ There was also the post of the Muhtasib which was entrusted to an influential person who treated cases without any partiality or fear. His duty was the same as under the Caliphate, i.e. to punish all those who openly violated

1. Gardīzī, P. 25. Amir Naṣr was only eight years old when he succeeded to the throne.

2. Barthold, Turkeṣtān, P. 232.

3. Siyāsatnāmā, P. 17.

4. Mir Khwānd, P. 715.

5. Barthold, Turkeṣtān, P. 232; quoted from Bib. Geog. Arab III. P. 339.

6. Ibid. P. 232.

the sacred law, attempted to cheat customers or failed to pay the established taxes.¹ In matters of weights and measures such strictness was observed that when Ismā'īl heard that certain measures with which the corn for Kharāj used to be weighed were heavier than they ought to have been, he sent for them to Bukhārā and cut the additional weight; and made it a punishable offence.²

The model of government being the same, it is not surprising to find that the Sāmānids were in the long run to meet the same fate at the hands of their governors as the Caliphate met at their own hands. In both cases, with the decline of the central authority, the provincial governors assumed independence and only kept up a semblance of unity by putting the name of their overlords in the Khutbā and coinage. In the absence of any national movement in Mediaeval times, the Sāmānids in spite of their good government, could not rally any national support to their cause against either the Qārā Khānids or Maḥmūd of Ghaznā, who divided their territories between themselves and put an end to the first independent Persian dynasty. When the Sāmānid possessions were threatened in 390/1000 by the Qārā Khānids, the Sāmānid preachers in Bukhārā ascended the mosque pulpits calling on the people to enlist, and saying in the name of the

1. Barthold, Turkestan, P. 231.

2. Mir Khwānd, P. 716; Ibn Khaldūn, III. P. 334-335.

Sāmānids: "You are aware how well we have conducted ourselves and how cordial have been the relations between us. This enemy now menaces us, and it is your manifest duty to help us and fight on our behalf. So ask God's grace in succouring our cause." When the common people heard this, they instead of listening to the appeals of the Sāmānid agents and helping them in their hour of need, consulted the Muslim jurists on the subject of fighting. The latter dissuaded them, saying: "If the Khān's followers were at variance with you on religion, it would be a duty to fight them. But where the object of dispute is temporal, no Muslim has a right to risk his life and expose himself to bloodshed. These persons (i.e. the enemy) are well conducted, and orthodox; it is better to keep away from the fray".² "This", says the historian, "was one of the chief causes of the victory of the Khānites, of the rout of the Sāmānids, and the extinction of their empire".³

In Persia proper, the Sāmānid possessions were conquered by Amīr Maḥmūd of Ghaznā, whose relations with the Abbasid Caliphate it now falls to trace.

1. Misk. III. P. 373; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 400.
The above historian holds that most of the people of Bukhārā as also of Transoxaniā were bearers of arms.

2. & 3. Ibid. III. P. 373; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 400.

With the disappearance of the Sāmānids as rulers, the legal title by which they were authorized to rule the country also ended and it reverted to its grantor i.e. the central government which was the sovereign de jure. Likewise the authority delegated to the Sāmānids by the Caliphate to appoint Qādīs and other religious officials lapsed, and the mandates of the Qādīs were in theory annulled until the new ruler was lawfully established. Maḥmūd of Ghaznā, after his victory over the Sāmānids, required a legal title to hold the country which he had already conquered; and must have the delegated authority from the Caliphate to carry on the administration of justice in accordance with the Sharīʿa.¹ Hence it follows that Maḥmūd in his relations with the Caliphate was guided by political as well as religious motives.

The very fact that he recognized Qādir instead of the deposed Caliph Tāi who was still recognized by the Sāmānids and whom Maḥmūd himself had recognized while serving under the Sāmānids,² at once shows his motive. It was not because he considered the Caliph Qādir as the rightly elected Caliph that he recognized him in preference to the deposed Caliph Tāi, but

1. It would be a mistake to think that the Caliphate only in its position of a religious head was considered to bestow any part of the Islāmic empire on any body it chose. Most writers have completely ignored the other aspect of the question i.e. that the Caliphate was the custodian of the sovereignty de jure which it never parted with, and went on renewing both on the change of the Caliph and the ruler. Of course it was chiefly due to the position of the Caliphate as the religious head that the Muslim ruler respected that right.

2. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, II. P. 131. On a gold coin minted at Nishāpūr in 385 A.H. appear the names of the Caliph Tāi and Nuḥ b. Mansūr on the reverse side, and that of Maḥmūd on the obverse side.

because otherwise he could obtain neither the legal title to rule the country nor the delegated authority to administer justice in accordance with the laws of the Sharīʿa.

The first thing which Mahmūd, after his victory over the Sāmānids in 389/999, did was to draft a petition¹ to the Caliph Qādir in the most humble terms, calling himself and his brother slaves of the Commander of the Faithful, and heaping prayers on him and ascribing every possible virtue to him. He states in this petition that the sole cause of his fighting against the Sāmānids was that in spite of every exhortation on his part, they would not recognize the Caliph h. "I appealed to Mansūr b. Nūh, and urged him with my utmost strength thereunto, only he would not listen to dutiful admonition, nor attend to enlightening exhortation".² He then describes the course of the war in detail and speaks of his victory and the steps subsequently taken by him in the following words: "And now when I write this letter, God has opened to the Commander of the Faithful all the territory of Khurāsān, and caused its pulpits to rival one another in mention of his name; in him the cause of right triumphs, and desires vie in embracing his side. Further I have taken no steps so as to bind or loose, ratify or annul, till I should obtain from him some exalted order which should

1. The petition of Mahmūd to the Caliph Qādir is printed and translated in Misk. III. P. 341-345, and Eclipse, trans. VI. P P. 366-370 respectively.

2. Misk. III. P. 342; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 367.

serve as a basis for my building as a call for me to follow, by God's grace and favour."¹ After describing his victory as the victory of the Commander of the Faithful Maḥmūd makes out his case for the Amirate of Khurāsān and outlying provinces already conquered by him in the following words, "And if our Lord and master the Commander of the Faithful think meet to deign to peruse this letter and employ his slave on his orders and prohibitions, let him do so if God will".²

On receiving the petition of Maḥmūd, the Caliph Qādir granted him a patent of sovereignty and crown, and confirmed him in all the possessions which he had already acquired. The Caliph also bestowed upon him the title of Yamin al-Dawlā wa Amin al-Millā³. As shown by the above petition Maḥmūd had already ordered the Caliph's name to be mentioned in the Khutbā all over his territories; but on Caliph's asking him to recognize the right of his son, Ghālīb, by conjoining his surname with that of the Caliph in the Khutbā, he made it a matter of obligation, and on all days of festivals and congregations caused the Khutbā to be read with these two surnames.⁴ The name of Ghālīb was also put on the coinage minted at Nishāpūr.⁵

Besides serving his own political ends Maḥmūd, by recognizing the Abbasid Caliphate, helped its cause a great deal, raised its

1. Misk. III. P. 344; Eclipse, trans. P. 369.

2. Ibid.

3. 'Uṭbī, P. 234.

4. Ibid.

5. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, P. 133:

It is only the coins minted at Nishāpūr which bear the name of Ghālīb, son of the Caliph, Qādir.

prestige in the eyes of the Muslim world and revived its authority in Persia. The acceptance of a deed of investiture by Mahmūd in 389/999 and another diploma in 417/1026 confirming him in possessions newly conquered¹ re-established not only the religious but also the political supremacy of the Caliphate, which had broken down at the end of the Sāmānid period. Mahmūd's successor, Masūd (421-432/1030-1040) also asked for and received deeds of investiture both on his accession to the throne² and on the death of the Caliph Qādir in 422/1031.³ The renewal of the deed of investiture to the Ghaznevids bound them with formidable oaths to abide by the conditions laid down therein⁴, and necessitated the despatch of large sums of money and numerous gifts to the Caliph and his officials on such occasions.⁵

According to Māwardī's classification of Amīrs, the Ghaznevids also fall within the third category, i.e. 'Amīrs by force'. And it will be interesting to see how far the seven conditions⁶

1. Gardizi, P. 87-88.

2. Bayhaqi, P. 45-46.

3. Ibid. P. 86.

4. Bayhaqi, PP. 384-389. There is a copy of an oath of allegiance taken by Masūd to the Caliph. The chief obligations are that he should rule his territory strictly in accordance with the laws of the Shariā; and render unconditional obedience to the Caliph.

5. Ibid. P. 46: On the occasion of the renewal of the deed, a grand reception was given to the Caliph's ambassador; and everything was put into good order so that favourable reports should be communicated to the Caliph. Presents in kind and coins were despatched to the Caliph and his officials. Cf. Bayhaqi, P. 361.

6. See above. P. 53-54. Whether this category was not explicitly designed to cover the position of Mahmūd?

laid down by Māwardī for such Amīrs, were complied with in actual practice by Maḥmūd and his successor, Masūd, in their relations with the Abbasid Caliphate.

1. Both Maḥmūd and his son Masūd maintained a respectful attitude towards the Abbasid Caliphate, and always considered the Caliph as their supreme religious head. In 391/1001, Wāthiqī, a descendant of the Caliph Wāthiq, after conspiring with the jurist Abu'l Faḍl Tamīmī, forged a letter in the name of the Caliph Qādir appointing Wāthiqī to the succession. Hārūn b. Ilak Bughrā Khāqān being convinced of his claims, warmly supported him and ordered that prayer should be offered for him throughout his dominions after the name of the Caliph. This action of Bughrā Khāqān created great uneasiness at the Caliph's court and led the Caliph Qādir to repudiate Wāthiqī's claims and to appoint his own son, Abu'l Faḍl (Ghālīb) his successor. On this occasion, Maḥmūd not only recognized the claims of Ghālīb by putting his name in the Khutbā and on the coinage, but when Wāthiqī came to Khurāsān to invoke Maḥmūd's help, the latter had him arrested and sent him as a prisoner to a fortress where he remained till his death.¹ But the greatest service that was rendered by the Ghaznevīds to the Abbasids' cause was in counteracting the active propaganda

1. Misk. III. P. 393; Eclipse, trans. VI. P. 424.

of the rival Fāṭimid Caliphate¹; and it was only through Maḥmūd's whole-hearted support of the Abbasid Caliphate that the Fāṭimids, in spite of all their efforts, could not secure a footing in Persia. When in 403/1012-13 Ḥakīm, the Fatimid Caliph, sent a letter to Maḥmūd, perhaps to procure his allegiance, the latter sent the letter to Baghdad to be publicly burnt.² A little later in the same year Maḥmūd, on hearing of the arrival of an emissary Ṭahārtī who was supposed to have been despatched by the Fāṭimid Caliph to him with the same object in view, had him arrested; and set up a court of eminent Theologians to investigate into his conduct and deliver their judgment on him. In compliance with their decision, Maḥmūd ordered Ṭahārtī to be put to death.³

II. As regards open religious submission to the Caliph, Maḥmūd tried his utmost to maintain a compromising attitude. Although in some cases where personal interests were involved it was difficult to obey the orders of the Commander of the Faithful, yet Maḥmūd overcame this difficulty by adopting a conciliatory attitude. The case of Abū 'Alī Ḥasan commonly known as Ḥasnak is a good example of Maḥmūd's attitude of mind in such intricate cases. In 414/1023 Ḥasnak while on his way back from his pilgrimage to Mecca received a Khilāf from the Fāṭimid Caliph, Aḥ-Zahīr

1. 'Utbī, P. 296; Reynolds, trans. P. 439-440. Maḥmūd commissioned spies to make investigations into the conduct of those who professed to adhere to the cause of the Fāṭimid Caliphate. He uprooted and annihilated all of them. Most of them were impaled or stoned.

2. Nāẓim, Sultān Maḥmūd, P. 164.

3. 'Utbī, P. 296-299; Gardīzī. P. 71.

This greatly annoyed the Abbasid Caliph, Qādir who naturally suspecting that it was done with the knowledge and consent of Maḥmūd, addressed a strongly worded letter to the latter in which he charged Ḥasnak with Qārmātian^h beliefs and demanded his execution. Much correspondence passed about the matter, and Maḥmūd being greatly annoyed and vexed, said one day, "Write to this doting old Caliph, that out of regard to the Abbasids, I have meddled with all the World; I am hunting for the Qārmātians^h, and whenever one is found who is proved to be so, he is impaled. If it were established that Ḥasnak is a Qārmātian^h, the Commander of the Faithful would soon learn what had happened to him. But I have brought him up and he stands on an equality with my sons and brothers. If he is a Qārmātian^h so am I also". After much consideration it was decided that the robe of honour which Ḥasnak had received, and the presents which the Egyptian Caliph had sent to Maḥmūd should be sent with a messenger to Baghdad to be publicly burnt.¹ If on the other hand, under the guise of the orders of the Commander of the Faithful, some ulterior motive of the ruler could be served, much outward importance was attached to it. The same Ḥasnak was stoned to death by the order of Masūd, who bore a grudge to him on account of his arrogant behaviour and opposition to Masūd's² succession to the throne. In order to remove him, the old charge

1. Bayhaqī, P. 212-213; trans. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II. P. 93.

2. Bayhaqī, P. 208, 210. So great was Ḥasnak's power during the time of Maḥmūd that he occasionally offended and sometimes insulted Masūd with impunity.

of heresy was brought up against him once again on behalf of the Caliph; and to make the people believe in its truth, two men were dressed up as messengers coming from Baghdad, bearing a letter from the Caliph to the effect that Hasnak being a Qārmāṭian^h should be executed and stoned to death, so that no one else in defiance of the Caliph, might dare to accept the Khilāf of the Egyptian Caliph. When Hasnak was being executed, the following message from Masūd was delivered to him, "This is your own wish, for you desired me to bring you to the scaffold whenever I became king. I wished to have mercy on you, but the Commander of the Faithful has written that you have become a Qārmāṭian^k and by his order you are led to the scaffold."¹

III. As long as their own personal interests were not affected both Mahmūd and his son Masūd remained on good terms with the Caliphate, and always tried to render him assistance in all common matters of Islām. Both of them obliged the Caliph to grant them the deeds of investiture of those countries which had not yet been conquered by them;² and both of them entered into a treaty with

1. Bayhaqī, P. 217-218; trans. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II. P. 97-98.

2. Haig, Art. on Mahmūd in Encycl. of Islām.

Habīb, Sultān Mahmūd of Ghaznīn. P. 33. In 403/1012-13, Mahmūd compelled the Caliph, Qādir, to hand over to him the districts of Khurāsān which were still in his hands. Muhammad Habīb relates that the Caliph stoutly refused Mahmūd's further demand that Samarkand should also be given to him. "I will do no such thing, he replied, "and if you take possession of Samarkand without my permission, I will disgrace you before the whole world. Mahmūd was furious, "Do you wish me to come to the capital of the Caliphate with a thousand elephants", he threatened the Caliph's ambassador, "in order to lay it waste and bring its earth on the backs of my elephants to Ghaznīn?" (I am not aware of the source of the story). But in the words of Muhammad Habīb, "The policy of plundering the centres of Muslim and Hindu civilization simultaneously was too

the Caliph by which the latter bound himself not to enter into direct relations with the Qārā Khānids.¹ Any title or robe of honour granted to the latter was to be bestowed through the agency of the Ghaznevids. So emphatic was Maḥmūd in this matter that Abu'l 'Abbās Māmūn, the Khwārazm-Shāh, out of regard for the sentiments of Maḥmūd, did not openly accept the robes of honour sent by the Caliph ~~and~~ nor did he assume the title granted to him.² To serve their own purposes sometimes the help of the Caliph was also invoked. When Maḥmūd displeased with Masūd, wished to nominate another son Muḥammad, in preference to Masūd, he asked the Caliph to give precedence to his name over that of Masūd in official correspondence.³ When Masūd heard of the order of the Caliph giving preference to Muḥammad over him, he declared, "The sword is a truer authority than any writing."⁴

bold even for Maḥmūd, and he had to apologize humbly to the power which even in its hour of weakness could have shattered the moral foundations of the Ghaznevid kingdom".

Masūd also insisted on the inclusion of certain provinces in the deed of investiture before he accepted it. Cf. Bayhaqī, p. 359.

1. Bayhaqī, P. 359.

2. Ibid. P. 838-839.

3. Ibid. P. 258-259.

4. Juzjānī, *Tabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, trans. Raverty, P. 92.

But as soon as he heard the news of his father's death in 421/1030 he most courteously replied to the Caliph's letter interceding for the ruler of Isfahān, 'Alā al-Dawlā b. Kākawayh, which had till then lain unanswered; and pleaded his cause for the bestowal of a deed of investiture,¹ which was, as a matter of course, granted to him.

As regards helping the Caliph in all common matters of Islām, since both the Ghaznevids and the Caliph belonged to the Sunni sect, their religious interests coincided and therefore no difficulty was encountered in this respect. The persecution of the Qārmāṭians, Bāṭinīs and Mu'tazilites, which was in accordance with the wish of the Caliph, also served the political motives of the Amīrs in rooting out all these elements which were endangering the peace and safety of the country. Mahmūd was particularly ruthless in his persecution of the Qārmāṭians. Thousands of them were gibbeted, stoned to death, or carried in chains to Ghaznā. A hundred camel loads of books dealing with their heretical beliefs were cast into the flames.² The imperialistic policy led by Mahmūd likewise served his double purpose. In the eyes of the Caliph and the Muslim public he figured as a champion of the Islāmic faith, when he waged

1. Bayhaqī, P. 14-17; Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 279.

When Masūd after his conquest of Rayy proceeded to complete the conquest of Hamadān and Isfahān, he put 'Alā al-Dawlā to flight and occupied both places. Thereupon the latter prevailed on the Caliph, through his kinsman, Jalāl al-Dawlā to ask Masūd to let him remain as his deputy at Isfahān.

2. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 262.

wars against the infidels of Hindūstān. In fact the wars to which he had given this religious colour were the outcome of his insatiable greed for money, and the necessity of providing the funds required to maintain the magnificence of his court. The policy of Mahmūd in this respect has been well described by Professor Muhammad Habib in the following words: "His persecution of the heretics, apart from the pressing demand of the orthodox may have been due to ~~his~~ conviction that their immoral doctrines would shake the foundations on which Muslim society was based, and a greed for money and power, not an enlightened desire for the spread of Islām, was the motive of his Indian campaigns." However, he gratified the Caliph by notifying his victories over the infidels, but here too he achieved his other object, the enhancement of his prestige in the eyes of the Buwayhids, his political rivals at Baghdad. On the other hand, the prestige of the Caliphate was raised also and they now began to feel more secure than before under the bonds of the Buwayhids. About the close of his reign, Mahmūd seems to have resolved to rid the Caliphate of the Buwayhids. Masūd when left at Rayy in 420/1029 was instructed to conquer Isfahān and then to release the Caliph from the bondage of the Buwayhids, but before

1. Habib, 'Sultān Mahmūd of Ghaznī', P. 19.

2. Victories of Mahmūd were officially notified to the Caliph. Cf. Sibt. Ibnu'l Jawzī. f. 204 b. Gardizi, P. 87-88. When the news of Somnāth victory reached the Caliphate, the Caliph heaped titles and honours on Mahmūd, his sons and his brother. Mahmūd received the title of Kahf-al-Dawlā wa'l Islām.

Mahmūd's plans could materialise, he died.¹ Both Mahmūd and Masūd provided facilities for the pilgrims. Mahmūd offered large sums to the Beduins for letting the caravans pass unmolested,² and Masūd likewise held himself responsible for the safety of the pilgrims' caravans. In 423/1032 he drew the attention of the Caliph's messenger who had been sent for the renewal of the deed on the death of the Caliph Qādir, to the point that he should convey a warning to the Buwayhids to provide similar facilities.³

IV. In order to maintain religious rights, Qādīs chosen from among Muftīs and Faqīhs of established reputation for learning and character, were appointed all over the kingdom.⁴ There was a Qādī for every town and a Qādī al-Qudāt or Chief Qādī for every province.⁵ The Qādīs received handsome salaries and according to Nidhām al-Mulk, were removed only for grave misconduct in the discharge of their duties.⁶ Besides the administration of justice the Qādīs had various other duties to perform⁷. The Qādī's position was very important and he was said to have 'power over the life and property of the Muslims'. His orders were executed with the help of the local governors, and defaulters

1. Bayhaqī, P. 83, 359.

2. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 229.

3. Bayhaqī, P. 360. The Caliph sent Masūd a satisfactory answer saying that he had drawn the attention of the Buwayhids, and arrangements are being made to render the route of the pilgrims safe. Cf. Bayhaqī, P. 441.

4. Nāzim, Sultān Mahmūd, P. 148.

5. Bayhaqī, P. 246; Nāzim, P. 147.

6. Nidhām al-Mulk, P. 38; 77.

7. Sulūk al-Mulūk, fol. 42 a. The various duties of a Qādī are given.

were severely punished.¹

V. Little is known in detail of the financial system of the Ghaznevids, but it was doubtless the case that the main sources of revenue were the same as those of the Caliphs; the chief permanent sources being the land-revenue, the Zakāt i.e. two and half percent tax on property of the Muslims, tribute and presents from the dependent princes, the produce of gold and silver mines,² and the duties levied on the articles of imports and exports that passed through the frontiers of the Ghaznā kingdom. Whether any of the other illegal taxes called by the jurists 'Mukūs' were levied in the Ghaznevid kingdom seems not to be known. In any case this income was supplemented by the huge amount of booty that was captured during Mahmūd's successful wars in India. But his continuous raids, though they brought rich booty for himself and his guards and soldiers, proved ruinous to his subjects. He devoted most of the money he brought from India to magnificent buildings in order to give an impress of dignity to his court, and consequently he was in constant need of money to carry on his Indian campaigns. Before one of his campaigns Mahmūd ordered the indispensable sum to be collected within two days, which was actually achieved from the officials, who, in the words of the court historian, 'Utbi, were 'fleeced like sheep'. It goes without saying that those officials must have realized

1. Nidhām al Mulk, P. 40.

2. Nāzim, P. 133.

3. Barthold, Turkestan, P. 293.

from the poor more than they paid to the Amīr. In consequence of heavy taxation "the agricultural districts were to a great degree deserted, and the irrigation works in some places had fallen into decay, in others had ceased altogether."¹ During the reign of Masūd, the people had to suffer all the more. Even the peace that prevailed during the previous reign disappeared with the removal of powerful personality of Mahmūd. Abu'l Fadl Suri, the civil governor of Khurāsān from whom the Amīr received large presents, shared the spoils of the robbers who quietly continued their activities and robbed the people to their fill. The population was reduced to despair and the aristocracy began to invoke the help of the 'Leaders of the Turks' in Transoxania.² Hence the second part of Māwardī's fifth stipulation was certainly not scrupulously observed. However, genuine complaints of the people were sometimes listened to by the Amīrs and in times of unforeseen calamity, their sufferings were, to a certain extent, alleviated. When for the upkeep of his magnificent garden, Mahmud imposed an extra tax, the people remonstrated and stopped him in one of the streets of Balkh, and Mahmūd had to yield to their complaints and remit the heavy obligation.³ In 401/1011 when crops failed owing to early frosts, the wazīr remitted the land revenue, and issued loans to the cultivators to enable them to buy seed and cattle.⁴

1 & 2. Barthold, Turkestan, P. 293.

3. Hāfiz Abrū, f. 184; Āwfi, f. 173.

4. Ūtbi, P. 247.

VI. For the administration of criminal law, the court of Madhālīm was held by the Amīrs daily, and impartial criminal justice was dealt out to high and low alike. Besides, all the princes, wazīrs commanders of the provincial armies and other high officials held their courts and decided such cases as did not involve intricate questions requiring expert knowledge of the law or were connected with their own departments.¹ Amīr Maḥmūd had a strong sense of justice and in order to keep himself informed of the doings of the state officials and provincial governors, he employed spies and newswriters throughout the whole empire. No body could plead rank or birth as an excuse for leniency or special treatment before Maḥmūd,² who enforced respect for law by all the means at his disposal. However, the cases that were tried by the Amīrs were few and far between, and no general effort was made to suppress the robber chief whose castles blocked all inter-communication between the various parts of the empire.³

VII. Amīr Maḥmūd and his successor Masūd did not tolerate any deviation from belief in the orthodox Sunni sect; and they protected the faith by rooting out all the heretical elements from their territories. A censorship of the religious beliefs of the

1. Bayhaqī, PP. 40, 181

2. Nidham al-Mulk, P. 208. Even prince Masūd had to pay his debts when sued by a merchant of Ghaznā.

Ibid. P. 42. 'Alī Nushtigin, a high military officer was stopped and lashed in public for open defiance of the Muslim law. The 'Amīl of Nishāpūr on the complaint of a woman whose property was seized by him, was flogged and dismissed. Cf. Ibid. P. 66.

3. Habib, P. 69.

Muslim subjects was instituted, and there was an officer appointed to punish heretics, Qarmatians, Bātinīs and Mu'tazalites¹; and all their literature dealing with heresy was ordered to be destroyed wherever found.² This policy must have encouraged the faith to which they as well as the Caliph belonged. Though the Amīrs were not missionaries and conversion was not their chief object, yet they were not devoid of missionary spirit altogether. We often find preachers in the wake of Maḥmūd's army extending the invitation of Islām to non-Muslims.³ Maḥmūd also appointed teachers to instruct the converts in the 'rudiments of their new faith' and ordered mosques to be built all over the country.⁴ Very little is known about their private lives but it can be said that they lived more or less in accordance with the Muslim code of morality.⁵ They were quite punctilious in the performance of their religious obligations; offered the usual prayers regularly and read the Qur'ān; and also used to give Zakāt.⁶ In addition to this they devoted large sums of money to giving alms to the poor, and settling handsome allowances on scholars and disabled persons.⁷ However they indulged in wine drinking, but their bouts were limited to a select circle and their companions⁸ had to walk out sober for fear of being punished by the Muhtasib

1. Nāzim, P. 160.

2. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 262.

3. Nāzim, P. 162.

4. Gardīzi, P. 72.

5. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 262. Amīr Maḥmūd did not exceed the prescribed limit with regard to number of wives.

6. Nāzim, P. 159.

7. Bayḥaqī, P. 330.

8. Nidhām al-Mulk, P. 41-42.

In conclusion one is forced to admit that both Mahmūd and Masūd generally complied with Mūwardī's conditions to a much greater degree than the Buwayhids. They revived the Abbasid Caliphate and raised its prestige in the eyes of the Muslim world. Like the Sāmānids, they felt it their duty to see that the Abbasid Caliphate should be respected and recognized by the Buwayhids.² But as compared with the first Sāmānids, the Ghaznivids were generally more over-bearing in their dealings with the Abbasid Caliphate though always ready to compromise in the end. They had acquired a sort of legal authority from the Caliph to conquer any lands they liked, and set up a sort of central agency through which the Caliphate was required to deal with other powers. Both of them assumed the title of Sultān though out of religious regard for the Caliphate they did not put it on their coinage as it was not officially granted to them by the Caliphate.³— a privilege which was first accorded to their political successors, the Saljūqs, whose relations with the Caliphate shall form the theme of the next chapter.

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1. The victories of Mahmūd announced from the pulpits of the Caliphate must have raised latter's prestige.
 2. Bayhaqī, P. 359-360. In his letter to the Caliph Qā'im in 423/1032, ~~Sultān~~ Masūd wrote that the Buwayhids should make it a point to keep up the prestige of the Caliphate.
 3. Kramer, Art. on Sultān, in Encycl. of Islām, says that according to Athir, IX. P. 92, the title Sultān was granted to Mahmūd by the Caliphate but the actual words قوله يا ابا عبد الله do not show that it was granted by the Caliphate.

C H A P T E R. III.Caliphate and Sultanate.

At the time of the appearance of the Saljuqs¹ as a political force in Persia, the temporal power of the Caliphate had been reduced to its lowest ebb both at Baghdad and its neighbouring provinces by the Buwayhids and in Persia by the Ghaznevīds. It is true that, with the decline of the Buwayhids' power at Baghdad, the Caliphs were making some tentative efforts to assert their importance either by figuring as champions of good government against the misrule² of the later Buwayhids, or by interposing themselves as arbitrators between the Sunnis and Shi'ās in their religious quarrels.³ But, in fact, during the later period of the Buwayhids neither the Caliphs nor the Amīrs were in a position to assert their authority against the turbulent Turks who always needed a strong hand to control them. The Turks themselves were neither able to produce any capable leader to manage the affairs of the state, nor would they allow any capable Buwayhid Amīr to control the machinery of the government

1. See article on Saljuqs in Encyclopaedia of Islām.

2. See above P. 51.

3. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 235-236. The religious innovations introduced by the Buwayhids at Baghdad resulted in a series of bitter quarrels between the Sunnis and Shi'ās, and offered an opportunity to the Caliph to assert his authority. In 415/1024 in a quarrel between the Abbasids and the 'Alids at Kūfā, the former lodged a complaint with the Caliph who compromised the matter temporarily. The Abbasids being dissatisfied came to Baghdad, did not allow the Khutbā to be read on Friday, and insisted on the removal of the prefect at Kūfā; and appoint the one whom they wanted. When the Caliph complied with their request, the wazīr Abu'l Qāsim, owing to his relationship with the deposed prefect, began to take hostile action against the Caliph. Thereupon the latter issued an order for the

In 418/1027 they approached the Caliph to appoint some commander over them to take charge of affairs but when Jalāl al-Dawlā was called by the Caliph, they several times revolted against his authority, besieged his house, maltreated his family and subjected him to various indignities; and obliged the Caliph on several occasions to drop his name from the Khutbā.¹ Both the Amirate and the Caliphate during this period of inactivity, had become politically ineffective, and in the absence of a strong hand to curb the activities of evil-doers, misrule, anarchy and licentiousness reigned supreme.²

Though the Buwayhids had usurped all the temporal power of the Abbasid Caliphate in actual practice, yet in theory they found it necessary that certain functions, for political reasons should be fulfilled under the signature of the Caliph. As already shown, the latter was still required to issue orders under his name affecting certain temporal affairs; and even the partial right of appointing the wazir and the governors was allowed to be retained by him. The ceremony of issuing the deeds of investiture to individual rulers enabled the Caliph to enter into direct political relations with them. Besides, the Buwayhids, being unable to fulfil the obligations of the Caliph, were

expulsion of the wazir from Samarra, which was duly carried out

1. Ibn Athir, IX. PP . 288 & 308-309.

2. A robber named Al-Burjūmi terrified the citizens in 425-26/1034 so much that they had to call him, 'The chief Abū 'Alī. He had fixed tribute paid to him by the citizens, caravans, and several professionals; and even the Sultān had to surrender some of his revenues.' Cf. Levy. Baghdad Chronicle, P. 173-174.

not granted the title of Sultān. Thus the Sultanate set up by them, though an accomplished fact, had not yet reached the stage of full emancipation, and was never complete in the eye of the law.¹ Likewise, though the Ghaznevids had actually assumed the title of Sultān, they too, owing to the exclusion of their political authority from Baghdād, could not obtain official recognition of the title. The Sultanate in fact existed, but as an usurped authority, lacking any legal sanction, and unrecognized in official correspondence and coinage. Nothing short of the combination of the functions of the Ghaznevids and the Buwayhids by a Sunni ruler would form the basis of a legally constituted Sultanate. Such was the situation and the position of the 'Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdād and in Persia when the Saljūqs burst like a storm on the scene and displaced both the Ghaznevids and the Buwayhids.

It is an established fact that Saljūqs being recent converts to Islām were orthodox Muslims, and as such they considered it their duty to recognize the institution of the Caliphate. In a petition which they sent to the governor of Khurāsān requesting him to ask Masūd to allot them the districts of Nasā and Farāwā,

1. No Buwayhid Amir was ever granted the title of Sultān; and none of them even assumed it as their coinage shows. It is wrongly stated by Amir Ali that Muiz al Dawlā received the title of Sultān. Cf. 'A History of the Saracens, P. 503.

they called themselves proteges of the Commander of the Faithful.¹ The Caliph, on the other hand, never hesitated to assert his authority and claim obedience from them, whenever an opportunity was offered. In 429/1038 when Tughril was declared king at Merw and Nishāpūr, and his name was mentioned in the Khutbā in all the places which fell to him, his brother Dā'ūd carried on such ravages in these provinces that rumours of his malpractices reached the ears of the Caliph Qā'im who realizing his responsibility for the welfare of the people, despatched an ambassador to Tughril forbidding him to tyrannise over the people. The mission of the Caliph had the desired effect since Tughril after paying due respect and honour to the ambassador, stopped the malpractices complained of.²

It was, however, after the defeat of Masūd at the hands of the Saljūqs at Dandanqān in 431/1040 that for the first time, the latter came into direct relationship with the Abbasid Caliphate. The Saljūqs after their victory over Masūd held a consultation between themselves and wrote a letter to the Caliph Qā'im saying that they were a people always obedient and well-wishing to the Caliph as well as to the Prophet and that they had always carried on Jihād and performed pilgrimage to the Kabā. They complained against Mahmūd for imprisoning their uncle Isrā'īl,

1. Bayhaqī, P. 583.

2. Bundārī, P. 7; Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 312.

without any provocation on their part, and emphasized the negligence exhibited by Masūd in the affairs of his government and his indulgence in wine-drinking, luxuries and enjoyments. They also pointed out that the nobles and great men of Khurāsān requested them to stand by them in overthrowing the power of the Ghaznevids. Then they mentioned their victory over Masūd which was attained through divine aid and in order to thank God the Almighty they were administering the country with justice and equity and were refraining from exercising any sort of tyranny. At the end there was a request to the Caliph to bestow on them the sovereignty of the already conquered lands in order they should be able to rule the country according to the Sharīʿa and the command of the Commander of the Faithful.¹ The contents of the above letter show very well the motives of the Saljūqs, which obliged them to approach the Caliph for authorization to rule the country. In making this request, they did so only in order to fulfil a religious obligation. It was still believed that without such sanction from the Caliphate, the religious institutions i.e. the appointment of Qadis etc. would not be considered as valid from the point of view of the Sharīʿa. However, it seems that it was done more to satisfy their own conscience than the public mind, which had already accepted them as their rulers by mentioning their names in the Khutbā and by

1. Rawandī, P. 103; Bundarī, P. 8;

Brown and Sykes wrongly put the despatch of this letter after the defeat of Masūd at the hands of the Saljūqs, i.e. three years later. Cf. Literary History of Persia, II. P. 172; Sykes, History of Persia, II. P. 30.

calling Tughril Sultan al Mu'adhdham¹. That the sanction from the Caliphate was necessitated purely from the religious point of view is evident by the very fact that immediately after they despatched the messenger, they proceeded to divide up the vast territories which had so quietly passed under their control.² When the letter reached the Caliph he sent one of his trusted officers to Tughril with kind messages and charged him to ask Tughril to come to Baghdād.³

Tughril could not find time to pay his attention to the affairs at Baghdād till 447/1055 when with the permission of the Caliph, he paid his first visit to the metropolis of Islam where he was received with great honour, and orders were given to mention his name in the Khutba and coinage in preference to that of Malik al Rahim; and he was granted the title of Rukn al Dawlā.⁴ In spite of this, relations between the Caliph and Tughril Beg

1. Although Tughril was addressed by the people and even mentioned in the Khutbā in different places that had fallen into his possession, as Sultan al Mu'adhdham in 428/1036. (Cf. Athir, IX. P. 328; Zubdat al Tawarikh, F. 6) yet this title does not seem to appear on his coinage till the year 439/1047. Such coins in addition to the above title also bear the title of Shāhinshāh - a title whose bestowal to one of the Buwayhid rulers had been a subject of controversy and had led the celebrated Qadi al Qudāt, al Māwardī to vote against its award. How were the times now changed that such important and even objectionable titles were assumed by the Sunni rulers without any commotion. There is no historical evidence to show whether and when such titles were granted to Tughril. According to Athir, IX. P. 312.7 the Caliph in letter of 429 A.H. mentioned above "addressed them by exalted titles", (الاعظم). Raverty holds on his own authority that in 432 A.H. Tughril obtained the Caliph's consent to his assuming sovereignty, and the title of Sultan. Cf. Juzjani, Tabaqāt-i-Nasiri, Trans. Raverty, P. 132.

2. Rawandī, P. 104; Bundarī, P. 8.

3. Rawandī, P. 105; Bundarī, P. 9.

4. Rawandī, P. 105.

care of God's people. It is incumbent upon you to be God-fearing in what he had entrusted to you. Acknowledge the favours of God, strive to exercise justice abroad, to prevent wrong-doing and to prosper the subjects". The Caliph then invested him with a 'robe of honour, a collar and bracelets, and also with a scented gold embroidered turban symbolizing the combination of the 'Arab and non-Arab crowns.' He was also presented with two swords by the Caliph and addressed as 'King of East and West'. Tughril in token of servitude kissed the Caliph's hand and laid it upon his eyes'.¹ This memorable document was the first of its kind of which we have any knowledge in the history of the Caliphate. No one before Tughril had been given jurisdiction over "all the countries whose government had been delegated to the Caliph by God." The Sultānate now at last received legal sanction from the Caliphate itself.

The prestige of the Sultānate was further raised when Tughril paid his third visit to Baghdad in 451/1059, and re-instated the Caliph Qā'im who, during the former's absence from Baghdad, was imprisoned by Bassāsīrī who had proclaimed the recognition of the Egyptian Caliphate at Baghdad.² The Caliph,

1. Bundārī, P. 14; Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 436; Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, P. 188.

2. In 450/1058 Bassāsīrī, a Shi'ite Turkish general who had not been on good terms with the Caliph, came to Baghdad, defeated his forces, arrested him and sent him to Anā. He caused the Khutbā to be read for the Egyptian Caliph, Mustangīr at Baghdad and had the dinars struck in his name. The Sunni formulae in the 'Adan was replaced by that of the Shi'ite, and the black standard of the Abbasid was changed into that of the white. Cf. Rāwandī, P. 108; Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 441; Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 88-89; Zubdat al-Tawārīkh, f. 13.

As soon as Tughril heard of this, he rushed back to Baghdad, defeated Bassāsīrī and re-established the Abbasid Caliphate. Cf. Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 90; Athīr, IX. P. 448; Zubdat al T. P. 13.

on this occasion,¹ presented to the Sultān the only sword which was left with him; and substituted the title of Rukn al Dīn for Rukn al Dawlā.²

Tughril had not even conceived the idea of taking over the administration of Baghdad, but, in fact, had thought of leaving it with the Caliphate. It was only due to the lack of aspiration on the part of the Caliph and the wit of Tughril's wazīr in detecting it, that Baghdad was thrown into the direct possession of Tughril.³ Thus so far as the temporal power of the Caliphate was concerned, it was now left in as sad a plight as it was during the Buwayhid regime. Be that as it may, the Sultanate created by Tughril was of a higher status than that enjoyed by

1. It was a strange and unprecedented scene when the Caliph and the Sultān met on this historic occasion in an unceremonious manner, the Caliph presenting to the Sultan his sword, the latter giving proof of the utmost humility by leading the horse of the Caliph by the bridle to the palace. Cf. Rāwandī, P. 110; Bundārī P. 18; Zubdat al Tawārikh, f. 13; Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 446.

2. Rawandī, P. 110.

3. A few days after the re-establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate Tughril asked his wazīr 'Amīd al Mulk to approach the Caliph for the allotment of a certain portion of territory in the neighbourhood of Baghdad to meet the expenses of his army as he would be required to come so often to Baghdad in connection with administrative affairs. The quick witted wazīr asked Tughril to wait as he expected a move by the Caliph himself to provide him with a fixed grant for his own upkeep. Actually as it happened, 'Amīd al Mulk, on his way to the Caliph, saw the latter's wazīr, coming to the Sultān. Guessing the mission of the Caliph's wazīr, 'Amīd al Mulk hurriedly retraced his steps and informed the Sultān about the approach of the Caliph's wazīr, advising him at the same time that if the Caliph's message was to the same purpose as he had anticipated, the Caliph should welcome it saying that he was already concerned about it. By chance it so happened that the Caliph's message was to the same purpose as was anticipated by 'Amīd al Mulk, and naturally the Sultān sent the same reply to the Caliph as was suggested to him by his wazīr. Shortly afterwards the Sultān sent for the record book from the Diwān and noted down therein the personal allowance of the Caliph. Cf. Rawandī, P. 110-111; Tarīkh i Guzīda, P. 435.

any before or after him.¹

With the establishment of a Sunni Sultanate at Baghdad a new era was inaugurated in the history of the institution of the Caliphate. The Saljuqs by conquering Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Asia Minor once more re-united the scattered provinces of Islām belonging to different dynasties hostile to each other, under one sovereign. In the words of Lane Poole, "They put a new life into the expiring zeal of the Muslims, drove back the encroaching Byzantines, and bred up a generation of fanatical Muḥammadan warriors, to whom more than to anything else, the Crusaders owed their repeated failure".² The rise of the Saljūqs also meant the victory of the Sunni creed, as far as their power extended, over the Shī'ā tendencies which had been gaining more and more ground under the Buwayhids and the Fāṭimids. Since the Saljūqs regarded the Abbasid Caliphate as the head of orthodox Islām, they 'constituted themselves the champions of the Abbasid Caliphate and were naturally the declared enemies of the Fāṭimid Caliphate.'³ They took energetic steps against the dangerous activities of the Ismā'īlites and further the interests of Sunni

1. A gold coin minted at Baghdad in 455/1063 bears the following inscription on the reverse side, 'Al-Sultān al-Muḥdham Shāh-in-Shāh Tughril Beg'. The word Sultān does not appear on the Baghdad coinage after Tughril. Cf. British Museum Catalogue.
2. Lane Poole, Muḥammadan Dynasties, P. 150.
3. The Damascus Chronicle, trans. H.A.R. Gibb, P. 19-20.

theologians.¹

With the rapid conquests of the Saljūqs, the religious authority of the Abbasid Caliphate was established in all lands that fell under their political control. Besides, the prestige of their power prompted many an independent prince to reject the religious authority of the Fāṭimids and recognize that of the Abbasids instead.² It was during this period that the name of the 'Abbasid Caliph was inserted in the Khutbā in the sacred cities of Mecca and Madina, whose inclusion within the sphere of the Abbasids' control must have raised the prestige of the Caliphate.

As regards the institution of the Caliphate itself, the Saljūqs, considering it a religious institution, left it to run its normal course. In the election of the Caliph a formal sort of consultation took place between the Wazir, Qādīs and other high officials and usually a son of the deceased Caliph was raised to the Caliphate. Since most of the Caliphs nominated their successors in their own life time there was little choice. It,

1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 24. When Alp Arslān was engaged in the war with Qutulmish, Nidhām al-Mulk said to the former, 'I have brought soldiers from Khurāsān who will assist and not desert you, and who will shoot arrows that never miss, viz. the 'Ulamā and the ascetics, whom by my favours I have made your best auxiliaries.'
 2. In 462/1070 an envoy from the Amīr of Mecca came to Alp Arslān informing him that he had established the Khutbā for the Abbasids and discontinued it for the Egyptian Caliph Mustansir whereupon the Sultān bestowed upon him thirty thousand dinars annually. He further offered twenty thousand dinars and an annual salary of fifty thousand dinars to the Amīr of Medina if the latter followed the same example. Cf. Bundārī, P. 36; Athīr, X. P. 41. In 463/1070 the Khutbā was read for the Caliph Qā'im and Sultān Alp Arslān at Halab when the people there beheld the supremacy of the Saljūqs' authority, and the decline of the sway of the Egyptian Caliph. Cf. Bundārī, P. 37; Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 98; Athīr, X. P. 42.

therefore, became practically a matter of hereditary succession based on nomination by the late Caliph.¹ Paradoxical as it might appear, the election of the Caliph was not influenced by the Saljūq Sultāns.² Henceforward the Caliphs were not deposed arbitrarily³ by the Sultāns as was the case during the time of the Buwayhids. They were now left in the peaceful enjoyment of their allowance and the income of their personal estate without the fear of any demand being made or of their estate being confiscated.⁴ Besides, the Sultāns despatched huge sums of money and costly presents to the Caliphs on different occasions.⁵

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1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 65. The Caliph Qā'im nominated Muqtadī during his own life time.
The Caliph Mustadhīr nominated Mustarshīd during his own life time. Cf. Athīr, X. P. 376. The Caliph Rāshīd was also nominated. Cf. Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 251; Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 17.
 2. In spite of all his efforts, Sultān Masūd could not set aside the election of Rāshīd whom he did not want to succeed owing to his enmity with his father. Cf. Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 251.
 3. The commital of the Caliph Rāshīd in a document that if he waged war against the Sultān he should be considered as deposed, gave an opportunity to Sultān Masūd to secure a Fatwā from the 'Ulamā to this effect after the Caliph had fled from Baghdad. Cf. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 26.
 4. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 209. Barkyāruq being hard pressed for money asked and secured from the Caliph Qā'im fifty thousand dinars.
 5. Ibn Athīr, IX. P. 397. In 443/1051 Tughril sent ten thousand dinars to the Caliph, 5,000 dinars to his officials and 2,000 to Rais al Ruṣṣā; and some precious jewels and other valuable presents to the Caliph.
Malik Shāh despatched precious presents to the Caliph on his first visit to Baghdad in 479/1086. Cf. Ibid X. P. 103.

The Caliph was also allowed to appoint his own wazir. But since the de facto position of the Caliph had not improved, the functions of the wazir remained practically the same as those of the Secretary in the past regime; and the change effected therefore merely meant a change of title. However, such prestige was attached to this office that persons were desirous of occupying it even without any remuneration.¹ Nor were the Sultāns unmindful of its importance, because smooth relations between the Caliph and them largely depended upon the wazir; and consequently they tried as tactfully as they could to interfere in the appointment of the Wazir. Most of the wazirs were appointed and dismissed under instructions from the Sultān.²

With regard to the Caliph's prerogatives, the latter was more independent in exercising them during this period than under the Buwayhids. At Baghdad the coinage not only bears the name of the Caliph on the obverse side but also with the epithet Amīr al-Mūminīn which had disappeared during the Buwayhid regime; and no coins minted at Baghdad after Tughril bear the title Sultān.

1. In 433/1061 Abu'l Fattāh Maṣṣūr Aḥmad was appointed wazir on condition that not only would he not accept an Iqtā' but that he would pay something to the Caliph. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 9.

2. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 74-75. In 471/1078 Wazir Faḥr al-Dawla Abū Naṣr Ibn Jahīr was dismissed on the Sultān's request. The next appointment was made on the recommendation of the Sultān, and the person, who in the meanwhile, had already been appointed, had to vacate the position for the nominee of the Sultān.

This shows that the temporal authority of the Saljūqs was not legally recognized at Baghdad. In other parts of the Saljuqid empire, the Caliph's name with the same title appears on the obverse or reverse side indiscriminately.¹

In the case of the Khutbā, the Saljuqid Sultāns were punctilious in mentioning the Caliph's name in the Khutbā all over their empire. Though several times the Sultān's name was dropped from the Khutbā at Baghdad,² the Sultāns could never retaliate by omitting his name.

Even in granting titles³ the Caliph was more free than before, though he was obliged to grant high sounding titles even to minor Sultāns.⁴

The Caliph was now shown more reverence by the Sultāns not merely out of political consideration, but as being their religious head. With the curtailment of his temporal power, the Caliph began to attach more sacredness to his office and person;⁵

1. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, III. P. 30-37.

2. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 23. Sultān Masūd's name was dropped from the Khutbā at Baghdad.

Sultān Sanjar's name was also omitted from the Khutbā from the whole of 'Irāq in 526/1131. Cf. Ibid. X. P. 476.

3. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 57; Arnold, *Caliphate*, P. 83. When in 479/1086 the prince of Ceuta and Morocco, Yūsuf b. Tashifīn recognized the Abbasid Caliphate, the Caliph Muqtadī on prince's insistence, granted him the title of Amīr al Muṣlīmīn - a much more flattering title than any granted to a Saljuqid Sultān.

4. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 145. Muhammad whose age was only four years was granted the title of Nāṣir al-Dawla wa al-Dīn. In 498/1104, Barkyāruq's four years' old son was granted the same title which was given to his grand-father, Malik Shāh. Cf. Ibid. X. P. 260.

5. Bundārī, P. 81; Ibn Athīr, X. P. 103-104. In 489/1086, Malik Shāh was not allowed to kiss the Caliph's hand. His request to kiss the Caliph's ring only was granted.

and not only laymen but the Sultāns themselves believed in his spiritual powers, and sometimes attributed mere accidents to his supernatural powers.¹ Owing to his eminent position it was considered a great honour if the daughters and sisters of the Sultāns were accepted in marriage by the Caliphs.

The existence of a Sunni Sultānate was not wholly without a disadvantage to the Abbasid Caliphate. Since the institution, as already shown in the first chapter, had become a mere figure-head, it could not be left alone by the stronger and more capable rulers. But its existence was tolerated on the one hand because of the reverence attached to the Abbasid family and its claim to the office based on supposed traditions, and on the other hand the absence of any line of demarcation between the religious and temporal duties of the Caliphate had made the whole politico-legal structure so complicated that there was no way but to maintain the institution. The above argument can very well be supported by the remarks of one of the greatest philosophers of Islām, Imam Ghazzālī, who lived during the early Saljūqid period. The learned Imām says, "There are those who hold that the Imāmat is dead, lacking as it does the required qualifications, but no substitute can be found for it. What then? Are we to give up obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the Qādīs, declare all authority

1. Bundārī, P. 70; Suyūṭī, trans. Jerrett. P. 446. Malik Shāh's death in 485/1092, was taken to have been caused by the prayers of the Caliph. In 521/1127, Sultān Mahmūd attributed his illness to his war against the Caliph. Cf. Bundārī, P. 152.

to be valueless, cease marrying and pronounce the acts of those in high places to be invalid at all points, leaving the populace to live in sinfulness? Or shall we continue as we are, recognizing that the Imāmat really exists and that all ~~acts~~ acts of the administration are valid, given the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment".¹ If there had been a real election, the fittest and most competent person might have been definitely designated to the office of the Caliphate; but in its absence, the natural forces came into play and the man who possessed most strength asserted his authority and claimed the power. In fact the Sultānate was the necessary consequence of the kind of institution which the Caliphate had become. In such circumstances, the Caliphate had to be maintained but at the same time the Sultānate had to be accommodated. To get out of this awkward position, a *viā media* was sought. The Sultānate was legalised by means of a legal fiction i.e. by the issue of a deed of investiture to the Sultān by the Caliph himself - a mere formality created in order to give a show of legitimacy to the Sultānate, which was in fact based on force.

Now for the first time in the history of the institution there stood by the side of the Caliph a legally constituted Sultān whose power depended on the sword and could not very well be set aside by any means other than the sword itself. A Sunni

1. Levy, *Sociology of Islām*, Vol. I. P. 306.

Sultān was not only required to fulfil certain obligations as prescribed by the Muslim jurists to an 'Amīr by Force' but he was expected to take over and fulfil entirely the duties set forth for the Caliph himself. As long as the Sultān fulfilled && these obligations, administered the country according to the laws of Shari'ā and thus gave peace and security to the people, there was none to lift a finger against him.

During the Saljūq period, the word Sultān¹ assumed a new significance. There is an attempt to confine its meaning to the sole possessor of the temporal power of the Caliphate.² In theory there should now be only one Sultān and down to the reign of Muḥammad b. Malik Shāh, the other ruling princes of the dynasty in Persia contented themselves with other titles of less importance e.g. Malik etc.³ It was for the justification of the above interpretation that Nidhām al-Mulk, in order to place the Sultānate on a legal basis, made an effort to formulate the theory of the Sultānate in his celebrated book called 'Siyāsat Nāmā'.

Nidhām al-Mulk, according to the well known story, had been asked, amongst others, to write a book dealing with administrative problems so that the principles enunciated therein might serve as a model in governing a Muslim state. Though primarily a book

1. See art. by Kramers, on Sultān, in the Encycl. of Islām.

2. Barthold, 'Caliph and Sultān'.

3. The Saljūqids of Kirmān called themselves Malik, while the Saljūqids of Rūm styled themselves as Sultān al Mu'adhdham. Cf. Lane Poole, Coins of Saljūqs, Vol. III. P. 48.

which deals with administrative problems and conduct and the deportment of kings from a strictly practical point of view, yet the author devotes a few pages to the origin of kingship and to the duties and responsibilities of kings. He does not even acknowledge the Caliph as the ultimate source of the temporal authority of the Sultān; but instead he substitutes a sort of divinely ordained kingship when he says, "That in every age God the Almighty selects one from amongst his creatures, and adorns him with kingly attributes; and entrusts him with the peace and welfare of His subjects. His fear and grandeur is created in the hearts of the people, so that the latter may live peacefully under the banner of his justice."¹ As regards the duties of the kings, he requires that they should deal with their subjects with justice and equity and tempts them with the double reward of perpetuating the sovereignty in their own family and of enjoying the fruits of their justice in next World.² Though not expressly, yet by giving interesting and instructive anecdotes, he holds the Sultāns responsible to God Who, in his opinion, will hold the kings responsible for the slightest injustice, injury or even negligence shown not only by themselves but even by their officials.³ He in no way holds the rulers responsible to their subjects, and by a mystic argument seeks to prove that as long

1. Nidhām al-Mulk, P. 5.

2. Ibid. P. 8-9.

3. Ibid. P. 9.

as the people obey the laws of the Shari'ah, God will continue to grant them a good ruler. "If the people show any sign of disobedience or contempt towards the Ordinances of the Shari'ah or if they fail in their duties towards God, then His displeasure manifests itself in the disappearance of the just king from amongst them. Consequently disorder prevails, blood is shed and whosoever is powerful snatches the power into his own hands, and rules over the subjects despotically and does as he pleases. In consequence of this, the sinners are destroyed and with them the pious people as well. Ultimately one of the people, through God's grace, gets the power and control, and God grants him sufficient wisdom and intelligence to carry on the affairs of the state."¹

To a superficial observer, the theory of kingship as propounded by Nidhām al-Mulk gives the impression of a sort of Divine Right of Kings, and misleads one into thinking that it bears a close resemblance to the theory of pre-Islāmic Kingship in Persia more especially as he frequently quotes anecdotes of the Sāsānian kings as examples; but a critical study dispels any such misunderstanding. For examples while the pre-Islāmic kings in Persia called themselves gods² and as such considered themselves above the law, our author ties the Sultān hand and foot to the obser-

1. Nidhām al Mulk, P. 6.

2. Christensen, P. 88. Khusrū II, called himself an immortal man amongst the gods and a very illustrious god amongst the men.

vance of the Shari'ah.¹ Any opposition to the orders of a pre-Islamic Persian king was inconceivable and punishable with death,² but our author in dealing with the administration of justice, gives some instructive anecdotes suggesting that in this respect rulers stand on the same footing as ordinary men.³ On the other hand, his theory is in complete contrast to that of Mawardi who also wrote at a time when the Caliphate had scarcely a vestige of temporal power. While Mawardi suggests that a Caliph should be elected and should be responsible to the people, who had the right to depose him in case of the non-fulfilment of his duties, Nidham al-Mulk entertains no such ideas and develops an argument by which he tries to prove that it is entirely through the faults of the people themselves if they do not have good rulers, whom he makes responsible only to God. His departure from the established Islamic theory can be explained by the fact that the very nature of the situation he was in made it impossible for him to follow the lines of Mawardi; and if he had done so, it would have defeated his own object. The chief aim of Nidham al-Mulk was to establish a justification for the Sultanate in its

1. Nidham al Mulk, P. 54.

2. Christensen, P. 98; Huart, 147-148. When Khusru I. reformed the system of taxation and established new principles of collection he assembled his council and invited their opinion. A man asked respectfully whether the king had meant to establish a certain tax for perpetuity, which, in his opinion, as time went on, would lead to injustice. "Accursed and rash man", cried the monarch, "To what class do you belong"? The man replied that he was one of the secretaries. The king ordered him to be beaten to death with a writing case. This was done and the beholders exclaimed, "O king we find all the taxes which you have imposed on us are just".

3. Nidham al-Mulk, P. 39.

own right without any external agency being responsible for it; while recognizing at the same time the 'Abbasid Caliphate as a religious institution. Since in theory the Sultān derived his power to rule from the Caliph, his office could neither be made elective, nor could he be made responsible to the people. That Nidhām al Mulk was prepared to acknowledge the Caliphate as a religious institution only is easily proved by the fact that while in the case of temporal power, he ignores the Caliph as the source of the Sultān's authority and attributes it to God, he acknowledges the Caliph as the ultimate source of religious authority to the Sultān, when he says, "The Qādīs are the Nāibs (representatives) of the Caliphs and as such possess their ways, and they are appointees and deputies of the Sultān, and as such perform his duties."¹ In other words he commits himself to the fact that the Sultan has been delegated authority to appoint such officials from the Caliph. Again on the chapter of 'Titles', he acknowledges the legality of the titles that were bestowed by the Caliphs on the Saljūqid Sultāns.² In fact his was an effort to find a via media that the Caliph was the religious head and yet the Sultān too held divinely ordained authority.

1. Nidhām al Mulk, P. 41-42.

2. Ibid. P. 136. How is it possible for Nidhām al Mulk to talk about the titles of the successors of Malik Shāh when he himself died during the former's life time. Cf. Nidhām al Mulk, P. 137. It shows that this chapter was not written by Nidhām al Mulk himself.

It may seem even more extraordinary that much the same views are expressed by Imām Ghazzālī, 'Know that God hath chosen from among the sons of men two groups, viz. (1) The Prophets to make clear for His servants the way to His service and illuminate for them the way to knowledge of Him, and (2) He hath chosen kings to protect His servants from injuring one another, and hath given them possession of the reins of binding and unloosing (*ابرام ولفظ*) and hath bound upon them the well being of His creatures in their lives by His Wisdom, and established them in the most honourable place by His power; as it is to be heard in the Traditions *..... البجبات على الله في ارضه* Wherefore it is fitting that it should be known that he to whom God hath given the degree of Kingship and hath made His shadow upon earth, the love of him is incumbent upon all men, and they are bound to follow him and obey him, nor is it lawful for them to disobey him or oppose him, and it is fitting that every man to whom God hath given the Faith should love the kings and Sultāns and obey them in what they command."¹

In his later work² he returns to this subject and attempts to define the relationship between Caliphate and Sultānate.

"An evil-doing and barbarous Sultān, so long as he is supported by military force, so that he can only with difficulty be deposed and that the attempt to depose him would cause unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left in possession and obedience must

1. Ghazzālī, At Tibrul Masbūk, P. 40-41.

2. Ghazzālī, 'Ihyā' al-'Ulūm, II. P. 124.

be rendered to him, exactly as obedience must be rendered to Amīrs. For in the Ḥadīths regarding the duty of obedience to the Amīrs (اسمراء الطبرستان وان استعمل عليكم عبدی جیشی) and the prohibition of withdrawing one's hand from assisting them, there are expressed definite commands and restraints. We consider that the office of the Caliphate is contractually assumed by that person of the Banū 'Abbās who is charged with the responsibility of it, and that the function of government in the various lands is carried out by means of Sultāns, who owe allegiance to the Caliph

For if we were to decide that all governments are now null and void, all institutions of public welfare would also be absolutely null and void; thus the capital would be lost in straining after the profit. Nay, but government in these days is a result solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph. And whosoever exercises independent authority, so long as he shows allegiance to the Caliph in the matter of his prerogatives of the Khutbā and the Sikkā, the same is a Sultān, whose orders and judgments are valid in the several parts of the earth.

Remarkable that the author transfers to the temporal princes the ḥadīths which were invoked by early writers to claim obedience to the Caliphs.

Nothing could have been more fatal, however, to the smooth working of this dual system than the arrangement suggested by 'Amīd al-Mulk to Sultān Tughril i.e. the occupation of Baghdad by him. Outside Baghdad the conflict of authorities might be avoided; within the city any harmonious solution was an utter impossibility. In the presence of the Caliph at Baghdad, no Sultān could exercise unquestioned authority in the city, especially through a subordinate. The absence of any clear line of demarcation between the religious and temporal powers in Islām gave an opportunity to any energetic Caliph to play at Baghdad the role of the temporal as well as the religious head of Islām; and it was natural that his interference was more effective than that of a Sultān who was always absent from the place. Again, as during the Buwayhid occupation, there were certain things connected with the personal office of the Caliph, which could be performed by no other. Such obligations could be transferred to any lieutenant of the Caliph in a far off territory, but the delegation of such powers at the residence of the Caliph had no justification. For instance, the appointment of Qādīs, Khatībs, Imāms and all other religious functionaries had to be made by him personally at Baghdad. Whether the Qādīs drew their salaries from the Caliph's or the Sultān's exchequer, they were not subject to any outside influence in the exercise of their duties. Some of them were so independent and fearless in the discharge of their duties that they did not spare even the

Sultāns from fulfilling certain obligations.¹ Even the Mudarris of the Nidhāmiā Madrasā could not hold the office without the permission of the Caliph. For not having obtained such permission the Mudarris Yūsuf al-Dimishqī was excluded from the mosque on Friday, and even the substitute sent by Sultān Masūd was not allowed to undertake his duties until the Sultān himself had interceded with the Caliph.²

The Caliph was also held responsible for the 'moral and cleansing' conditions of the city. In the year 466/1073 before the innundations, petitions had been sent by prominent citizens to the Caliph Qāim complaining of the excess of wine drinking and vice in the city and requesting him to abolish the places of ill-resort. The Caliph Muqtadī enacted several laws in order to safeguard the morals of the people. Singing women and prostitutes were banished from the city and their houses were sold, people were forbidden to enter the public baths without wearing a cloth, and the removal of various structures of reed and high towers used ostensibly for bird houses, but in reality for the unlawful purpose of spying on the private quarters of the people, was ordered. Lastly the Caliph issued an order forbidding the

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1. In a particular case the Chief Qādī Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Mudhaffar Al-Shāmī, refused to accept the testimony of a witness on the ground that he was dressed in silk. When the complainant protested that on similar grounds the evidence of the Sultān and of his minister, Nidhām al-Mulk should be disallowed, the Qādī agreed with him and said that he would not accept their testimony either. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 173.
 2. Ibn Athīr, XI. P.100.

ferry men to carry men and women across together in their boats.¹ In the religious quarrels which broke out sometimes between the Shiites and Sunnites and other times between the Hanbalites and the Ashrites, the Caliph's help was invoked, and his authority was regarded as supreme.² In all other matters connected with religion, his was the chief authority that could not be easily gainsaid.³

That the Caliph~~h~~ did not divest himself of his temporal power at Baghdad is evident from a study of the coinage. After Tughril, no Saljūqīd Sultān was allowed to add the title Sultān after his name on the coins minted at the metropolis of Islām.⁴ The fact that the Caliphs were still able to levy taxes on the people at Baghdad also goes to prove this statement.⁵ On the other hand the Sultāns farmed the revenue of Baghdad and held themselves responsible for the government of the city. For this purpose they appointed a prefect (Shihnā) at Baghdad who was charged with the duty of maintaining peace and the security of the citizens. The position of this prefect was most precarious. On the one hand he was the representative of the Sultān and must therefore carry out his duties in accordance with his orders;

1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 156; Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, P. 203.

2. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, P. 202.

3. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 123. Over the Jew Abū Sād Ibn Simhā's high-handedness with a huckster, the Caliph issued an order that all Dhimmis must mark themselves with the special tokens and wear the garments prescribed for them by the Caliph Umar.

4. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, Vol. III. P. 30-37.

5. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 435. The Caliph Mustarshid in order to meet the expenses of construction of a wall, levied a tax on all exports leaving the city through its gates.

on the other hand he had to deal with a still higher authority than that of the Sultān, i.e. the Caliph, who still considered himself the supreme authority in all matters at Baghdad at least. In cases of negligence or malpractices started by the prefect, the people, instead of complaining to the Sultān, approached the Caliph who was at Baghdad and thus easily accessible.¹ Thus a sort of dual government was established at Baghdad, and sooner or later it was to bring about a serious conflict between the two authorities.

No serious rupture in the relations of these two authorities took place however during the Nidhām al-Mulk's period. This was due partly to the occupation of the Sultāns in their wars with non-Muslims, and partly to the wise administration and good counsel of Nidhām al-Mulk whose chief aim was the unity of the Islāmic world under the guidance of the Caliph.² During this period, the occasional interference of the Caliph in temporal affairs at Baghdad was met with a compromising attitude adopted by Nidhām al-Mulk.³ The Caliph, on the other hand, adopted a

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1. Several times the Caliph by sending the Qādīs stopped the malpractices started by the Shihnās. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 163 and 231.
 2. Houtsma, Art. Indian Journal, September, 1924.
 3. An illustration of this can be found in the following case. Aytagin al-Sulaymānī, the prefect at Baghdad, who was appointed by Alp Arslān had left his son to officiate for him during his absence. He maltreated the people and killed one of the servants of the Caliph, Muqtadī. The people of the Caliph's Diwān complained against him to the Sultān asking him to remove the prefect from his post. Since his father was in great favour with Nidhām al-Mulk, the request of the Diwān was not favourably considered. Nidhām al-Mulk sent the prefect Aytagin to Baghdad in 464/1071, and requested the Caliph to forgive him. When the Caliph rejected the request of Nidhām al-Mulk, the latter sent him to Takrit and granted him an Iqṭā there. On hearing this, the Caliph sent orders to the governor of Takrit not to allow him admittance into his country. This affair

similar attitude; and did not like to create trouble over petty things. Even the assumption of the royal prerogatives, e.g. the sounding of drums, by the Shihnā as representative of the Sultān at Baghdad, was tolerated by the Caliph.¹ But it required the greatest political prudence to maintain concord between the two authorities, and the ability of Nidhām al-Mulk to achieve this is fully illustrated by the fact that during so many years no serious quarrel arose. Even the rupture between the Caliph and Malik Shāh was not caused by any political incident, but was the outcome of the unhappy marriage of Sultān Malik Shāh's daughter with the Caliph Muqtadī.²

opened the eyes of Nidhām al-Mulk and the Sultān and they had to remove Aytagin and sent Sād al-Dawlā in his place to Baghdad. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 47.[^]

1. In 471/1078 Sād al-Dawlā had drums beaten at his gates at prayer times (five). This was the first innovation introduced by a prefect. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 72. Muayyid al-Mulk, b. Nidhām al-Mulk did the same thing in 475/1082. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 83.

2. The unhappy relations between the Caliph and his wife, the Sultān's daughter, brought about their separation, and ultimately the premature and tragic end of the princess caused Malik Shāh to conceive a hatred against the Caliph, whom he looked upon as the author of his misfortune. He completely ignored the Caliph's presence during his visit to Baghdad in 484/1091 and showed his public displeasure by not even seeing him. This was bad enough but worse was to follow; for the Sultān ordered the construction of various buildings for the use of himself and his officials, indicating thereby that he intended to make Baghdad his winter resort for the future. (Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 135) Any serious step against the Caliph at this juncture was avoided by the wise counsels of Nidhām al-Mulk, but after the latter's death, the way was open to the Sultān to give vent to his feelings. He sent instructions to the Caliph to retire from his residence to Baṣrā or, if he desired, to the Holy cities in Arabia; and to nominate the little Jāfar as his successor, without even realizing the consequences of such an unwise step as to declare a child as

The death of Nidhām al-Mulk, shortly followed by that of Sultān Malik Shāh, in 485/1092 gave the signal for a long struggle for the succession to the Sultānate between the sons of the Sultān. These wars offered an unexpected opportunity to the Caliph to assert his independence but it seems that his temporal power during the Nidhām's period was so weakened that he was incapable of taking advantage of these long and bloody wars. The Caliph's position can be well realized from the fact that he had to delegate the temporal power even to minors.¹ A strange and ridiculous position had arisen in Muslim politics. A minor could not be elected as Caliph though the latter, during this period, was not the actual ruler of the Islāmic state, while the Sultāns who were supposed to have delegated powers from the Caliphate to manage temporal affairs might be little more than babes.² As a matter of fact both Barkyāruq and Muhammad, who succeeded Mahmūd on account of his sudden and premature death, were minors though not

Caliph, which was against the traditions of Islām. This unexpected order caused a great stir at the court of the Caliph. Resistance was out of question; the only thing which the Caliph could secure was a delay of ten days. Meanwhile he occupied himself with fasting and praying; his appeal to God was not ineffective because within that period the Sultān fell ill and died. Cf. Bundārī, P. 70; Suyūṭī, trans. Jarrett, P. 446.

1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 145. The Caliph Muqtaḍī, under the pressure of Turkān Khātūn, had to grant the deed of investiture to her child of four years of age. In 498/1104 after the death of Barkyāruq his Shihnā Amīr Il-Ghāzī had the Caliph mention Barkyāruq's five years old son's name in the Khutba at Baghdad and also on the coinage. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 262.
2. ~~Ibn Athīr, X. P. 145.~~ This state of affairs was neither in keeping with the doctrines of the Islāmic jurists nor with the views of Nidhām al-Mulk. Imām Ghazzālī objected to Caliph's granting the deed of investiture to the four year old son of Sultān Malik Shāh. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 145.

of very tender age, but there was no way of preventing their succession to the Sultānate as their power mainly depended on the right of the sword. Whosoever came out successful of the war of succession had his name mentioned in the Khutbā at Baghdad and also on the coinage, with of course, the permission of the Caliph, which was quite formal and nominal.¹ The prayers for the Sultān at Baghdad had become almost as necessary as for the Caliph. People used to offer prayers for them automatically as soon as they heard the result of the war, and in case of doubt they mentioned the word 'Sultān' in the Khutbā without mentioning any particular name.² The Caliph realizing his incapacity adopted a passive attitude and calmly watched the progress of war between the two brothers, Barkyāruq and Muḥammad. The latter went on fighting, settling terms and even dividing countries with rights of mentioning their names in the Khutbā, and informed the Caliph afterwards.³

Both the Caliph and the Sultān tolerated each other in spite of their personal recriminations and animosities; the former owing to his inability to adopt any other course and the latter out of religious regard did not think it worth while to

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1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 155. In 487/1094 after his victory Barkyāruq came to Baghdad and asked the Caliph for the inclusion of his name in the Khutbā, which was done. And Khutbā was read for Muḥammad at his request, when the latter defeated Barkāruq. Cf. Athīr, X. P. 195.⁴⁶
 2. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 265. In 498/1104 Muḥammad reached Baghdad and encamped on the west side where his name was mentioned in the Khutbā, whereas in the East, the Khutbā was read in the name of Malik Shāh. In the mosque of Mansūr the Khaṭīb contented himself with naming the Caliph and offered prayers in the name of Sultān of the World without mentioning any personal name.
 3. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 254-255.

involve himself in any quarrel with the Caliph.¹ If any Sultān did not behave with respect to the Caliph or oppressed the people, he ran the risk of alienating the sympathies of the public.²

In the absence of any stable government at Baghdad during this period, owing to the continuous wars of succession, the Shihnā instead of maintaining peace and security began to govern more despotically and to oppress the people. The Caliph felt his responsibility for stopping these malpractices, but unable to assert his will except by sending Qādīs³ to intercede with the oppressors, took the fatal step of inviting Sayf al-Dawlā Sadaqā, an Arab Shīā chief of Hillā, to intervene. The latter seized the opportunity to plunder the people and sometimes even imposed conditions on the Caliph before he would stop pillaging the city.⁴ The rapid changes of temporal authority at Baghdad had also rendered the position of the Shihnā insecure. Since the change of Sultānate from one candidate to another also meant a change of Shihnā at Baghdad, it sometimes led to a war

1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 209-210. In spite of Barkyāruq's misbehavior with the Caliph, the latter had to grant him the deed. In the same way in spite of his denunciation by the Caliph, Barkyāruq had to put up with the same Caliph.

2. Ibid. X. P. 209. When Barkyāruq oppressed the people and confiscated the property of the Qādī Sālīm, the people sided with Muhammad.

3. Ibid. X. P. 163. In 487/1094 Aytayin the Shihnā at Baghdad set fire to the entire Bāb al-Basrā because his Hājib Muḥammad was stoned to bleeding. The Caliph through the intercession of the Qādī stopped him from further injuries to the citizens. The men of Il Ghāzī showed their high-handedness by murdering a boatman because he was slow in bringing a boat for their use. Cf. Ibid. X. P. 231.

4. Ibid. X. P. 245-246. Sayf al-Dawlā stopped plundering on condition that the Shihnā sent by Barkyāruq should be turned out.

between the two rival claimants. This further worsened the lot of the citizens who were always the victims in such struggles. In such wars the help of the Caliph was sometimes sought and was given to one who happened to be at Baghdad.¹

On the whole, however, the Caliph, realizing his incapacity to assert his position, left matters in status quo and contented himself with the affairs of Baghdad, the enjoyment of his personal income free from all responsibilities, and his own private affairs. Neither the Caliph nor the Sultān stirred a finger at a time when the Crusaders were gaining victory after victory in the Muslim lands. Appeal after appeal was made to the Caliph who, neither cared to send help himself as head of the Muslim community, nor could he force the Sultān to fulfil the obligation of waging Jihād or at least of protecting the lives and property of the Muslims.² Only in 504/1111, the Caliph and the Sultān were obliged to comply with the request of a mission which was headed by a good many of the learned scholars of the Metropolis who were anxious to uphold

1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 374. In 512/1118, Aqsunqar with the help of the Caliph turned out the new Shihnā sent by Mahmūd.

2. Even the population of Baghdad beyond shading tears, was not moved by the news of the advance of the Crusaders on Jerusalem in 492/1092. The city did not take any practical step even when a delegation came to secure help after the fall of Jerusalem. Cf. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 192.

In 501/1108 a second appeal arrived at Baghdad, headed by the ruling chief of Tripoli himself. The latter was received with great honour and consideration by both the Caliph and the Sultān, and was promised troops but not a single man went out of Irāq to give battle to the enemy. Cf. Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 161; Ibn Athīr, X. P. 315-316.

the prestige of Islām.¹

A new step was taken in the development of the Sultanate when after the defeat of Sultān Mahmūd at the hands of Sanjar, the latter was acknowledged as suzerain at Baghdad in 513/1119.² Henceforward Sanjar became the official Sultān and his name was mentioned in the Khutbā as well as on the coinage not only at Baghdad³ but in all those countries which were under Saljuqid control in Persia.⁴ This was the first occasion in the history of the Caliphate that a ruler was allowed this honour without having possession of Baghdad, and set an important precedent, which was

1. The men of Aleppo and their supporters, on the Friday after their demonstration, went to the mosque in the Caliph's palace with a view to enforcing their appeal. They were joined by many citizens. When their entry was prevented by the guardian of the gate, they pushing aside the guard forcibly entered the sacred building, tore down the grille surrounding the part of the mosque attached for the Caliph's private use, broke the pulpit and caused the abandonment of the public service. The Caliph was thus obliged to refer the matter to the Sultān in strong words with the result that the Sultān sent orders to Maṣil and to other cities within his sphere of influence, commanding the governors of those places to prepare themselves to partake in the Holy War against the Franks. Cf. Ibn Qalānisi, P. 173; The Damascus Chronicle, P. 111; Ibn Athir, X. P. 339; Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, P. 211.

This occasion coincided with the arrival of the Sultān's daughter, the Caliph's wife, who entered the city with great pomp and magnificence; but as the ceremony was marred by these disturbances the Caliph instituted an enquiry to find out the real authors of the trouble so that condign punishment should be meted out to them, and was only prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of the Sultān. Cf. The Damascus Chronicle, P. 111-112.

2. Ibn Athir, X. P. 388.

3. It should be noted however that at Baghdad, Sanjar's name appears on the coinage without the epithet Sultān.

4. Lane Poole, Coins of the Saljūqs, Vol. III. No coins of Sanjar period are known from Kirmān, but even in earlier times the Saljuqid maliks of Kirmān did not strike the Sultān's name on their coins.

subsequently invoked by powerful rulers, who demanded as a right that their names should be mentioned in the Khutbā at Baghdad. The position was further complicated by the fact that the rulers who were in possession of Baghdad also called themselves Sultāns, as their coinage shows.¹ It consequently became necessary that their names should be mentioned in the Khutbā also and inscribed on the coinage at Baghdad by virtue of their being the de facto sovereigns. The only difference between the two categories of Sultāns was that while Sultān Sanjar's name was mentioned in the Khutbā and inscribed on the coinage in the territories administered by the Sultāns of 'Irāq, the latter did not enjoy the same privilege in Sultān Sanjar's dominions.²

As soon as Sultān Sanjar made peace with his nephew Maḥmūd he made him his heir apparent and ordered the inclusion of his name in the Khutbā all over the Islāmic empire, and afterwards informed the Caliph to this effect.³ This was the limit of encroachment upon the prerogatives of the Caliph by the Sultān. It was now Sultān Sanjar who gave the government of 'Irāq to whomsoever he liked but since the government of Baghdad was also involved, the prince concerned had to take an oath of allegiance to the Caliph and to receive a deed of investiture from him in

1. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, Vol.III. P. 43-44.

2. Ibid. Sultān Sanjar's name appears on all coins minted in 'Irāq; while no other Sultān's name appears on the coinage minted in the dominions of Sultān Sanjar.

3. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 384.

return. The situation had become complicated in the extreme and was made worse by the wars of succession that were to follow the death of Mahmud. The help of both Sultān Sanjar as de facto suzerain of 'Irāq and of the Caliph as the holder of de jure sovereignty was invoked by the conflicting parties.

The unity of the Saljūq dynasty broke down on the death of Sultān Muhammad in 511/1117 and the accession of his son Mahmūd whose authority at Baghdad was intermittent, being challenged first by his uncle Sanjar and then by his own brother, Masūd, who ruled at Maṣīl. This fraternal conflict was due to the intrigues of Dubays, son of the famous Sadaqā, and gave an opportunity to the Caliphs to assert their temporal power by trying conclusions with the Saljūqid Sultāns.

Thus it was the activities of Dubays which gave a chance to the Caliph Mustarshid (512-529/1118-1135) to organize the forces which later on proved useful to him and to his successors against the Saljūqid Sultāns. Dubays was a mere plunderer and was most unscrupulous in his actions. He would neither listen to the Caliph nor to the Sultān and if it suited his purpose, he would tender his apologies to both of them.¹ Since he had been continually raiding Baghdad and harrying the surrounding districts, the Caliph had to assume the role of a defender. In order to meet this common enemy, Caliph and Sultān had to act in concert, and

1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 397-398.

Sultan Mahmūd rendered all necessary help to the Caliph against Dubays. When however, in 516/1122, the latter made peace with the Sultān by giving his brother Mansūr as a hostage for his good conduct, the Caliph did not approve of the peace and wrote to Sultān Mahmūd that under no circumstances should peace be made with him as he was intending to come to Baghdād to avenge his father's death.¹ The Caliph also asked the Sultān to recall Aq-sunqur Bursuqī from Mausil in order to assume charge of Baghdād and 'Irāq as prefect.² A desultory war went on for some time between the joint forces of the Caliph and Bursuqī and those of Dubays; but the Caliph finally defeated him by leading a huge army personally against him in 517/1123, and returned to Baghdād in triumph. This victory had a great moral effect on the public mind and reestablished the prestige of the Caliph.³ After getting rid of Dubays, it was the turn of the prefect, Aqsunqur, with whom the Caliph got displeased and thus had him re-transferred from his post.⁴ Another prefect Yarqutāsh was sent to Baghdād, but now the growing powers of the Caliph Mustarshid would not allow him to tolerate any prefect of the Sultān at Baghdād. Mustarshid was an able and energetic Caliph who generally commanded the respect of the Sultān and others, and he was the first Caliph who seriously thought of translating his family's theoretical rights into

1. & 2. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 422.

3. Ibid. P. 428-430.

4. Ibid. P. 431.

actual practice. His ideas can be judged from the following speech which he delivered after the Friday sermon just before giving battle to Sultān Mahmūd in 520/1126, "We entrusted our affairs to the house of Saljūq, but they rebelled against us, and time lengthened over them, and their hearts were hardened, and many of them were sinners."¹ The continuance of a dual government at Baghdad under such an imperious Caliph was out of the question. The struggle that had long been brewing broke out openly in 520/1126 when the Caliph was involved in a quarrel between his Wazir and the prefect of the Sultān at Baghdad. The latter, on a threat from the Caliph, left Baghdad and fled to the Sultān, before whom he laid his complaint, warning him that the Caliph's power was on the increase and unless he took proper steps immediately the Metropolis would be lost to the Saljūqs. Acting on this advice, the Sultān mobilised his forces and proceeded towards Irāq. The Caliph remonstrated and requested him to turn back, on the ground that the country and its inhabitants were impoverished as a result of the ravages of Dubays and not in a position to supply the needs of the Sultān's army. In asking him to put off his visit until the city had been restored at least to some of its former prosperity, the Caliph promised that no opposition would then be made to his coming. In return for this consideration, he offered the Sultān some money, which so streng-

1. Nidhām-i 'Arūḍi, Chahār Maqālā, trans. Browne, Anecdote, VIII. PP. 23-24.

thened the suspicions of the latter that he insisted on coming to Baghdad. This led to the actual rupture between the two.¹ In the ensuing struggle the people, exasperated by the plunder of the Caliph's crown and private dwelling by the Sultān's army, enthusiastically took the part of the Caliph who was enabled to raise a huge army of about thirty thousand. But the desertion of a Kurdish chief to the Sultān and the intervention of Zangī, then governor of Wāsīt, turned the scale in his favour.² The Caliph, seeing the prospects of war against him, made overtures for peace, which were accepted by the Sultān, who contented himself with a present of money and other gifts from the Caliph and retired from Baghdad in 521/1127 after a bout of illness.³

On the death of Sultān Maḥmūd in 525/1131, the Caliph Mustarshid took advantage of the quarrel between Dāūd, the son of Sultān Maḥmūd, who was recognized as Sultān in Jibāl and Adharbaijān, and his uncle Masūd, who revolted against his authority. Both of them applied to the Caliph for the inclusion of their names in the Khutbā at Baghdad, but he refused their requests with the remarkable words (if Ibn al-Athīr is to be trusted), "The decision regarding the Khutbā rests with Sultān Sanjar whomsoever, he wants, the Khutbā will be read in his name."⁴At

1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 448.

2. Ibid. P. 449-450.

3. Ibid. P. 450. (Noteworthy that Ibn Athīr's sympathies rather with the Sultān; Bundārī's against him.); Bundārī, P. 152

4. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 474.

the same time he wrote to Sultān Sanjar not to recommend anybody's name.¹ During the troubled years which followed, when various princes of the Saljūqid dynasty tried to gain the mastery of 'Irāq, the Caliph Mustarshid played off the claimants against one another welcoming the defeated party and often helping it with men and money. This attitude at once involved him in a conflict with Sultān Sanjar, and relations between Caliph and Sultān became so straitened that the former dropped the Sultān's name from the Khutbā in 526/1131.² Upon this Sanjar gave Hillā to Dubays and invited him to advance towards Baghdad. The joint advance of 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī and Dubays on Baghdad compelled the Caliph who was heading an army with Malik Saljūq Shāh and Masūd against Sultān Sanjar, to retrace his steps. Sultān Sanjar after defeating the combined forces of Malik Saljūq Shāh and Masūd reinstated Malik Tughril in 'Irāq; the Caliph, on the other hand, having defeated the forces of Zangī and Dubays,³ again helped the refugees, i.e. Malik Dāūd and Masūd, with men and money, inserted their names in the Khutbā and sent them twice to fight against Malik Tughril. He was unable, however, to instal his nominee in 'Irāq against the nominee of the Sultān, and only Tughril's death in 529/1134 allowed Sultān Masūd to succeed him.⁴

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1. Ibn Athīr, X. P. 474.
 2. Ibid. P. 476.
 3. Ibid. P. 476-478.
 4. Ibid. XI.P. 11.

But no sooner was Masūd installed than Mustarshid's determination to get rid of Saljūqid control led him to a decisive struggle with the new Sultān of 'Irāq, which caused his defeat and capture and cost him his life. When Sultān Masūd occupied Hamadān, several of the leaders of the Saljuqs turned against him. The Caliph not only welcomed the rebels as usual, but to make ~~and~~ matters worse, dropped the name of Sultān Masūd from the Khutbā at Baghdad.¹ In the ensuing campaign of 529/1134, the Caliph was refused help from the governor of Baṣrā² and many of his leaders deserted to Sultān Masūd, with the result that his forces were defeated and he was personally captured with all his remaining officers. The Sultān appointed as prefect at Baghdad, Beg Abāh al-Mahmūdī, who confiscated all the personal property of the Caliph and also plundered his palace. Upon this the people at Baghdad were deeply grieved and gave expression to their feelings not only by breaking the minbar of the mosque and preventing the khatīb from reading the Khutbā, but also by fighting against the prefect.³ In the meanwhile news arrived of the revolt of Malik Dāūd and in consequence of this the Sultān hastened in that direction with the imprisoned Caliph in his wake.⁴ Peace was made between the Caliph and Sultān Masūd on the following terms:-

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1. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 14; Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 248.
 2. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 15.
 3. *Ud. P. 16.*
 4. Ibn Qalānīsī, P. 249; Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 16.

That the Caliph shall pay a sum of money to the Sultān; that he shall not again assemble armed forces; and that he shall not leave his place.¹ These terms show very clearly that the Sultān was determined to prevent the Caliphate from assuming the functions of temporal rulership. As the Caliph was making arrangements for his return to Baghdad, however, he was murdered by some Bātinīs in his tent, though it was naturally suspected at Baghdad that the murder had been instigated by the Sultān.²

In spite of the humiliation which attended Mustarshid's efforts to free himself from the control of the Sultāns, the spirit of independence which he had displayed fired his successors and after one more attempt the Caliphs at ~~last~~ succeeded in realizing their ambition when the Saljūqids were quarrelling over the fragments of their empire. The struggle was renewed immediately on the succession of Mustarshid's son Rāshid, who refused to adhere to the terms of the treaty, and would not pay the sum demanded. On a mere suspicion, he expelled the prefect from Baghdad, and dropped the name of Sultān Masūd from the Khutbā.³ This was sufficient for the reopening of war between the Caliph and the Sultān. The former mobilised his forces and allied himself with Malik Dāūd b. Sultān Maḥmūd, who came to Baghdad with all his forces from Adharbaijān in 530/1135; and for whom the Khutbā

1. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 16.

2. Bundārī, P. 178. It was also rumoured that it was at the instigation of Sultān Sanjar.

3. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 23.

was read at Baghdad.¹ Relying upon the strength of his combined forces, and with the advice of his counsellors, the Caliph rejected the peace overtures of the Sultān who had offered obedience and submission to him.² Sultān Masūd consequently proceeded to Baghdad, and besieged it for about fifty days. When he was on the verge of raising the siege, he received some boats from the governor of Wāsiṭ, with which he succeeded in crossing the Tigris. The Caliph fled with all his allies to Maṣīl and the Sultān triumphantly entered Baghdad in 530/1136.³ His first business on entering was to summon an assembly of the Qādīs, Faqīhs, public notaries and other high officials and lay before them the document of the Caliph in which he had declared himself deposed if ever he went out to fight against Sultān Masūd. Thus the Sultān secured a Fatwā from the Qādīs and Faqīhs for the deposition of Rāshid, and issued an order intimating the deposition of the Caliph and the exclusion of his name from the Khutbā.⁴ Afterwards he consulted the late Caliph's wazīr and agreed with him to the election of Muqtafī (530-555/1136-1160) as the new Commander of the Faithful, a man who was to deal a hard blow to Saljūq power. Ibn al-Athīr relates that when the Sultān sent a messenger to the new Caliph with regard to an estate belonging to the privy purse, he received the following reply: "Eighty mules are used

1. Bundārī, P. 179.

2. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 24.

3. Ibid. P. 26.

4. Ibid. P. 26-27.

for bringing water from the Tigris. Let the Sultān see that those who drink this water have their needs supplied." This unexpected reply led the Sultān to realize that he had elected too strong a man for the Caliphate.¹

The Caliph Muqtafi, although a creation of the Sultān, assumed a more independent attitude than many of his predecessors. He entered into a plot to murder the Sultān while at Baghdad, but it did not materialise owing to the incessant rain that fell that day and prevented the Sultān from coming out of his house for prayers.² It was well for the Caliphate that Sultān Masūd died in 547/1152. With his death, the temporal power of the Saljūqs disappeared from Baghdad and the surrounding territories for ever; the libertine Masūd al Bilālī, the prefect at Baghdad, fled³, and the Caliph proceeded to ransack the houses of the Saljūq officials who were quartered in the city.⁴ In accordance with the oath taken by the Caliph at his accession, he banished from the city those Turks and Persians who had any connection with the Saljūq regime,⁵ and appointed Greek and Armenian mamlūks to be Amīrs in their places. All the estates formerly held by the Sultān's minister were now given to his own Wazir. In the same

1. Ibn Athīr, P. 28. Vol. XI.

2. ~~ibid.~~ Rāwandī, P. 238.

3. Zubdat al-Tawārikh, fol. 72.

4. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 106.

5. Zubdat al-Tawārikh, fol. 72; Levy, Baghdad chronicle, P. 222.

year, the Caliph occupied 'Irāq as far as Takrīt, Hulwān, Hillāh, Kūfā and Wāsiṭ. Some forces sent by Malik Shāh were defeated by the Caliph's army and the latter two places came under the direct control of the Caliphate.¹

After establishing his temporal power at Baghdad and surrounding provinces, the Caliph considered it a stigma and a mark of subordination to continue to insert the Sultāns' names in the Khutbā at Baghdad. Since prayers had been offered for them at Baghdad only by virtue of their de facto occupation of the city, with the disappearance of their sovereignty their names could no longer be included in the Khutbā. But the Sultāns were not to accept this view without challenge. It appears from historical evidence that the Caliph was still willing to mention the name of the official Sultān in the Khutbā, and as long as Sultān Sanjar continued to exercise effective rule, his name was mentioned in the Khutbā and inscribed on the coinage at Baghdad.² The Caliph paid the same honour to Sulaymān Shāh b. Muḥammad, who had been made an heir apparent to Sanjar, when the former after his defeat by the Ghūzz came to Baghdad in 551/1156.³ On the other hand, he refused the request of Muḥammad, who had succeeded in Persian 'Irāq, for the inclusion of his name in the Khutbā at Baghdad.⁴

1. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 106.

2. Ibid. P. 147.

3. Bundārī, P. 241; Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 136.

4. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 140.

This furnished a pretext to Sultān Muḥammad to start siege operations against the Metropolis, but the shrewd Caliph was quite prepared to withstand an attack. The Sultān unnecessarily delayed the siege operations in spite of the fact that he was supplied with continual reinforcements of ships. For certain reasons, he continued to send messages to the Caliph assuring him of his loyalty if only his own claims were acknowledged. It must remain uncertain whether this was due to the fact that his only aim in fighting with the Caliph was to establish his right to inclusion of his name in the Khutbā at Baghdad, or to the fact that some of the besiegers' apparently had scruples about warring against the Caliph and the 'Heart of Islām'. In the meanwhile, the Caliph's wazir was secretly trying to win the Sultān's officers by sending them secret gifts of money accompanied by warnings that it was 'contrary to the teachings of Islām to rebel against the Caliph, or to attack Baghdad, which was his abode'.¹ To some extent the Wazir's propaganda proved effective, but the real help came from the other direction. By the time the Sultān was ~~228~~ ready to attack in earnest, the diplomatic efforts of the Caliph and his Wazir bore fruit in persuading Malik Shāh and other claimants of the Saljūqid throne to move hostile troops against the Sultān's base at Hamādān. Afraid of more serious trouble at home, he had to raise the siege; the city was saved, and never again

1. Zubdat al-Tawārikh, fol. 75; Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, P. 225.

did any Saljūqid Sultān forcibly attempt to claim Baghdad as his own.¹

On the death of Sultān Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad b. Malik Shāh in 554/1159, Sulaymān Shāh b. Muḥammad was reinstated as Sultān, and since the latter had already been accepted by the Caliphate as the successor of Sanjar and his name had been mentioned as such in the Khuṭbā, no trouble arose. But when Malik Shāh, gathering some followers at Iṣfahān, sent to the Caliph demanding the inclusion of his name in the Khuṭbā at Baghdad and threatening at the same time that in case of non-compliance he would attack Baghdad, the Caliph's Wazir sent a slave girl to poison him in 555/1160². After the murder of Sulaymān Shāh, who had given himself up to pleasure and luxury, by his own wazir Sharaf al-Dīn, the Saljūqid Sultānate at Baghdad came to an end.³ When his successor Arslān Shāh b. Ṭughril (556-573/1161-1177) sent a request for the inclusion of his name in the Khuṭbā at Baghdad, the messenger was disgracefully turned out.⁴ The efforts of the last of the Saljuqid Sultān, Ṭughril, to revive the claims of the Sultānate at Baghdad, i.e. to deprive the Caliphate of its temporal power, led him into a sharp collision with one of the most energetic of the Caliphs, Nāṣir, who had the satisfaction of

1. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 140-142; Bundārī, P. 246.

2. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 174.

3. Ibid. P. 175.

4. Ibid. P. 177-178.

seeing Tughril's head hung at the gates of his palace in 590/1194 in Baghdad.¹

From its long drawn out struggle for temporal power with the Saljūqs, the Abbāsid Caliphate thus emerged successful up to a point. The Caliphs were able to create a small independent state for themselves, in which they enjoyed not only religious authority, but also held the temporal sovereignty. This small state was by no means created through the right of their religious authority, but at the point of the sword. No doubt, the Caliphs still commanded the sympathies of the public more than the Sultāns², some of whom with their commanders hesitated to oppose an army personally led by the Caliphs.³ But these factors were not so important as to enable incapable Caliphs to assert their temporal authority. Their success was mainly due to the continual wars of succession between the Saljūqid claimants, coincident with the emergence of a line of energetic and ambitious Caliphs.

On the other hand, during the Saljūqid period the Caliph's temporal power in Persia vanished entirely. Since the Caliph had vested absolute temporal power in the Sultān, who could

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1. Zubdat al-Tawārīkh, f. 110. Juwaynī, P. 32. II; Athīr, XII. p. 70.
 2. Rāwandī, P. 346. The Caliph was held in such esteem in the public eye that when the last Saljuqid Sultān, Tughril, defeated the forces of the Caliphate and much booty fell to him, people did not purchase an Arab horse even for a dinar out of their regard for the Caliphate.
 3. Rāwandī, P. 284. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd was told that if the Caliph led the army personally, the Amīrs would not have courage to oppose him. Sultān Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd considered the war against the Caliph inauspicious. Cf. Bundārī, P. 236. Some of the besiegers apparently had scruples about warring against the Caliph and the 'Heart of Islām'. Cf. Levy, P. 225.

bestow any part of the Islāmic empire in his possession to whomsoever he chose, the Caliphate was completely cut off from relations with other Persian rulers. It had already been noted that Tughril and his brothers immediately after writing their letter to the Caliph in 432/1040, divided out the possessions which had fallen to them by conquest. To Qāvurd b. Chagri Beg's share fell the government of Kirmān. When Tughril was recognized as Sultān, the Saljūqs of Kirmān set themselves up as independent rulers and they gave little heed either to the Caliphate or to the Great Saljūqs, with whom they were often at war. When Qāvurd in 465/1072 contested the succession to the Sultānate of Malik Shāh, he was defeated, captured and poisoned by order of Malik Shāh; but afterwards his son Sultān Shāh, who also had fallen into the hands of the Sultān (Malik Shāh), managed to effect his escape to Kirmān, where he installed himself as Malik in 467/1074 without taking the trouble to approach either the Caliph or the Sultān for a deed of investiture.¹ In 472/1079 Malik Shāh marched towards Kirmān but on the submission of his nephew Sultān Shāh who welcomed him and gave valuable presents, he returned to his own country and invested him with the possession of all the territories that were ruled by him.² Since these Maliks were never

1. Muhammad Ibrāhīm, History of Saljūqids of Kirmān, ed. Houtsma P. 17.

2. Ibn Athir, X. P. 74-75.

granted any deed of investiture directly from the Caliphate they had no political connection with the institution whatsoever. During their intermittent wars of succession they never approached the Caliph even in order to strengthen their position against one another, and seem to have ruled their country solely by right of conquest.

Khurāsān likewise was politically cut off from the Caliphate since the ceremony of the renewal of the deed of investiture fell into disuse. After Sanjar received his deed from the Caliphate, it was never renewed even on the death of a Caliph. It seems that the renewal of this deed both on the change of the Caliph and of the rulers was required only in those cases where the Sultān happened to be in possession of Baghdad itself. That Khurāsān was still in touch with the Caliphate can be explained by the fact that its ruler had become the official Sultān, and as such had to deal with the central government. However, the paucity of correspondence regarding important matters between the governors and the Caliphate shows the extent of their independence. The successors of Sultān Sanjar, Malik Sulaymān Shāh and Maḥmūd Khān b. Muḥammad b. Bughrā Khān, who were in turn raised to the Sultānate during the captivity of the Sultān in 549/1154, did not approach the Caliph for the renewal of the deed of investiture.¹ Even after Sanjar's death in 551/1155,

1. Ibn Athīr, XI. P P. 119 & 121 respectively.

Mahmūd Khān who finally succeeded Sanjar in accordance with the will of the latter, did not trouble to approach the Caliph for the renewal of the deed. He seems to have succeeded and ruled only by right of testament.¹

Since various governors in Persia held their appointments directly from the Saljūqid Sultāns, they either maintained a semblance of allegiance to them or freed themselves from their yoke whenever it became possible for them to do so.² No doubt all these rulers kept on mentioning the Caliph's name in the Khutbā and inscribing it on the coinage current in their territories, but this recognition was now an automatic traditional usage - it was not coupled with any formal profession of allegiance and receipt in return of a deed or other insignia of temporal sovereignty. It was purely to the force of religious tradition that these practices owed their survival. Hence it can safely be said that, at this time, an implicit distinction was made between the religious and temporal recognition of the Abbasid Caliphate by the rulers in Persia.

1. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 147.

2. Ibid. XI. P. 121. Al-Muwayyḍ one of the slaves of Sanjar occupied Nishāpūr, Tūs, Nāsā etc. without possessing any legal title. With great hesitation he acknowledged Sultān Mahmūd as his overlord. In 558/1163 when he became the master of the greater part of Khurāsān, he acknowledged Arslān as his overlord and mentioned his name in the Khutbā. Cf. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 192-193.

To sum up, the Saljūq period, so far as the Abbasid Caliphate is concerned, is characterized by two significant features:-

I. It was during this period that the renewal of the deed of investiture to individual rulers fell into disuse; and its necessity was felt only on the change of the dynasty instead of the ruler in the same family. Thus the Caliphate was politically cut off from Persia altogether and even that semblance of political control that existed during the preceding regime came to an end.

II. The other and the most important political significance of the Saljūq period, as far as the Caliphate is concerned, is the complete severance of the temporal and religious functions of the institution. For the first time in its history, the Caliphate had delegated the temporal functions of its own free will to a Sultān who was henceforward considered as the head of the temporal affairs of the Caliphate. The following ideas expressed by the Atābeg of the last of the Saljūqid Sultāns were the outcome of the delegation of the temporal affairs of the Caliphate to the Sultān: "The Caliph, in the capacity of an Imām, should occupy himself with the performance of Namāz (prayers) and religious leadership, as it is the foundation of the faith and the best of deeds. As regards temporal affairs, they should

be delegated to Sultāns".¹ These ideas are not based on exaggeration, but only describe the position that had actually arisen. On the other hand as soon as a strong and capable person occupied the Caliphate, it was natural, on his part, not to admit the Sultānatê, but to revert to the earlier position, as actually happened in the case of the last three successive holders of that position during the Saljūqid period. But one thing which cannot be denied is that an innovation had taken place with all legality of a practical sort behind it, which the Caliphate could not refuse to a strong Sultān if only he was capable of claiming it, and which he could hold, once he had obtained it, with all show of legality and authority of a precedent. It was on the strength of this precedent that the Khwārazm-shāhs claimed the privileges previously enjoyed by the Saljūqs, and carried on continual struggle with the Caliphate that was brought to an end only on the destruction of both dynasties. The next chapter shall be devoted to this fact.

1. Rāwandī, P. 334.

CHAPTER. IV.The last years of the Caliphate.

With the advent of the Khwārazm-shāhs¹ to power in Persia, the final step was taken in the development of the institution of the Sultānate. They were the first sovereign rulers in Persia to dispense with the traditional policy of approaching the Caliphate for the confirmation of their temporal rights, when the intermediate power from which they had derived their authority had ceased to exist. Il Arslān (551-568/1156-1172), the son and successor of Atsīz, had secured a deed of investiture from Sultān Sanjar after the latter's escape from his captivity at the hands of the Ghuzz in 551/1156.² But after Sanjar's death in 552/1157, he neither approached the Abbasid Caliphate, as he ought to have done in the absence of any intermediate authority, for the legitimization of his rights, nor did he take any steps in this direction in his dealings with Maḥmūd who had succeeded in 'Irāq as the head of the Saljūqid dynasty.³ Il Arslān may perhaps be taken as

1. See Art. on Khwārazm-shāhs in *Encycl. of Islām*.

2. Ibn Athīr, XI. P. 138.

3. Although Il Arslān welcomed Maḥmūd Khān as the successor of Sultān Sanjar in Khurāsān and informed him that he had ordered the observance of three days mourning in his territories on the death of the Sultān, he placed him on the same official footing as other minor rulers of Khurāsān when he called himself 'Sincere friend' (Mukhlis). It should be noted here that Atsīz in his letters to Sultān Sanjar used to call himself 'Slave (Bandā)'. On the other hand in his correspondence to the person who was to represent the Khwārazm-shāhs at the court of Ghyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, the ruler of 'Irāq, and the head of the Saljūqid dynasty, he addressed the latter ruler as 'Sovereign of the World', supreme Sultān, 'Commander of all the Earth'. Cf. Barthold Turkestan, PP. 332-333. This appears to convey a formal acknowledgment of his subordination to the Saljūqid Sultān, but in actual practice he tried to play the role of mediator between the Sultān and the Caliph Muqtafī. In the Khwārazm-shāh's letter

a legally constituted ruler since he had secured the deed to rule his country from Sultān Sanjar; but after his death in 568/1172 his two sons, Takash and Sultān Shāh, who had been struggling for the succession, did not entertain the idea of appealing to the Caliph¹ even to strengthen their claims. Instead of approaching the Abbasid Caliphate for its moral and material support, both brothers in turn invoked the assistance of the infidel Qārā Khitays¹. By this time, in fact, a deed of investiture from the Caliphate had lost even its moral value, and for the determination of such rights only military strength was of any consequence.

In the same way, the Ghūrīds, though they were political rivals of the Khwārazmshās in Persia and noted for their amicable relations with the Abbasid Caliphate, yet, in accordance with the spirit of the time, limited the recognition of the Caliphate simply to the mention of the Caliph's name in the Khutbā and its inscription on their coinage.² There is no historical evidence to show that they ever approached the Caliphate for a deed of investiture; and notwithstanding the fact that they were never granted the title of Sultān, the epithet was duly assumed by them, as is shown by their coinage.³ There was, no doubt, an exchange of embassies between the Caliphate and the Ghūrīds, who received robes

to the Wazir of the Caliph, it is stated that 'only Sultān Muḥammad could rid Khurāsān of highway robbers and Transoxania of the yoke of the infidels, that the inhabitants of these provinces await his arrival with impatience and that at such a time the Caliph's govt must forget its enmity to the Sultān, for which indeed it had no serious cause, and afford him support. Cf. Barthold, P.332.

1. Juwaynī, II. P. 17 & 20.

2. & 3. Lane Poole, Add. IX. P. 5, 8 & 9.

of honour from the Caliphs on several occasions.¹ But they were favoured by the Caliph only because they were quite content with their position and did not make a demand, like the Khwārazm-shāhs for the inclusion of their names in the Khutbā at Baghdad and the grant of the Sultanate. Thus it can safely be concluded that by this time no ruler in Persia held a direct authority to rule his territories from the Caliphate to validate their personal position or to legalise the working of the religious institutions had disappeared with the lapse of time. No question seems to have arisen as to the legality of the appointment of Qādīs and other religious functionaries by Sultāns who possessed no delegated authority from the Caliphs to this effect? as had been disputed by the legists of the time of Imām Ghazzālī. We still find the Caliphs trying to retain their hold on these rulers by sending them 'Sultānian robes', but the Sultāns lay no store by them and even refuse to accept them if they cannot have their own way. On the other hand they might accept them with all outward show of joy and satisfaction in order to show the public that they had received some sort of recognition from the Caliphate. In fact the Sultanate was established now in its own right, and it had not only taken over the temporal authority of the Caliphate but also its religious functions in their territories. Nay, not

1. Juzjānī, trans. Raverty, P. 383. On the arrival of the robe of honour from the Caliph Nāṣir, the Sultān assumed the prerogative of having drums sounded at his gates five times a day.
 2. The Saljūqids of Kirmān, no doubt, had set an example in this respect, but their case was quite different either from the Khwārazm-shāhs or the Ghūrīds. They had inherited their territory from their ancestor who had secured a deed from the Caliphate.

content even with this state of things, the Sultāns would try to assert their right over the Caliphate itself at Baghdad. By this time, however, the Caliphs, having retrieved their old position to some extent, were not only unwilling to accede to their demands, but were persistent in extending their political authority over as wide an area as possible. This situation created a bone of contention between Caliph **h** and Sultān.

As soon as the Caliph Nāṣir had got rid of the last Saljūqid Sultān with the help of Takash, he found in the latter a far more formidable opponent than the crumbling house of the Saljūqids, and realized that his ambition to occupy Persian⁶ Irāq would be seriously challenged. Having defeated Tughril, Takash proceeded to occupy Hamadān; the Caliph being informed, sent his Wazir with 'Sultānian robes' and rich presents to Takash, with instructions to settle terms with him. There might have been some compromise between the Caliph and the Sultān, but the demands of the Wazir were phrased in so haughty a manner that they were not acceptable to the Sultān. The Wazir announced that since the Sultān owed his throne to the Supreme Dīwān i.e. the Baghdad government, he should be the first to come forward to meet him and should dismount from his horse.¹ Since these pretensions were taken to be

1. Juwayni, II. P. 33.

According to Ibn Athīr, the Wazir demanded that the Sultān should present himself in his tent to receive personally the robe of honour ordered for him. Cf. XII. P. 70.

a ruse, they were firmly rejected; and only the Wazir's hasty retreat avoided a collision on this occasion. Takash after disposing of the government of the various newly conquered provinces retired to Khorezmiā.¹ But the uncompromising attitude of the Wazir soon involved the Caliphate in a war against the Sultān. In 591/1195 the Wazir who had all along been extending the territory of the Caliphate, attacked Hamadān and captured it.² The messenger sent by Takash to settle the terms of peace was summarily dismissed by the Wazir who would not agree to anything less than the occupation of the whole of Persian 'Irāq. The Sultān was thus obliged to take arms against the Caliph's forces, and utterly routed them and occupied Hamadān. The body of the hated Wazir (who had died in the meanwhile) was exhumed and his head hacked off and sent to Khorezmiā in 592/1196³. While the Sultān was at Hamadān, the Caliph sent Muġīr al-Dīn Abu'l Qāsim Maḥmūd Ibn Al-Mubārak Al-Baghdādī, Faqīh of the Shāfites at Baghdad to him, warning him to be content with the territories which were held by his father and grand-father and to retire from the newly conquered places; or else steps would be taken to turn him out. The Sultān, instead of listening to the demand of the

1. Juwaynī, II. P. 34.

2. Ibn Athīr, XII. P. 73.

3. Rāwandī, P. 383; Juwaynī, II. P. 38; Ibn Athīr, XII. P. 73.

Caliph, in his turn, demanded the province of Khuzistān as well.¹ Thus the messenger returned disappointed and for the time being the status quo was maintained. In 594/1198, Takash made a definite request to the Caliph that he should be granted the Sultanate, and that his name should be included in the Khuṭbā at Baghdād.² Though apparently this demand in itself did not mean the temporal power of the Caliphate at Baghdād³, it was surely a prelude to it. The Caliph, after the unhappy experience of his predecessors, was reluctant to revive the grant of this privilege, and in order to remove the menace of a fresh occupation of Baghdād, he insisted the Ghūrids⁴ to fight against the Khwārazm-shāh and occupy his possessions.⁵ It was only the serious defeat of the Qārā Khitays, the allies of Takash, by the Ghūrids, that obliged the Khwārazm-shāh to come to terms with the Caliphate⁶, and as the result of this intervention, peace was made between them. In 595/1199 Sultanian robes were sent to Sultān Takash and his son, Qutb al Din Muhammad, by the Caliph.⁷ Thus the Caliphate succeeded for the time being, with the assistance of the Ghūrids, in evading the demand of Takash, which was however to be renewed by his son Muhammad in still stronger terms.

1. Rawandi, P. 385.

2. Ibn Athir, XII. P. 88.

3. Cf. Barthold, Turkestan, P. 373.

4. To the Ghūrids, the commands of the Commander of the Faithful would be doubly welcome. On the one hand they did not wish the Khwārazm-shāh to assume a position of pre-eminence amongst the Muslim princes; and on the other, they would enlist the sympathies of the public against the Khwārazm-shāh. This, to a certain extent, accounts for their close alliance with the Abbasid Caliphate.

5. Ibn Athir, XII. P. 88-89.

6. Ibid. P. 90.

7. Ibid. P. 100.

As soon as Muhammad, the son of Takash, rid himself of his rivals¹ and stood pre-eminent among the eastern Muslim rulers, he openly aspired to the restoration in his favour of the universal Sultānate. He assumed the title of a second Alexander and allowed himself to be called by the name of Sultān Sanjar², and already at this time had the words 'Shadow of God on Earth' engraved on his seal.³ He then turned his attention towards the Caliphate in order to assert his right as Sultān over Baghdad itself. Though the Khwārazm-shāh had many grievances against the Caliphate, there can be little doubt that the main object of his hostilities against the Baghdad government was his desire to attain the same status at Baghdad that the Saljūqids had enjoyed before him. Since the Khwārazm-shāh considered himself superior in power to the Buwayhids and at least equal to the Saljūqids, he naturally desired to exercise the same rights in his relations with the Caliphate as the two previous dynasties had done.⁴ At first, however, Muhammad sought to

1. Muhammad continued his struggle against the Ghūrīds whom he expelled from all their possessions by the year 604/1207. Ghayāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, the Ghūrīd ruler, remained only in possession of Ghūr and here too he was compelled to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Khwārazm-shāh by reading the Khutbā and coining money in Muhammad's name. Cf. Juwaynī, II. P. 65. The next step on his part was to shake off the yoke of the Qārā Khitāys with whose assistance he had been able to overthrow the power of the Ghūrīds, Cf. Barthold, P. 363.

2. Barthold, (texts) P. 84. The adoption of Sultān Sanjar's name by the Khwārazm-shāh might have been in order to gain the same popularity and respect amongst the Muslim community; or perhaps that he desired to attain the same position in his relation to the Abbasid Caliphate.

3. Barthold, Turkestan, P. 364.

4. Juwaynī, II. P. 121.

achieve his object by diplomatic means, and sent the Qādī Mujīr al-Dīn b. 'Umar, b. ^{al}Ṣād to the Caliph with a request that the Khwārazm-shāh's name should be mentioned in the Khutbā at Baghdad. To a certain extent, Muḥammad was justified in demanding this privilege as there was a precedent set by Sultān Sanjar; but he knew very well that his demand was sure to be rejected by the Caliph, just as his father's had been. As expected, the Caliph would not listen to the arguments of the Qādī, and explained to him the situation which had obliged the Caliphate to grant this privilege to the Saljuqid Sultān Tughril Beg.² The Caliph also despatched Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn to the Khwārazm-shāh to dissuade him from pressing his claims. The envoy of the Caliph was paid due honour and the Sultān went on his knees to listen to a Ḥadīth which was to the effect that the Prophet warned the 'Faithful against causing harm to the family of 'Abbās.' The Sultān answered 'Although I am a Turk and possess very little knowledge of the Arabic language, yet I have understood the sense of the Ḥadīth recited by thee; I have not harmed a single descendent of 'Abbās; nor have I endeavoured to do them evil. On the other hand I have heard that a good many of them are always to be found in the prison of the Commander of the Faithful, and even multiply and increase there; if the Shaykh were to recite the same Ḥadīth in

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1. & 2. Nāsāvī, P. 12.

the presence of the Commander of the Faithful, it would be more to the point and would serve a better end"¹. The Shaykh tried to justify the action of the Caliph in imprisoning individuals in the interests of the Muslim community as a whole, but the embassy failed to achieve its ends, and the hostility between the Caliph and the Sultān increased. According to Juwaynī², the Sultān did not want to be spoken of as having 'for the sake of his ambitious objects made an attack on the Imām, the fealty to whom constitutes one of the fundamentals of Islām, and thrown his faith to the winds'; and was obliged to contrive a more plausible pretext for war than the question of the Khutbā. In the unscrupulous proceedings of the Caliph Nāsir against him, he saw an opportunity for the realization of his long cherished aim. Owing to the rebellious nature of the dynasty, the Caliph had always looked upon them as rivals, had incited the Ghūrids against the Khwārazm-shāh and even suggested the alliance of the Qārā Khitays against him. Unfortunately for the Caliph's hate, all this correspondence was found by the Khwārazmshāh when he triumphantly entered Hirāt in 612/1215.³ These documents Muhammad now published, and at the same time disclosed the treacherous action of the Caliph in insti-

1. Nasavī, P. 13.

2. Juwaynī, II. P. 121.

3. Ibid.

Another cause of his resentment against the Caliph, Muhammad found in an insult done to him by the preference given to Jalāl al-Dīn Hasan, the chief of the Ismā'ilites over him in leading the pilgrims on the occasion of the Hajj. Cf. Juwaynī, II. P. 120-121.

gating the murder of Aghlamīsh, Viceroy of Muḥammad in 'Irāq and the then Amīr of Mecca.¹ In this way he succeeded in obtaining a Fatwā from the 'Ulamā of his kingdom to the effect, "That an Imām who committed such undesirable and unbecoming acts, was unworthy of his office, and that a Sultān who proved himself a supporter of Islām and devoted much of his time to war for the faith, pursued by the intrigues of the Imām, was justified in deposing such an Imām and appointing another; finally that the Abbasids had forcibly seized the Caliphate which, by right belonged to the descendants of 'Alī". On the basis of the above Fatwā, he rashly declared the Caliph Nāṣir deposed, omitted the mention of his name in the Khutbā and on the coinage;² and proclaimed as Caliph the Sayyid Al-Mulk Tirmidhī³. Thus prepared for drastic action, the Khwārazm-shāh marched on Baghdad in 614/1217. Unfortunately for the Sultān, a division led by him from Hamdān to Baghdad, was overtaken by snowstorms in the mountains of Kurdistan and sustained heavy losses; its remnants were almost exterminated by the Kurds, and only a small portion returned to Khorezm. Thus a serious blow was dealt to the prestige of Muḥammad, the more so because the people regarded this defeat as a punishment

1. Juwaynī, II. P. 121.

2. Ibid. P. 121-122.

3. Ibid. P. 97.

4. Ibid. P. 98; Ibn Athīr, XII. P. 207.

from above for his sacrilegious campaign. According to Nasavī¹, Muḥammad after his misfortune expressed his repentance and tried to make peace with the Baghdad government; but according to Ibn al-Athīr, he did not cease his feud with the Caliphate and on his way back to Khorezmīā to meet a projected invasion, he gave out that the Caliph was dead and caused his name to be omitted from the Khutbā in various places.²

The action of Muḥammad shows the climax of the claim of the Sultanate to assert its supreme rights and dictate its terms to the Caliphate. That the Khwārazm-shāh failed in his attempt is due to a number of circumstances. The most fatal and foolish mistake he committed in this respect was to declare a Shīā as an Imām, thus antagonizing not only the Abbasid house, but the whole of the Sunni community. It was little wonder, under such circumstances, that he did not succeed in having the Caliph's name excluded from the Khutbā in various places.³ Were Baghdad in his possession, he would easily dictate terms to the Caliphate; failing that, the second best alternative for him would have been to instal in the Caliphate some claimant from the Abbasid house itself. However, the impending Mongol invasion did not give him much time to put his plans into practical shape. In any case it cannot be denied that this move on the part of the Khwārazm-shāh was an open assertion of that right over the Caliphate,

1. Nasavī, P. 20-21.

2. Ibn Athīr, XII. P. 207. This version seems to be more correct than that of Nasavī as one of the terms of the treaty made between Jalāl al-Dīn and the Caliphate in 623/1226, was that the former would insert the name of the Caliph in the Khutbā in those places where it was excluded by Sultān Muḥammad. Cf. Howorth, III. P. 12.

3. Ibid.

which, with all decency of secrecy, had been exercised during the Saljuqid period. Matters had now reached such a stage that Sultān could retaliate upon the Caliph^s by omitting his name from the Khutbā in his territories, if the latter was not willing to mention his name in the Khutbā at Baghdad; and more than this, while the Caliph could not depose a Sultān from his position, the latter could depose the Caliph by securing a Fatwā from the 'Ulamā.

So long as the Abbasid Caliphate survived, however, the Sultānatē had still to reckon with the force of public opinion. How much veneration was still felt for the Caliphate as a religious institution can be gauged from the attitude of such contemporary writers as Ibn al-Athīr and al-Isfahānī. Ibn al-Athīr for example, in referring to the pre-eminence of the noble house of the Abbasids, goes so far as to say, "Any one who sought to bring evil upon it was punished for his action or for his evil intentions"¹. Even the writers who were in the service of the Sultānate could not afford to ignore the existence of the Abbasid Caliphate, but recognizing the necessity of the latter institution, only tried to find a place in it for the numerous independent monarchs that had arisen in dominions once belonging to the Caliphate. Nidhām-i-'Arūdī, a writer of the twelfth century while assigning relative positions to Caliphate and Kingship,

1. Ibn Athīr, P. 207. XII.

propounds a theory to suit the exigencies of the time. The author says, "So long as such a man (Prophet Muhammad) lives, he points out to his people what things conduce to well-being in both worlds by the Command of God, glorious is His Name, communicated to him by means of the Angels. But when by natural dissolution, he turns his face towards the other world, he leaves behind him as his representative a Code derived from the indications of God Almighty and his own sayings. And assuredly he requires, to maintain his Law and Practice, a Vice-gerent who must needs be the most excellent of that community and the most perfect product of that age, in order that he may maintain this Law and give effect to this code; and such an one is called an Imām. But this Imām cannot reach the horizons of the East, the West, the North and the South in such wise that the effects of his care may extend alike to the most remote and the nearest and his command and prohibition may reach at once the intelligent and the ignorant. Therefore must he needs have vicars to act for him in distant parts of the world, and not every one of these will have such power that all mankind shall be compelled to acknowledge it. Hence there must be an administrator and compeller, which administrator and compeller is called a 'Monarch, 'that is to say, a king; and his vicarious function (niyabat) 'sovereignty'. The king, therefore, is the lieutenant (naib) of the Imām, the Imām of the Prophet, and the Prophet of God (Mighty and Glorious is He)"¹. The above theory clearly does

1. Nidhām-i-Arudi, Chahār Maqālā, P. 10; Trans. Browne, P. 11.

not justify any monarch in ousting the Caliph altogether from the temporal power; more so if the Caliphs could rule their territories as efficiently as the Sultāns themselves. Were any Sultān to try to do so, he must run the risk of alienating the sympathies of 'Ulamā, Muslim princes and the general public. The Khwārazm-shāhs, in consequence, could rely upon little support from any direction in their attempt to secure the supremacy of the Sultānate. To make matters worse, they were known to be in constant alliance with the infidels, i.e. the Qārā Khitays,¹ against the Ghūrīds, who were backed up by the moral support of the Caliphate. The sentiments of the Muslim public towards the family for its inveterate hostility to the Caliphate and disgraceful alliance with the Qārā Khitays, were vigorously expressed by Maulānā Zahir al-Dīn Faryābī, addressing Sultān Takash, in the following strophe:-

"Oh, Shah ! since 'Ajam, by the sword, to thee has been consign'
Towards Muṣṭafā's place of repose, an army send,
Then lay the Ka'bah desolate, and a fan bring,
And like unto useless atoms, to the winds the dust of the Haram
send.

Within the Ka'bah the drapery crumbleth away: place it in the
treasury,
And, for the Prophet's tomb, two or three ells of matting send,
When thou shalt have a perfect infidel become, rush on Karkh,
And, then, the Khalīfah's head to Khitā send."²

1. Juzjānī, *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsirī*, trans. Raverty, P. 244.
Sultān Takash while dying had enjoined on his son 'Alā al-Dīn Muḥammad that the latter should never quarrel with the Khitay if he desired to preserve the safety of his dominions.

2. Juzjānī, *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsirī*, trans. Raverty, P. 243.

So hostile were the people towards the Khwārazm-shāhs that they even preferred to live under the protection of the Qārā Khitays. When Takash in 594/1197 was besieging Bukhārā, according to the uncorroborated statement of Ibn al-Athīr, the inhabitants sided with the Qārā Khitays and showed strong resistance. They expressed their contempt of the Sultān by taking a one-eyed dog and dressing it up in a caftan and high peaked cap, exhibited it on the wall, calling it the Khwārazm shāh (Takash was one eyed); after this they threw it into the Sultān's camp, crying, 'Here is your Sultān'¹. Instances are not wanting when the inhabitants of different provinces invited the Caliph Nāsir to substitute a nominee of his own for the rule of the Khwārazm-shāh;² and the murder of all the Khorezmian soldiers by the people of Hamadān after the death of Takash in 596/1199 is a sufficient proof of their hatred of the dynasty.³.

On his return from the Baghdad campaign, the opposition to Muḥammad came to a head - on the one hand, the military class headed by his mother, Turkān Khātūn, were, for reasons of their own, openly hostile to the Sultān; on the other, the 'Ulamā could hardly forgive him for the Fatwā extorted from them authorizing the deposition of the Caliph. Even his war with Chingīz Khān coul

1. Ibn Athīr, XII. P. 90.

2. Ibid. P. 76. In 591/1195 the people of Isfahān not tolerating the rule of Khwārazm-shāhs, invited the Caliph to send his representative which was done.

3. Rāwandī, P. 399.

not be represented in the colour of a religious war, since it was the slaughter, by Muhammad's governor, of a caravan consisting of none but Muslims that supplied the immediate pretext for hostilities.¹ Not only had he himself to pay the penalty for his treacherous and unscrupulous conduct, but it affected also the fortunes of his gallant son Jalāl al-Dīn, who certainly deserved a better fate. The latter was regarded with the same hostility as his father by the Muslim public and rulers, and even by the Abbasid Caliphate. When pursued by the Mongols, Jalāl al-Dīn reached Zauzān from Nishāpūr in 618/1221 and desired to fortify himself in the citadel of the town, he was forced to leave the place owing to the hostile attitude of the inhabitants.² When he approached the Caliphate for help against the Mongols, he not only failed to secure it, but had even to face an army sent by the Caliph to drive him out.³ On the other hand after the death of the Caliph Nāṣir, peace was made between him and the Caliphate in 623/1226 on the terms that the Sultān would not exercise any rights of suzerainty over certain princes who were to be considered as the feudatories of the Caliph; and that he would re-insert the Caliph's name in the public prayers in Persia whence it had been excluded by his father. The Caliph in return sent the deed of investiture for Persia to Jalāl al-Dīn, together

1. Juwaynī, I. P. 60-61; Juzjānī, *Tabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī*, trans. Raveri P. 27.

2. Juwaynī, II. P. 134.

3. Ibid. P. 154.

with some rich presents. He was styled as Khāqān, and also Shāhinshah, but the title of Sultān was not granted to him. Thence forward he called himself servant of the Caliph in his letters, and addressed the latter as his lord and master.¹ The peace was made too late and it did not serve any useful purpose for the Sultān, as the Caliph could not and the other Muslim rulers did not give him any substantial support when he was attacked by the Mongols. In 627/28-1231 he made his last and final effort to induce the Muslim rulers of Rūm and Shām to form a joint league against their common enemy, the Mongols, but jealousy and mistrust on their part prevented them from making any such useful alliance.² Finally fleeing from the Mongols, the gallant prince was murdered in Kurdistan in 628/1231.³ Thus ended the dynasty of the Khwārazmshāhs who had united under their rule most of the countries incorporated in the empire of the Saljūqs.

Though it seemed that the 'Abbasid Caliphate had thus emerged victorious and successful in its struggle with the Sultāns, it is clear in retrospect that it had lost all control over the temporal rulers in Persia. The fact that the Caliphs were now in possession of a comparatively larger area than before, should not mislead one into thinking that they had retrieved their

1. Nasavī, P. 247; Howorth, III. P. 12; D'Ohsson, Tom, III. PP. 35-37; Ibn Futi, P. 14.

2. Juzjānī, Tabaqat-i-Nasirī, Trans. Raverty, P. 298.

3. Juwaynī. II. P. 189-190.

lost position. They had acquired these possessions as temporal rulers and not, by any means, as the religious heads of Islām. The legal theory of the Caliphate had never in fact corresponded to the realities of the situation. By the doctrine of election and the assertion of a supreme religious authority it concealed the fact that the historical Caliphate had become a temporal authority supported by military force. It was thus a natural consequence that stronger powers should in time seize the temporal functions of the Caliphate. Then as always happens, a semblance of the past, a fiction is persisted in, in order to avoid a violent wrench with the past and the shock that each innovation gives to the conservative mind. Thus as the real power passes from the hands of the Caliph, the insignia of his suzerainty for the sake of form are still kept in tact. A deed of investiture is issued by the Caliph at the occasion of every new ruler, his name is placed on the coinage and recited in the Khutbā. With the lapse of time, the necessity of such a deed of investiture is felt only with the change of a dynasty, and before long, that too is dispensed with; and some sort of bare recognition, e.g. the receipt of Sultānian robes etc. from the Caliph, is considered enough. This last stage was reached during the time of the Khwārazm-shāhs. The Sultānate that had risen through its incompetence, on the other hand, had to remain

Nidhām al Mulk justifies its existence like a courtier; while Ghazzālī puts up with it as an indispensable necessity. Hence it is safe to conclude that before it came to an end, the Caliphate had ceased to exercise any influence whatsoever on the political organisation which arose in Persia. The violent end that overtook the Caliphate at the hands of the Mongols did little more than remove a phantom authority, even though, in order to appease the tender consciences of the Muslim public, the name of the Caliph had still survived in the Khutbā and coinage. A study of the political factors which obliged the Muslim Mongol rulers to reject even this privilege to the Cairine Caliphate, will be very interesting but it shall form the theme of an independent work.

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